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Taxation and Landownership in the Westernization of Japan*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Nobutaka Ike
Nobutaka Ike
Affiliation:
The Johns Hopkins University
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Extract

Japan's transformation into a modern state began shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century when she was forcibly opened to international trade. In the ensuing years, the old social, economic, and political structure was overhauled to the end that Japan might become a powerful nation able to stand on an equal footing with the more advanced Western nations. Early attention was given to land reform and peasant emancipation since the country was predominantly agricultural, with about four fifths of the population engaged in cultivating the soil. In the early 1870's the prevailing system of servile land tenure was swept away and replaced by a system of private ownership of land. Henceforth, the peasants, who had formerly held land from feudal nobles in return for certain dues and services, were given title to land on which they, as owners, paid a land tax.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , November 1947 , pp. 160 - 182
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1947

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References

1 This is a term used by Eijiro, Honjo in his The Social and Economic History of Japan (Kyoto, 1935), pp. 18–44.Google Scholar

2 Honda Masanobu, one of Iyeyasu's closest advisers, once wrote: “The peasants are the basis of the empire. There are ways of ruling them. First, clearly mark off the boundaries of each man's fields; then have each one estimate the portion of the crop necessary to feed him for a year, and make him pay the rest as land tax.”—“Hon-sa-roku” [The Record of Honda, Sado-no-kami] in Nihon Keizai Taitem [A Cyclopedia of Japanese Political Economy], edited by Seiichi, Takimoto (Tokyo, 1928), III, 21.Google Scholar Many writers characterize Honda as “Machiavellian” and Takimoto suggests the possibility that Honda was influenced by Machiavelli, although it is evident that he thinks it highly improbable. See his “Nihon Kcizai Shiso Shi” [A History of Japanese Economic Thought], in Dai Shiso Ensaikuropijia [The Great Thought Encyclopedia] (Tokyo, 1928), XV, 197–207.Google Scholar

3 “All the land in a domain was carefully surveyed by officials of the overlord, and its yield was estimated in accordance with its position, the nature of the soil, the number of its cultivators, and in certain cases the harvest obtained from a test area. The overlord then took his share of the crop, which was divided in a customary ratio, generally 'shi-kö roku-min’ or ‘four to the prince and six to the people,’ but sometimes even two to the prince and one to the people.”—Sansom, G. B., Japan, A Short Cultural History (revised edition; New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938), pp. 464–65.Google Scholar

4 The more important decrees on the control of the peasantry may be found in Iichiro, Tokutomi, Kinsei Nihon Kokumin Shi: Tokugawa Bakufu Joki [A History of the Japanese People in Modern Times: The Early Part of the Tokugawa Bakufu] (Tokyo, 1924), II, 512–30.Google Scholar

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6 The debts and paper notes issued by the nobles amounted to more than 56 million yen, while the pensions granted to the nobles and the samurai came to more than 210 million yen.—Seitaro, Yamada, Nihon Shihonshugi Bunseki [An Analysis of Japanese Capitalism] (Tokyo, 1934), p. 185.Google Scholar

7 From 1868 to 1875, 82 per cent of the ordinary revenues of the government was derived from the land tax.—Takeo, Ono, Noson Shi [A History of Japanese Agriculture], which is Volume IX in the series, Gendai Nihon Bummei Shi [A History of Contemporary Japanese Civilization] (Tokyo, 1941), p. 50.Google Scholar

8 Kanda Kohei's memorial was the first of a series on the land tax. For a detailed account, see Michio, Ono, Kinsei Noson Keizai Shiron [A History of Agricultural Economics in Modern Times], which is Volume LIX in the series, Keizaigaku Zenshu [Collected Works on Economics] (Tokyo, 1933), pp. 283 ff.Google Scholar

9 Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, pp. 45 ff.

10 Ibid., p. 46.

11 Ono Michio, Kinsei Noson Keizai Shiron, p. 302; Shiomi, Saburo, “On the Revision of the Land Tax,” Kyoto University Economic Review, IV (1929), 79.Google Scholar

12 It was assumed that one tanbu (0.245 acres) of land would yield 1.6 koku of rice worth 4.80 yen on the basis of 3 yen per koku. Fertilizer and seed (at 15 per cent) came to 0.72 yen, while die land tax and local tax amounted to 1.224 yen and 0.408 yen respectively. The net profit was 2.448 yen, which, capitalized at 6 per cent, gave 40.80 yen for the land value. According to the above calculation, the land tax and local tax required 1.632 yen or 34 per cent of the gross proceeds.—Takao, Tsuchiya and Saburo, Okazaki, Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu Shi Gaisetsu [Outline History of the Development of Japanese Capitalism] (Tokyo, 1937), P. 60;Google ScholarYoshitaro, Hirano, Nihon Shihonshugi Shakai no Kiko [The Mechanism of Japanese Capitalistic Society] (Tokyo, 1934), p. 20, and hereafter cited as NSSK.Google Scholar

13 A survey in 1874 of 3 urban and 27 rural prefectures (excluding Hokkaido where holdings are larger) revealed that the average area, including paddy and dry fields, cultivated by a family was 2.353 acres.—Norman, E. Herbert, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 153.Google Scholar

14 The following table shows the fluctuations in the price of rice in Tokyo for the year 1875. The price is for one koku:

Berijiro, Nakazawa, Nihon Beika Hendo Shi [A History of Rice Price Fluctuations in Japan] (Tokyo, 1933), p. 322.Google Scholar

15 Paul Mayet, a German agricultural adviser to the Japanese government, has said: “Since a large amount of taxes was collected all.at once, the peasants were naturally forced to put a large part of their crop on the market all at one time. All of the peasants sold their rice on the market at the same time, and hence the supply exceeded the demand. Rice dealers suddenly became speculative buyers. They watched with folded arms and waited for the price to fall still more. Yet the peasants wished to sell their rice quickly because the time for the payment of the tax approached. Therefore, the price of rice fell immediately, and unfortunately the amount of money received from the sale was indeed small.” Quoted in Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, p. 71.

16 Yeijiro, Ono citing Max Fesca in “The Industrial Transition in Japan,” Publications of the American Economic Association, I (1890), 84 n.Google Scholar

17 Eijiro, Honjo, “Meiji no Beika no Chosetsu” [Regulation of Rice Price in the Meiji Era], Keisai Ronso [Economic Review], IX (1919), p. 835.Google Scholar

18 A decree in 1872 said that those who were late in paying the land tax must pay interest of one half per cent per month, and if they had not paid by July of that year they must be declared bankrupt and the tax and interest collected.—Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, p. 73.

19 In September 1877 the government set the legal interest rate at 20 per cent for loans under 100 yen, 15 per cent for those from 100 to 1,000 yen, and 12 per cent for those over 1,000 yen. In actual practice, rates were much higher.—Mayet, Paul, Agricultural Insurance in Organic Connection with Savings-Banks, Land-Credit, and the Commutation of Debts, translated by Arthur, Lloyd (London: S. Sonnenschein and Company, 1893), pp. 110, 113.Google Scholar

20 Max Fesca has said: “From what I can see, the fact that every year tenant farmers are increasing in Japan and owner-cultivators are, on the contrary, decreasing is chiefly due to this [i.e., poor crops].” Quoted in Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, p. 72.

21 Ono Michio, Kinsei Noson Keizai Shiron, pp. 340–41; Hirano Yoshitaro, NSSK, pp. 22–23.

22 Ono Michio, Kinsei Noson Keizai Shiron, p. 383.

23 “It is said that the fact that so much of our forest and meadow land belongs to the government finds its origin in the disposition of the village common land at that time.”—Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, p. 366.

The following table will give some idea of the extent of government-owned land:

This table comes from Yoshitaro, Hirano, Meiji Ishin ni Okeru Seijiteki Shihai Keitai [The Form of Political Control in the Meiji Restoration] (Tokyo, 1932)Google Scholar a brochure in the series, Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu Shi Koza [Lectures on the. Development of Japanese Capitalism].

24 Ono Michio, Kinsei Noson Keizai Shiron, pp. 368–70, 335.

25 The following table from Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, pp. 77–78, shows the fluctuations in the price of rice:

26 Shinichi, Watanabe, Nihon Noson Jinko Ron [On Japanese Agricultural Population] (Tokyo, 1938), pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

27 Allen, G. C., A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 1867–1937 (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1946), pp. 35–36.Google Scholar

28 Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, p. 152.

29 See note 25 above.

30 See table in E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence, p. 150. n. On the amount of tenancy, see note 50 below.

31 Hirano Yoshitaro, NSSK, p. 36.

32 P. Mayet, Agricultural Insurance, pp. 148–50.

33 Hirano Yoshitaro, NSSK, p. 26.

34 Yoshitaro, Hirano, Gikai Oyobi Hosei Shi [A History of the Diet and the Legal System] (Tokyo, 1932), in the series, Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu Shi Koza, p. 45.Google Scholar

35 This is condensed from the account given in Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, pp. 99–101.

36 Wakukawa, Seiyei, “The Japanese Farm-tenancy System,” in Japan's Prospects, edited by Haring, Douglas G. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 131.Google Scholar

37 Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, pp. 157–58.

38 Tsuru, Shigeto, “Economic Fluctuations in Japan, 1868–1893,” Review of Economic Statistics, XXIII (1941), 180. Although the Japanese depression came at about the same time as the European depression, it does not seem to have been influenced to any great extent by the latter.Google Scholar

39 Zenji, Yagisawa, “Meiji Shoki no Defureshion to Nogyo Kyoko” [Deflation and Agricultural Panic in the Early Meiji Period], Shakai Keizai Shigaku [Journal of Social and Economic History], II (1932), 263.Google Scholar

40 Ibid., pp. 264–65.

41 According to the original law which established the tax system, the tax was to be lowered eventually and the land revalued for tax purposes. In 1880 when the time came for revaluation, some adjustments were made in a few areas, but nationwide revaluation was postponed. In 1884, a new decree on the land tax omitted the clause that promised reduction to 1 per cent. Reduction of the land tax was opposed by Iwakura Tomomi, who said that the object of taxes was to build up a powerful country, and by Matsukata, who argued that the land tax must provide a large part of die revenue since industry and commerce were not flourishing.—Ono Michio, Kinsei Noson Keizai Shiron, pp. 308–17.

42 Adapted from the table in Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, p. 118

43 Ono Takeo, Noton Shi, pp. 281–85.

44 In 1880, the law permitting delay in the payment of the land tax was repealed and replaced by a system of loans. The government appropriated 1,200,000 yen for a loan fund to which peasants were to make payments. In times of need loans were made from this fund.—Ono Michio, Kinsei Noson Keisai Shiron, pp. 335–36.

45 Mayet's figures cited by E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence, p. 144.

46 This is based on Hirano's figures as cited by Ono Michio, Kinsei Noton Keizai Shiron, PP. 397–98, and on Watanabe Shinichi, Nihon Noson Jinko Ron, p. 34.

47 Ono Michio, Kinsei Noson Keizai Shiron, p. 398.

48 Most of the standard works on Japanese political and constitutional history deal with these revolts. Particularly useful are Junichiro, Otsu, Dai Nihon Kensei Shi [Comprehensive Constitutional History of Japan] (Tokyo, 1927), Vol. II;Google ScholarTaisuke, Itagaki, Jiyuto Shi [History of the Liberal Party] (Tokyo, 1910), Vol. II.Google Scholar

49 Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, p. 58.

50 Susumu, Inaoka, Nomin no Jatai Oyobi Nomin Undo Shi [A Short History of the Condiiton of the Peasantry and Agricultural Movements] (Tokyo, 1932), p. 8. This is another in the series of brochures issued under the general title, Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu Shi Koza.Google Scholar

51 E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence, pp. 146–47.

52 From the table in Ono Takeo, Noson Shi, pp. 67–68.

53 Ibid., p. 171.

54 Ibid., p. 172.

55 Ibid., pp. 173–74.

56 Ibid., p. 181.

57 Ibid., p. 178.

58 P. Mayet, Agricultural Insurance, p. 67.

59 For this section I am heavily indebted to Chapter 5 of E. Herbert Norman's Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, which pioneered in the use of Japanese sources.

60 One method of intensifying agriculture is to plant crops that require more labor but yield a larger gross return. For instance, hemp requires six times as much labor as upland rice and so is unprofitable in terms of labor expended, but it produces a larger gross income. See H., Jsobe, “Labor Conditions in Japanese Agriculture,” Bulletin of the Utsunomiya Agricultural College, II (1937), 57–58.Google Scholar

61 Tsuru, Shigeto, “Economic Fluctuations in Japan, 1868–1893,” Review of Economic Statistics, XXIII (1941), 180.Google Scholar

62 Yasuzo, Horie, “An Outline of the Rise of Modern Capitalism in Japan,” Kyoto University Economic Review, XI (1930), 109.Google Scholar

63 E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence, p. 158.

64 Ibid.. p. 159.

65 Ibid.

66 “Men. Yen and Machines,” Fortune, XIV (September 1936), 132.Google Scholar

67 Paul Mayet once estimated that the annual income of a tenant farmer, including income from subsidiary occupations, was between 44 and 66 yen; of a landowning peasant, 54 and 59 yen. Yasuzo, Horie, “The Development of the Domestic Market in the Early Years of Meiji,” Kyoto University Economic Review, XV (1940), 57.Google Scholar This is more or less substantiated by the autobiography of Sakai Toshihiko, the well-known Japanese socials:, who states that his family, which was one of the poorer samurai families, was able to get along on 5 yen a month.—Sakai Toshiko Den [The Biography of Sakai Toshihiko], in Gendai Nihon Bungaku Zenshu [Collected Works on Modern Japanese Literature] (Tokyo, 1930), XXXIX, 261.Google Scholar

68 “Whereas wage-earning labourers, who possess neither the sources of livelihood nor the means of production, spend their earnings on capitalistic commodities, tenant farmers who possess some of the sources of livelihood and certain productive media and who, besides, carry on various kinds of subsidiary industry, spend comparatively little in the purchase of commodities, especially as they get along with very little in the way of money.”—Yasuzo, Horie, “Rise of Modern Capitalism in Japan,” Kyoto University Economic Review, XI (1930), 58.Google Scholar

69 Taking the year 1882 as 100, the production of cotton yarn increased to 308.7 in 1887, 424.7 in 1888, 893.7 in 1889, and 1,397.4 in 1890.—Takako, Sampei, Nihon Mengyo Hattatsu Shi [History of the Development of the Japanese Cotton Industry] (Tokyo, 1941), p. 70.Google Scholar

70 The text of this agreement is given in Ibid., pp. 71–72.

71 “Victory in the Sino-Japanese war not only created the basis for the acquisition of raw materials for the development of Japanese industry—in actual practice the acquisition of Formosa and the nominal independence of Korea, which were the results of the Sino-Japanese war, were inadequate for obtaining raw materials—but also partly satisfied the demand for opening markets. That is, the export of Japanese cotton wear was made easier by the Treaty of Shimonoseki which opened Soochow and Hankow to foreign trade and gave Japan monopoly in the Korean market, and the right of navigation in the Yangtse river together with special commercial and industrial rights in the region, as well as by the creation of steamship lines to China. Hence victory in the Sino-Japanese war was of service in solving the serious problem of over-production [whose solution was necessary] for the development of the spinning industry, the progenitor of light industry, and a key industry in the growth of Japanese capitalism.”—Ibid., pp. 91–92.