Although any typology of constructivism might be arbitrary, there are, broadly speaking, two distinctive constructivist approaches in security studies as well as International Relations (IR) according to their different meta-theoretical stances: conventional constructivism, on the one hand, and critical constructivism on the other. Indeed, regarding how to understand state identity which is integral to national security, there has meta-theoretically been fierce contention between conventional and critical constructivist security studies. In not ignoring but slightly toning down this contention operating at the abstract level, this article aims to present a pragmatic application of the two different (or conflicting) constructivisms to capturing a more complete picture of state identity formation in substantive empirical research of constructivist security studies. The pragmatic approach is that, without being immersed heavily in the meta-theoretical strife between the two seemingly conflicting constructivist camps, both constructivisms should be treated as different analytical frameworks for examining different (internal and external) faces of state identity formation: the external construction of state identity can be well addressed by conventional constructivism, while the internal one by critical constructivism. In this sense, the relationship between conventional and critical constructivism can be understood as not conflicting but complementary in empirical research, as both constructivisms enrich and deepen our understanding of state identity formation in different ways.

This special issue focuses on the role of civil society in international relations. It highlights the dynamics and impacts of public opinion on international relations (Zaller, 1992). Until recently, it was usual to consider public opinion in terms of its influence on policy makers and in terms of moulding public opinion in the broad frame of the policy makers in one's country. Given that public opinion in the United States was assessed and judged so frequently and diffused so globally, it was natural to frame questions guided by those concepts which pertained to the global and domestic context of the United States.

Studies of foreign countries often depend on the lure of the image of an unknown market. The lure of the China market led King George III to send his emissary, Lord MacCartney, to China to meet Emperor Jianlung in 1793 and to give the Emperor a letter as well as an enormous collection of gifts. The purpose of this envoy to China was to convince the Emperor to ease restrictions on trade between Great Britain and China. In 1816, in the chronicles of Emperor Jiaqing, foreign countries were categorized in two ways: tributary countries and trading countries. By tributary country is meant a country, usually a smaller and less-advanced country, which pays loyal respect and is compliant and in return is given many rare and precious gifts, and is thus bestowed a position in what is considered as the Pax Sinica (Latin for Chinese Peace). By trading country is meant a country which is devoid of the meaning in the Pax Sinica in Chinese understanding. England was categorized as a tributary country, whereas in English history England was portrayed as one of the Western countries which tried to open the country and ports, thereby expanding its commercial ties. According to the Jiaqing huidian (imperial chronicles) England, Korea, and Vietnam are categorized as tributary countries, whereas France, the Netherlands, and Japan are categorized as a trading countries. During most of the Qing period (1644–1911), Japan adopted the system of trading with foreign countries whereby the Tokugawa central government monopolized external commerce, which traded only with Dutch and Chinese merchants. In 1949, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed to change the content of history. Instead of tributary-networked Pax Sinica, Western and later Japanese imperialism and colonialism started the destruction of the Pax Sinica which was replaced by Western hegemony spearheaded by England.

When the Soviet Union fell in 1990, three of its 15 components, the Baltic States, joined the European Union, and a fourth, Moldova, may well join in the future. The other 11 quickly became presidential republics, following the lead given by Boris Yeltsin, the president of the largest among them, Russia. By 1994, all 11 were headed by a president elected by universal suffrage. These ex-Soviet countries contribute significantly to the number of presidential republics in the world. Presidential republics form a clear majority, being predominant in Latin America and Africa, alongside the ex-Soviet Union. They are rare in Europe, the main cases being France, Romania, and, though seemingly temporarily, some Balkan states; in Asia, outside the ex-Soviet Union, they are a small minority.

Like many presidential republics elsewhere, those in the ex-Soviet Union are mostly authoritarian, but with variations: this is primarily so in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan and Belarus. These presidencies have been very stable, with some of their leaders, especially in Central Asia, being repeatedly re-elected, often without opposition. There has been a regular turnover in Armenia (but less so in Georgia) and in Ukraine (but not in Belarus). The Russian case is peculiar, as is well known: Putin became prime minister because he could no longer be constitutionally re-elected as president, at least without a break. The power of these presidents has varied over time: outside Central Asia (except Kyrgyzstan) and Azerbaijan, where they have been uniformly strong, their strength has declined in Georgia, increased in Russia and Belarus, and had ups and downs in Armenia and Ukraine.

Mixed member legislative systems have proliferated in the last twenty years, and while our knowledge of the institutional impacts has grown, we have had difficulty in separating institutional and contextual (namely party) influences. Through an analysis of Taiwan before and after the implementation of a mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system, the level of contamination between tiers and variance between parties becomes clearer. Survey results show a marked shift in constituency focus for district candidates, moving from multimember to single-member districts, while party list seats focus on district factors at higher rates post-reform. Variance between the two major parties further suggests differing levels of party pressure.

Chinese influence in Asia is complicated by many factors. There are those who argue that China's growing military and economic power make this influence an automatic threat, while others maintain that China's recent attempts at a ‘charm offensive’ mute this threat and have succeeded in creating a positive image for many of its regional neighbors. Drawing on survey data collected across 23 countries, we enter this debate by asking what individuals in and across Asia think about Chinese influence. Do they see this influence as positive or negative? What factors at the individual and national levels most clearly shape their perceptions? Using multilevel statistical analysis, we find that Asian opinions of Chinese influence are on the whole quite positive and are influenced by a range of factors, including foreign policy interest, national identification, foreign contact, and recent military conflict.

The failure to reconcile views of the past and to address historical injustice has damaged inter-state relations in Northeast Asia. Joint committees, dialogues, and the participation of civil society have been used to address historical issues, but scholars in the disciplines of international relations and area studies have largely ignored these dialogues and deliberative forums. At the same time, there is an emergent theoretical literature on how deliberative democracy can address ethnic conflicts and historical injustice. There is a serious disconnect or distance between the theoretical literature on the resolution of conflicts via deliberation on the one hand, and empirical studies of deliberative approach in East Asia on the other. This article aims to address this shortcoming in the study of the politics of historical dispute in Northeast Asia by proposing a deliberative approach to history disputes and highlighting the achievements, limits, and dynamics of deliberation. Through mapping and comparative testing, we confirm that deliberation offers some potential for a departure from nationalist mentalities and a shift towards a consciousness of regional history in Northeast Asia. Our empirical test of the utility of the deliberative approach suggests that a new model for addressing regional disputes may be emerging.

Japanese sociologists’ work on Japanese society from 2005 through 2010 is critically examined. Articles published in the Japanese Sociological Review (JSR) during this period are analyzed along with books reviewed in the same journal. These publications are classified by their substantive areas and types of inquiries (quantitative, qualitative, theory, etc.). ‘Culture and social consciousness’ is the area where the largest numbers of articles and books have been recognized by JSR, followed by ‘class, stratification, and mobility’ and ‘industry, labor, and organization’. Overall characteristics of sociological studies of Japanese society in Japan are summarized. The discrepancy between contemporary social phenomena and sociological research is also noted, using an example of freeters and neets, among others.

Using 2003 Asian Barometer Survey study data, this paper examines the economic voting model in the 2002 presidential election in South Korea. The core emphasis of the paper is on an investigation of the relative effects of different dimensions/scopes of economic evaluations on voting behavior, namely whether one form of assessment (e.g., pocketbook vs. sociotropic) can have similar consequences for electoral participation as others. The findings indicate that the overall economy is salient for Koreans to shape their political choices. In other words, voting behavior in Korea depends on how she or he thinks the national economy has been for the past five years. Also found is that voters’ perceptions of their own personal financial situations did not matter much as a predictor of voter choice.

A series of Six-Party Talks involving the United States, China, Japan, South and North Korea, and Russia resulted in the emergence of a narrative of a ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’. Given the prevalence of nuclear weapons amidst Sino-American rivalry, the area is hardly ‘nuclear-free’. Instead, the phrase has evolved into a common signifier for the US and China, suggesting that, despite their rivalries, the North Korean nuclear issue can be detrimental for both – a rare convergence of interests in an often sensitive bilateral relationship. This article provides a Constructivist perspective to this particular aspect of Sino-American balance of power by taking the language of ‘nuclear-free’ seriously, recasting the phrase as borne of both mutual scepticism, as well as convergent interests, over the Korean Peninsula.

The aim of this short essay is to further reflect on sociology in Japan by supplementing discussions on the three sociological papers compiled in this volume and adding critical perspectives. Discussions, and arguments, will be provided on the three thematic categories, namely, ‘international sociology’, sociology of culture as well as language use, and the global academic market, the latter addressing not merely sociology but also other social sciences.

In what countries and among which individuals in Asia is China's influence seen as least favorable? Drawing upon AsiaBarometer survey data from 12 Asian societies between 2006 and 2008, this study tests a series of hypotheses aimed at identifying those variables that most consistently predict individuals’ perceptions of China. With the exceptions of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, a clear plurality or a majority of respondents in each polity views China's influence positively. Concerns about domestic economic management were most consistently associated with perceptions of China that are more unfavorable, while greater levels of contact with the Chinese film and television culture were consistently associated with perceptions of China that are more favorable. These results suggest that China is more likely to be seen as an economic rather than military threat by Asian publics, and that Asia may prove responsive to a nuanced soft power campaign by Beijing in the future.

Despite Australia's increasing economic ties with Asia, little is known about how it is perceived by the typical citizen in the region. This paper seeks to contribute to the Australian discussion on ‘Asian engagement’, as well as to a general understanding of the structure of foreign policy beliefs, by examining perceptions of Australia's influence among the mass publics of 14 Asian polities. Despite some anxiety in Australia on national op-ed pages and among political leaders over how the country is perceived, we find that the average person in Asia probably does not have a strong or meaningful opinion about Australia's foreign policy. Using survey data covering the years 2006 through 2008 from the AsiaBarometer project, we find that, on average, far more people view Australia's influence on their country favorably (40.5%) than view it unfavorably (6.1%). A similar percentage (41.5%), however, have neutral views of Australia's influence, and 12% of people in Asian nations express no opinion on the topic. We suggest these high frequencies of neutral perceptions and non-response are evidence of considerable indifference towards Australia. Furthermore, we investigate the correlates of perceptions of Australia's influence and find that in almost all cases citizens’ views about US and Chinese influence on their country are much better predictors of their views of Australia's influence than core values, identity, information, and demographic characteristics. We posit that opinions about Australia, even those that are favorable, may have less to do with perceptions of Australia specifically, and more to do with respondents’ general internationalist sentiment or perceptions of major powers.

Success in SNTV requires not merely winning but also coordinating votes. Governing parties often reap coordination advantage thanks to their control of the state and its resources. Since governing parties in authoritarian states enjoy greater control over the state and its resources, we argue that they should also enjoy magnified coordinative advantages in SNTV election. Of course, authoritarian regimes often use state resources to win more votes; we argue that, in SNTV, in addition to winning more votes, those votes can also be distributed more effectively. We demonstrate our claims using election data from both local and national SNTV elections in Taiwan from 1954 to 2005.

This paper reviews the studies of Japanese society and culture undertaken by Hong Kong-based sociologists and scholars in related disciplines. It presents information on research projects funded by the Research Grants Council, Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), and Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI) journal articles, authored and edited books, book chapters, non-SSCI and non-A&HCI journal articles, as well as master and doctoral theses written by scholars and graduate students associated with Hong Kong's major universities. It is found that the main topics of research are Japan's capitalist development and corporate growth, meanings and social ramifications of traditional and popular culture, education, gender, and marriage, as well as aspects of work and employment, whereas the major research methods include document analysis, ethnography, and in-depth interviews. The limited amount of research and the preoccupation with economic development and popular culture reflect in part Hong Kong's unique political conditions and the government's indifference to the pursuit of social and political policy analysis. In recent years, the growth of academic exchanges between scholars in Hong Kong, Japan, and other East Asian regions and the heightened emphasis by university administrators on academic research will hopefully bring about advancements in such academic endeavors.

This article deals with the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a point of contention in US relations with Germany and Japan. Both countries rank among America's closest allies, but – quite contrary to the US – they have also been supporting the establishment and operation of the ICC, although each to a different extent. The article analyzes the reasons for the three countries’ diverging attitudes and policies towards the establishment and operation of the Court, and contrasts Germany's and Japan's handling of the ICC issue vis-à-vis the US. It suggests that Berlin's idealistic position and full ICC support on the one hand, as well as Japan's cautious and pragmatic approach on the other, are both rooted not only in their individual evaluations of the ICC's institutional design, but also the varying degrees of their bi/multilateral orientation and the extent of their ‘dependence’ on US security commitments.

There is a question that has not been raised in the literature on Japan's regionalism: Why does it have a strong tendency toward making the boundary of the proposed East Asian community fluid? By looking back beyond the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1940s, a method hitherto untried, the paper shows that this Japanese propensity was also present in the first half of the twentieth century, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, both then and now, Japan did not and does not have a firm adherence to an ideology. These are two similarities between the pre-World War II period and the present (from the 1960s). On the other hand, Japan's present international situation is very different from its pre-World War II position. The paper uses the logic of the ‘most different cases’ comparative method, which states that in two cases that are different in most aspects but the same in some, one or some of the similarities may explain the other similarity or similarities. It concludes that in both periods, the lack of a firm commitment to an ideology explains Japan's prejudice toward boundary fluidity. This explanation has the potential to contribute to a more comprehensive, if not yet a general theory of Japan's approach to regionalism because it applies not only to the present, but to the past as well. And it has to be stressed, the past refers not only to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1940s but also to the decades before.

During 1980–90, Japan's annual real GDP growth rate was 4.6%, but which declined to 1.2% in the 1990s. While the drop in itself is a problem, at the same time it exacerbated many other problems, namely inequality, budget deficits, and the increasing burden of an aging society.

Society is not concerned about income distribution when the economy is growing, but begins to worry about inequality when an economic slump shows no signs of ending. Moreover, prolonged recession magnifies inequality. With the employment situation surrounding young people worsening, there arose an inequality between those finding jobs and those unemployed. And, the prolonged recession led to a huge budget deficit and the accumulation of government debt. Tax revenue shrank, and the government repeatedly increased public investment in the form of economic stimulus measures, but the Japanese economy did not recover in a sustained fashion.

Japan's low growth has already continued for 20 years. Incomes of the younger and middle-aged segments of the population have not increased. Additionally, Japan is an aging society. The aged need pensions, and medical treatment and care, costs which must be borne by younger and middle-aged segments of the population, in fact those who have not experienced Japan's prosperous times.

This paper discusses issues relating to the Great Recession, inequality, and the budget deficit and burden of an aging population.

Japan's Great Recession is basically explained by monetary shocks. Just the bubble and its bursting are not solely responsible for the prolonged slump. There is no empirical evidence for the assertion that certain structural problems lessened the efficiency of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. TFP (total factor productivity) in the 1990s did not decline compared with the early 1980s. Fiscal policy and the diminution of the financial intermediary function can only explain the Great Recession in small part.

The absence of any real monetary policy hampered economic growth through the channels of stock prices and improvement in bank balance sheets. Using vector autoregressive models, the exchange rate was not found to be an important channel of monetary policy, but there is some evidence that it significantly affected output.

On inequality problems, that among younger generations is important since it will increase inequality in the future. Japan's economy will stagnate for a long time if the young are not employed and cannot garner skills.

Another important point is that the way of maintaining social stability and alleviating inequality in Japan is extremely inefficient. To construct useless dams, roads, ports, and airports is extremely costly just to give jobs to the unemployed. It would be much better to give direct assistance to those in need.

There is some reason to think that a budget deficit is not so serious a problem as generally believed, and that the important thing is to cut wasteful government expenditure and not raise government revenue. While I admit this argument carries some weight, there is nevertheless good reason to think that it is necessary to reduce the budget deficit.

Before the global financial crisis, Japan's budget deficit was controlled, and declining, but subsequently became uncontrollable. Additionally, and more importantly, an aging population demands more social security expenditure, which causes serious budget problems, but Japan does not seem ready to cope with such problems.

The selection of these topics is subjective, but I believe that these are reflected in the Japanese concerns now. Japanese academic circles do not necessarily respond to the interests of the society, but I have tried to select papers on these topics to the extent possible.

This article proposes an analysis of changes implemented during Malaysia's Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's administration (2003–09), using the theoretical framework commonplace in studies on conservatism. Based on the premise that transformations in conservative polities are prone to producing conflict, the dynamics of conflict situations during Abdullah's checkered Premiership is foregrounded. As we apply the main criteria defining conservatism to regime behaviour in Malaysia, it becomes clear that such criteria are stoutly held by the regime's elites in their quest for social harmony and political stability. Regime maintenance then finds justifications in such seemingly sublime ends, thereby self-perpetuating Malaysian conservatism. Such despondency prevailed during Mahathir Mohamad's administration (1981–2003), which displayed bias against changes and introduced schemes to justify the systems it upheld. Transmutations wrought during Abdullah's tenure may have been neither substantial nor totalizing, but within the conservative paradigm which had long gripped national politics, Abdullah's deviations were significant nevertheless.

Samuel Huntington's influential clash of civilizations hypothesis (Huntington, 1993; Huntington, 1996) has been widely debated, but empirical tests of his ideas about core states remain limited at the micro-level. In this paper, we bring new evidence to bear, focusing on the ‘cauldron of civilizations’: Greater Asia and the Pacific. Using the AsiaBarometer, we examine the extent to which publics in the region identify with the core states of the supposedly most contentious civilizations in the region – the US, China, and Iran – and the factors that influence those perceptions. We give attention to the role of globalization and nationalism and whether both may be subsumed by religiosity as Huntington suggests. Our descriptive evidence affirms some of the tensions between the US, China, and Islamic-predominant Asia identified by Huntington as areas of potential conflict. At the same time, we find no evidence to suggest that attitudes toward core states are zero-sum; Asian publics often see rival powers as mutually good influences. Using multivariate analysis, we find that religiosity, as the clash paradigm surmises, boosts Iranian influence and undermines American influence in several predominantly Islamic states. We also find, contrary to Huntington, that overall exposure to foreign cultures leads to a more positive assessment of American influence among Chinese and Pakistanis, as well as American perceptions of China. When foreign exposure influences perceptions of Iran, the effect is modestly, but consistently, negative. Taken together, the findings raise questions about two key assumptions of the Huntington framework – civilizational identity formation and cultural resurgence – and suggest that alternative approaches in recent civilizations literature show greater empirical promise.