In 2003 Ikuo Kabashima and Samuel Popkin invited Professors Masaki Taniguchi, Gill Steel, Susan Shirk, Jay Hamilton and Matthew Baum to join with them in charting a new path for research on the ways changing media are changing politics. In the last two decades, media studies have moved beyond claims of minimal effects by demonstrating how various characteristics of news stories–point of view (framing), connection to political offices (priming), emotional content, or causal implications– affect public opinion and voting. (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991) Here we examine the ways in which changing communications technologies change the issue content of news consumed by the public and political competition within and between parties.

After the collapse of the Cold War system, Japan became more active in contributing to international peace and security. Especially under the Koizumi administration, Japan successfully passed major pieces of national security legislation, such as the 2001 Anti-Terrorism and the 2003 Iraq Special Measure Laws, in a timely manner. A changing international security environment in the Cold War transformed Japan's media and public opinion to a more realistic one, which supported Koizumi's active national security policy and changed the dynamics of party politics. In order to prove this, this study first explores the influence of the Japanese media, especially the press. Next, it presents the opinion of major newspapers and the public on individual national security issues. Finally, it analyzes the press's influence on public over the issue of constitutional revision.

This issue of Japanese Journal of Political Science is devoted to the fruits of the latest AsiaBarometer Survey that was completed in 2006. The AsiaBarometer is a regional survey project that focuses explicitly on the daily lives of ordinary people in Asia. The first three waves of the survey were carried out in more than 30 countries in East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. The wave examined here is focused on seven societies that fall into the ‘Confucian’ zone of world politics: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Most of the comparative papers that constitute this journal were first presented at the AsiaBarometer Workshop and Open Symposium in Tokyo on 14 and 15 December 2006. A separate volume containing country profile chapters will appear at a later date.

This paper explores the economic factors that influence news coverage and discusses the difficulties of determining the impact of news content on political outcomes. Evidence from the United States clearly shows how supply and demand concepts can be used to predict content in newspapers, television, and the Internet. To demonstrate how the concept of market-driven news extends beyond the US, I trace out hypotheses about how media content in many countries should vary depending on three factors in news markets: the motivations of media outlet owners, the technologies of information dissemination available, and the property rights that govern how information is created and conveyed. I offer three different types of analyses – the measurement of product differentiation, information search patterns, and consumption patterns – to show how these ideas about competition influencing content could be tested across countries. The paper briefly discusses the degree to which market competition affects content in three Asian countries (China, Thailand, and Japan) and concludes with a section on the difficulties of designing policies to improve the operation of media markets.

In recent years, institutional financial institutions such as the World Bank have taken a keen interest in the links between governance and economic development in East Asia and in other regions of the world. However, the concept of governance has proven difficult to measure in cross-national studies and its meaning in the minds of citizens and experts may differ noticeably. This article examines elite and mass perceptions of governance using the World Governance Indicators developed by scholars affiliated with the World Bank and survey data derived from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey conducted in seven ‘Confucian’ societies. The results of the analysis capture considerable variation at the country and individual levels for how citizens and experts perceive governance in this region of the world. In addition, a multivariate test uncovered some convergence between citizen and expert assessments but only for some of the various governance components.

International relations (IR) is both a science and an art, i.e. the unity of object and subject. Traditional international relations theories (IRT) have probed the laws of IR, in an attempt to become the universal science. IRT have developed into a class doctrine that defends the legitimacy of the western international system as a result of proceeding from the reality of IR, while neglecting its evolving process, and overlooking the meaning of art and the presence of multi-international systems. In other words, IRT have turned into what Karl Marx might have deemed as the vulgar international relations theories (VIRT). For this reason, we declare the end of international relations theories. This phenomenon can only be negated by the so-called Chinese School, which will set the sustainable and harmonious relations among nations, between state and non-state actors, and within states and non-state actors (in one word ‘global-society’) in five life-forces of economy, politics, military, culture, and religion. Consequently, this will bring about a real regression of nationality and compatible development of various international systems.

In this article, we attempt to describe how ordinary people in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan view democracy and its authoritarian alternatives and how they experience institutional practices of their democracies to determine the extent of cultural and institutional democratization. The analysis of the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey data shows that although the citizens of East Asian democracies unequivocally reject military authoritarian rule, they are ambivalent toward civilian authoritarian rule, and are not yet fully committed to democracy. The analysis also shows that they are not satisfied with the provision of civil rights and institutions of horizontal accountability, but remain highly satisfied with voting rights, which suggests that East Asian democracies are not adequately liberal, though unmistakably electoral, in the eyes of ordinary people. On the basis of this finding, we conclude that East Asian democracies fail to achieve a high-level equilibrium between the popular demand for democracy and the institutional supply of democracy.

China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite dis-agreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China' leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China' relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China' most emotionally charged international relationship.

India is a large country with 29 states as constituents in its federal structure. The large and growing population imposes great pressure on available natural resources. Disputes arising out of contested river water entitlements between states are common and often intractable. Laws conceived for settling such disputes were created for a particular socio-political environment characterized by strong Centre and relatively non-assertive states. The paper argues that this political configuration has changed dramatically and in turn has reduced the efficacy of the existing statutory mechanisms. A new paradigm for dispute resolution is required. The existing institutional mechanism and its political environment are examined and the structural changes identified. A set of reforms in the dispute resolution mechanism is proposed, which would reduce the friction between the statutory mechanism and its operational environment.

This article examines the power relationship between the prime minister and ruling party legislators. I theoretically explore the power relationship between the prime minister and ruling party legislators, and examine legislators' parliamentary voting, focusing on the political process of postal service privatization of 2005. This analysis presents three arguments. First, theoretically, when the prime minister attempts to achieve a project, risking his or her job, he or she can firmly control ruling party legislators. Second, empirically, the anti-Koizumi legislators' rebellion was based on their unfounded assumption about the prime minister's behavior or ultimate outcomes. Third, the anti-Koizumi legislators' electoral incentives to secure their reelection and ruling incentives to weaken or overthrow the Koizumi Cabinet drove them to rebel against the prime minister in the Lower House, while the ruling incentives alone caused the rebellion in the Upper House.

This article examines the ways that new communications technologies change the organization of politics as well as the content of news. Changes in the media lead to changes in the mediators, the persons who choose and interpret the news for the public. When new mediators convey different news stories or offer different interpretations from the previous regime, they redistribute control of politics and culture.

As media get cheaper, faster and harder to control, state regulation of content becomes less effective. This provides new opportunities for citizens to monitor their leaders and alters the ways that leaders – whether they are democratic or authoritarian – demonstrate accountability.

Political leaders are always trying to control the agenda by limiting information available to the public and convincing the public that they know more and know best. New forms of media, such as the commercial television, cable and satellite television, and the internet change political competition by providing new opportunities for insurgent politicians to challenge their elders. I consider these changes within the context of past innovations, including the rise of the printing press, the telegraph, the newspaper, and radio.

Using the 2005 and 2006 AsiaBarometer surveys I analyze religiosity and secularization in Asia. I find that, in South Asia, identification with a particular religion is the norm and most people pray every day but, in East Asia, religious identification and religious practice are both much less common. Even in secular East Asia, however, the demand for religious services is high and belief in a spiritual world is common. I conclude that secularization does not necessarily produce uniformly secular societies. Turning to the causes and consequences of religiosity, I find surprisingly few significant relationships, results that echo similar analyses in Western Europe. I then discuss the implications of these non-findings.

Economic development and the social changes it brings are changing people's world views among the East Asia Confucian societies. Most notable is a change from stressing hard work and achievement toward stressing enjoyment, self expression, and a fulfilling lifestyle. With this people also have become more pro-equality and tolerant toward different ideas and styles. These newly emerged views of modernized societies can be called ‘postmodern’ values. People with stronger postmodern values are more active politically, more assertive in demanding individual and political rights, and more emphatic in their preference for democratic government. The implication is that people in East Asia will demand more democracy as economic development proceeds and as they acquire these postmodern values.

The objective of the paper is to examine the role of the two donor agencies, the IMF and the World Bank in the formulation of social welfare policies in the post-independence Sri Lanka. The ideologies of the two major parties in Sri Lanka, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), became the determining factor in the formulation of social welfare policies before 1977. In this context, the IMF and the World Bank played two different roles before 1977. Meanwhile, the ideological gap existed between the two major parties began to disappear after 1977 with the introduction of liberalized economic policies. The IMF and the World Bank played an important role during the post-1977 period. There was evidence that these funding bodies influenced in the formulation of social welfare programmes under the two major parties. The guideline recommended by these two organizations adversely affected the subsidized rice ration, one of the major welfare programmes, in the country.

In this paper, we examine some of the ways in which Koizumi Junichiro took advantage of changes in television news to win the 2001 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election and become prime minister of Japan. Koizumi adopted a strategy of political populism to increase his exposure in the media and develop a public reputation. Changes in the LDP selection procedure, in combination with long-term social and economic change and political reform, meant that the media mattered more to his campaign than had previously been the case. We use data from the Japan Election Study II (JES II) to show that the effects of Koizumi' media-driven popularity and style of politics reversed the LDP' electoral fortunes in the Upper House Election in 2001.

Since the 1980s, the mass media have changed the way they cover major political stories, like foreign policy crises. As a consequence, what the public learns about these events has changed. More media outlets cover major events than in the past, including the entertainment-oriented soft news media. When they do cover a political story, soft news outlets focus more on “human drama” than traditional news media – especially the character and motivations of decision-makers, as well as individual stories of heroism or tragedy – and less on the political or strategic context, or substantive nuances, of policy debates. Many Americans who previously ignored most political news now attend to some information about major political events, like wars, via the soft news media. These changes have important implications for democratic politics. Most importantly, a large number of particularly persuadable potential voters are now tuning in to politics via soft news outlets. This gives politicians an incentive to develop strategies for reaching out to them. Such individuals care less about the nuances of policy and more about the personality of leaders and any sensational human drama that a policy, like a war, entails. Soft news consumers care less about geopolitics than about body bags. Politicians who want their votes are therefore likely to emphasize body bags more than geopolitics. In short, the “new” media environment changes both the style and substance of politics in democracies.

This paper explores the common and different cultural globalization experience of the public's everyday lifestyles in seven societies in Asia-Pacific, focusing on the following aspects: connectivity with the world through personal encounters and digital media, English language capacity, support for the forces of globalization, global thinking and concern, the Internet's influences on sociopolitical opinions, appreciation of international food, and national vs. transnational identity. An analysis of survey data is used to contrast public experience of global thinking, global exposure, global diet, and global feelings in two separate developmental states with higher and lower HDI measures in seven Asia-Pacific societies. We demonstrate that individual globalization manifested in everyday life should be understood under a comparative societal perspective as citizens' global experiences are not only a simple matter of personal choice, but are also more a reflection of complex societal conditions.

This article examines the cross-level causal relationship between macro-political settings and micro-political attitudes in eleven Asian societies using the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey (China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and the 2006 South Asian Survey (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). After extracting the four underlying dimensions of political attitudes from the broadly comparable questions used in the two surveys, the study first detects national differences in terms of (1) citizens' attitudes toward political activities other than voting, (2) their commitment to a democratic system, (3) their political frustration, and (4) their confidence in their ability to govern themselves. Then, regression analysis examines the possibility that the micro-level variations in each of the four dimensions of political attitudes are related to the abundant macro-level variations found in these Asian countries. The results show that although the country-level predictors for citizens' attitudes toward direct political actions are common to both regions (ethno-linguistic fractionalization and the degree of institutionalization of preference articulation), factors influencing the variations in other dimensions are different. Specifically, the effects of political competitiveness and inclusiveness are more salient in South Asia than in East Asia.

This paper demonstrates that recent changes in the mass media, especially TV programs, change democratic practice. I argue that this theory is applicable not only to the US, but also to Japan after the 1990s. This paper is organized as follows: the first section confirms that the increase in TV news after the 1980s is driven by an increase in ‘soft’ or ‘infotaining’ political news. The second section describes the changes in political practice – elections, policy processes, and party organization brought about by this change in the mass media, using both quantitative and qualitative methods.

This paper tests the hypotheses that the tide of globalization undermines or reinforces the traditional types of social capital. Using the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey data and applying two-level logit regression analysis, this paper found that social capital related to sense of trust or human nature and interpersonal relations can be augmented by globalization, while social capital regarding familialism and mindfulness can be weakened.