When we examine the quality of life for each individual, several specific dimensions need to be considered. Health conditions and quality of family relationships are critical. When the individual in question is married, his/her marital quality is important. When he/she has a job, subjective assessment of that job is important. Social relationships regarding friends, neighbors, colleagues, relatives, etc. may be critical also. Although the quality of life is more than the sum of qualities of these specific areas of one's life, it is still determined to a great extent by the qualities of these sub-areas, including marital and family relationships (Proulx et al., 2007).

The thesis that ‘Asian’ cultures oppose the ‘Western’ emphasis on emancipative values and liberal democracy has mostly been criticized for its political instrumentality. By contrast, the empirical claim about most Asians’ dismissal of emancipative values and liberal democracy has not been tested on a broadly cross-cultural basis. Filling this gap, this article uses data from the World Values Surveys to put the values of Asian populations into global perspective. As a result, the differences between Asian and Western populations over emancipative values and liberal democracy appear to be gradual, not categorical. What is more, the forces of modernization that gave rise to emancipative values and a liberal notion of democracy in the ‘West’, are doing the same in the ‘East’, confirming a universal model of human development rather than Asian exceptionalism, or any other form of cultural exceptionalism.

Most of the current scholarship focuses on the functional aspects of regionalism such as economic and security issues, and the literature tends to be too focused on American or European concerns (Katzenstein, 2005; Higgott, 2007; Ravenhill, 2008). Despite the early examination of varied ideas of Asian regionalism (Milner and Johnson 1997, He, 2004, Acharya 2009), there remains a substantive lack of critical scholarship that focuses on the study of Asian ideas, proposals, and visions of regionalism.

Both general publics and elites have long used labels of left and right as cues for political communication and vote choice in Western democracies. This study examines the utility of these spatial semantics as means of encapsulating major political cleavages in East Asian democracies. Through analysis of public opinion surveys, we investigate the influence of organizational affiliation; views on socio-economic, religious, and ‘new politics’ issues, as well as attitudes toward the political system, as anchors of public understanding of the left–right dimension in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Patterns found in these countries are compared with two ‘Western’ nations in the region, Australia and New Zealand. Results show that citizens’ left–right positions in Japan and the Australasian countries are more clearly structured by well-defined cleavages, such as socio-economic issues and post-materialism, and that parties in these countries compete on the basis of clearer ideological profiles. In contrast, despite high rates of cognition of the left–right scale in South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, left–right orientations are less firmly anchored in attitudes and policy preferences. These differences in publics’ level of ideological conceptualization are likely related to party system development and democratic experience.

This article examines whether democracy affects quality of life. Scholars have conducted surveys to investigate whether democracy is likely to lead to good quality of life. There are two contested views to the relationship: some suggest that democracy has a positive causal effect on quality of life, whereas others contend that democracy does not play such a role. Previous findings are supported by cross-national statistical analysis with aggregated survey data. However, aggregated survey data may cause ecological fallacy. Also, in order to ascertain the extant research, it would be beneficial to test the hypothesis by incorporating both individual- and country-level variables. Therefore, this paper applied hierarchical modeling to investigate the regularity. Both individual-level perception of democracy and country-level political regime data were incorporated in our empirical model. Our findings suggest that individual-level satisfaction with democracy has positive causal effect on one's quality of life, whereas the country-level characteristic of the political regime has no effect.

While the United States is an important Asia-Pacific actor, its engagement with the region is complex and often difficult. Not only must US regionalism balance the diverse requirements of an ambitious policy agenda, but also US policy norms and priorities often clash with those of other regional actors. This has important implications for the capacity of the United States to provide regional leadership. Recent years have seen growing policy convergence between the United States and other Asia-Pacific actors, particularly in economic terms, but US regionalism continues to feature competition alongside collaboration.

In Japan, electoral campaigning in plurality districts often appears strangely ineffective to observers. In their explanations, political scientists have so far fallen back on the proximate cause, namely the strict Public Office Election Law (Kōshoku senkyo-hō), claiming that it is this law that prohibits different and more effective campaigning. This study, however, is based on the assumption that such an explanation could be insufficient since even those campaign tactics legally allowed are often executed and/or selected in an apparently ineffective way in terms of their appeal to voters. Especially when looked at from the perspective of structural learning theory, which assumes that actors adapt their behavior within stable structures by learning what works well and what does not, these observations invite further investigation.

As a first step, participant observation was used to identify types of apparently ineffective campaigning. In the second step, these types were discussed in qualitative interviews with candidates and other practitioners. The results show that next to appealing to voters there are other campaign goals that can determine the choice of electoral instruments: motivating campaign staffers, maintaining good working relationships with external helpers, presenting political convictions and personal determination. This explains part of the assumed ineffectiveness, but not all of it. When seen through the lens of structural learning theory research findings suggest that the lack of clear feedback regarding the impact of campaign activities on voters inhibits the learning processes of candidates. In combination with constraints regarding time, place and/or resources, these factors shape election campaigning to a considerable degree. Consequently, this study suggests that explanations need to take more factors into account than just the Public Office Election Law in order to solve the puzzle of ineffective campaigning in Japan.

As a rising power, China has become actively involved in regional bilateral/multilateral arrangements in the post-Cold War, especially post-crisis (1997– 98 financial crises) era, and this has attracted much attention from within and outside East Asia. Diverse understandings of China's regional ambition have appeared, especially since the launch of the China-ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA). Aiming at deciphering the ideas behind China's regional thinking, this paper argues that China's perspective on regionalism is a broadened economic regionalism, which is basically economic-centered, because economic performance is vital both to its long-term strategic target and to its internal social stability. This economic regionalism will last for some time because China will be a developing country at least in the mid-term, which means China will have to focus more on its economic performance. In practice, China will engage bilaterally or multilaterally with others through its FTA strategy. Thus, China cannot be a main contributor to East Asian integration as expected, owing to the inward-looking nature of its economic regionalism. Also, the institutional integration of East Asia needs the effort of all the players in the region.

Our paper reports and discusses issues relating to subjective wellbeing in selected countries in ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations), a regional organization that coordinates and promotes the economic, social and cultural interests of member countries in Southeast Asia. Comparisons will be made across the five founding members of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand using data from the 2004, 2006 and 2007 AsiaBarometer Surveys. The indicators of subjective wellbeing used are perceptions of happiness, enjoyment, and achievement. We also examined the impact of selected demographic and non-demographic variables on these indicators.

After being at the periphery for decades, India's proactive engagement with East and Southeast Asia has gradually transformed it into an active participant in Asian regional organizations and multilateral processes. This paper examines early Indian attempts at forging pan-Asian unity and assesses the motivations and impact of its Look East Policy. It evaluates India's changing role towards regional cooperation in South Asia and sub-regional groupings, the impact of domestic politics, and discusses how China has influenced Indian perceptions and strategy towards Asian regionalism. After a long gap, India is again contributing ideas on Asian integration and stresses that the broader East Asian integration process should remain open and inclusive.

This article addresses the complexities of institutional transfer by exploring the case of EMILY's List and WIN WIN, two women's organizations in the US and Japan respectively that seek to increase the number of women in office by providing funds early in candidates’ campaigns. Specifically, it asks why WIN WIN has struggled to successfully implement the EMILY's List model in Japan. This article argues that differing institutional environments and cultures have less explanatory power than decisions made at the organization level. In particular, while differences in the political funding regimes and so-called ‘cultures of giving’ exist, they do not necessarily preclude the success of an EMILY's List-type organization in Japan. Instead, WIN WIN made significant strategic organizational decisions that have impeded its ability to have a significant impact on female candidacy at the national level. Specifically, WIN WIN's lack of accountability to its members combined with its broader commitment to gender consciousness have limited its success.

This article attempts to answer why some countries experience the recurrence of civil war and others do not. One of the most significant differences between civil war onset and its recurrence is that the latter has once experienced termination of civil war, while the former has not. To find the cause of recurrence, this article examines how different war termination types influence the duration of post-civil war peace. Duration analysis of the civil wars between 1944 and 1999 shows that military victory, supported by peacekeeping operations or power-sharing arrangements, leads to the most durable peace in a post-civil war country. Contrary to the accepted wisdom, negotiated peace settlement, even when supported by peacekeeping operations or power-sharing arrangements, is not positively related to post-conflict peace.

Japan is geographically located on the fringe of Asia. Japan's location is often divided between those arguing that Japan is inside Asia and those arguing it is outside Asia. Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism are thus immensely varied. This article details a number of Japanese ideas on Asian regionalism with author/agency, scope and method specified. Special mention is made of weak integration of government agencies, thus causing proliferation of many Japanese ideas within Asia. With the increasing self-assertiveness of China, the apparent peaking out of American hegemony, and the steady rise of non-Chinese Asians, Japan tries to maintain enduring alliance with the United States, to invigorate interdependence with China, and to reinvent new relationships with the countries of the East Asian Summit. Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism take those templates as guidelines to develop new ideas of Asian regionalism.

The bilateral relationship between China and Myanmar is important and intricate despite being asymmetrical in China's favour. Whereas most observers regard the relationship as being heavily weighted in China's favour, Myanmar does have a fair amount of latitude within the relationship that is informed by historical, economic, and strategic considerations. The nationalism and xenophobia present in the attitudes of elite from the Myanmar military junta is both recognized and understood by China that is keen to have a stable peripheral environment. There are also important security issues such as the ethnic armies that currently have a ceasefire arrangement with the junta along the border areas that need to be resolved in a coordinated fashion to prevent negative spillage into China. In light of such special idiosyncratic and terrain considerations, Myanmar wields relative independence within this asymmetrical relationship.

Within a one-dimensional spatial framework, we deduce that parties’ incentives ‘to go negative’, by blaming alleged insufficiencies of the rival concerning commonly shared values, increase with their ideological proximity. We test our hypothesis by considering the long period of no-cabinet alternation that characterized both Italy and Japan. In particular, we focus on the (spatial) incentives of the Italian Communist Party and of the Japanese Socialist Party to emphasize on a particular topic related to negative campaigning, i.e. political corruption issues. The status of the perennial opposition held by both parties, together with the existence of several political corruption scandals during the period considered, makes the Italian and the Japanese political systems particularly apt to test our hypothesis. The results, based on data derived from electoral programs, support our theoretical insights.

In the past decade, ASEAN has been the primary driver of East Asian regionalism, and Korea has been an active supporter of ASEAN plus Three. Korea has explored the idea of an East Asian Community, and has been relatively open to notions of Asia–Pacific regionalism. The ROK has involved itself comparatively heavily in regional projects as both an initiator and a participant, but its notion of ‘region’ has oscillated between more and less inclusive forms of regionalism. This article examines how competing conceptions of region have influenced Korea's pursuit of regional initiatives. By revisiting historical understandings of Korea's regional identity, we explore the normative bases and material interests which motivate Korean regional initiatives, and assess the impact of its proposals.

This attempts to explain the limited political incorporation of Latin American Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants) (LAN) in Japan 1990–2004. A 1990 reform provides Nikkeijin a renewable visa that has enabled some 300,000 LAN to emigrate to Japan on the basis of Japanese blood descent or ethnicity.1 Long-term marginalized minority groups, such as Zainichi Koreans and Chinese,2 are comparatively better incorporated in Japan's political system and their demands increasingly recognized as more legitimate. I argue Japan's changing ethnic citizenship regime, political opportunity structure, and structure of civil society combined with LAN language difficulties, newness of residence, small size, low minority status, and powerful myth of return limits their immigrant political incorporation in Japan.

The debate over the future of East Asian democracy centers largely on the fit between democratic values and the Confucian way of life. Some interpret Confucianism's hierarchical, communitarian, and anti-pluralistic values as a roadblock to democratic consolidation. Others interpret the Confucian traditions of dissent and accountability as comparable to liberal institutions. This article surveys this scholarly debate by dividing the literature into three theoretical camps: compatibility, incompatibility, and convergence. Additionally, the few available empirical works on the Confucian-democratic dynamic are discussed and the findings are applied to the three categorizations. This review article maintains that a consensus on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy remains elusive due to the divergent conceptualizations and operationalizations of the two doctrines.