Other than during the Civil War of 1945–1949, Taiwan has never been part of a Chinese state ruled by Han Chinese in Mainland China. With the arrival of the Dutch in 1624, Taiwan underwent a succession of six foreign colonial rulers: the Dutch (1624–1662), the Spanish (in northern Taiwan, 1626–1642), the Cheng family (1662–1683), the Manchus (1683–1895), the Japanese (1895–1945), and the Chinese Nationalists (1945–1988). Only with democratization, beginning in 1988, have the people of Taiwan been able to rule themselves. With democratization, the people of Taiwan have increasingly identified as Taiwanese, an identification that is explicitly not Chinese. China's racial appeals to Taiwan are scientifically inaccurate and have no place in the modern world. In order to gain international support, Taiwan's leaders and people need to avoid the Chinese framework of ‘independence’ versus ‘unification’. Rather, they should emphasize Taiwan's decolonialization, a process that Taiwan shares with much of the world.

The success of India's democracy hinges on the pivotal role played by its auxiliary institutions in negotiating major challenges through slow and persistent transformation. However, an objective audit of the performance of these institutions in the recent past would indicate a decline in operations and an acute crisis of corruption. Key institutions responsible for governance – Parliament, civil services, judiciary, the Election Commission, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Central Vigilance Commission, and the Comptroller and Auditor General – have been put under the spotlight by an alert and mobilized civil society, urging immediate measures for ensuring their operational efficiency and integrity. This essay undertakes a critical examination of the present performance and efficiency of major democratic institutions in India, in the light of their prescribed roles and the malaise of corruption that plagues them. It argues that in order to articulate a comprehensive institutional response to the problem, relevant measures of political reform and constant vigil by civil society would prove crucial. The article is divided into six sections; first, a brief outline of the structure and changing nature of the institutional political set-up in India is provided; the second section examines the existing literature on ‘corruption’, and the third section highlights the increasing incidence of corruption in India at various politico-administrative tiers. The fourth section delineates the inception and role of anti-corruption institutions in India, signifying the early response to corruption. The fifth section critically reviews the theoretical and statistical evidence of performance-decline in the major institutions at present and gauges the potency of corruption; the sixth section explores the existing and prospective institutional responses for tackling corruption and the final section presents concluding observations.

While 3/11 has altered energy policies around the world, insufficient attention has focused on reactions from local nuclear power plant host communities and their neighbors throughout Japan. Using site visits to such towns, interviews with relevant actors, and secondary and tertiary literature, this article investigates the community crisis management strategies of two types of cities, towns, and villages: those which have nuclear plants directly in their backyards and neighboring cities further away (within a 30 mile radius). Responses to the disaster have varied with distance to nuclear facilities but in a way contrary to the standard theories based on the concept of the ‘distance decay function’. Officials in communities directly proximal to nuclear power plants by and large remain supportive of Japan's nuclear power program, while those in cities and towns at a distance (along with much of the general public) have displayed strong opposition to the pre 3/11 status quo. Using qualitative data, this article underscores how national energy and crisis response policies rest strongly on the political economy, experiences of, and decisions made at the subnational level.

When a central government deals with local demands, it may strengthen political accountability of the local governments by political decentralization or offer benefits through economic assistance. An authoritarian regime uses economic assistance policy because political decentralization may contradict regime survival. Although economic benefits can be used to buy political support, the distribution of these benefits is seldom equal. We argue that the unequal distribution is more salient in regions where ethnic minorities reside because the unusual demographic composition of those areas make it difficult for the national government to evaluate the performance of the local government who is responsible for the distribution of the economic benefits. As a result, economic assistance may backfire in ethnic regions and intensify their existing conflicts. We develop a simple formal model to illustrate our arguments and explore the cases of Xinjiang and Hong Kong for empirical analysis.

Based on data collected from a representative-sample survey conducted in five Chinese cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Hangzhou) in the middle of 2008, this study examines the behavioral orientations of Chinese middle class toward the local elections which are held in urban areas, and the attitudinal orientations of Chinese middle class toward the current regime. The results indicate that there is a strong division within the group of the middle class, especially along the lines of the relationship with the state. Therefore, this study suggests that the Chinese middle class is a class without a shared class identity.

Thus far, recent protests in the Arab world have led to different political outcomes including regime change, civil war, and suppression by regime. The present paper explores the reasons behind these different outcomes. The research methodology is a comparative case study approach, and five countries of Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria are examined. The hypothesis is that the different political outcomes of the protests are due to a combination of factors, including the level of mobilization of anti-regime movements, the responses of national militaries, and finally the reaction of international powers. Different configurations of these components in the crisis-stricken countries have led to different political outcomes.