Since the boat clash incident in September 2010, tensions have persisted between Japan and China over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Although territorial issues can easily become national symbols and used against other countries, nationalism hampers diplomatic concessions essential for diverse international resolutions. Greater the attention the public pays to such issues, lesser the room governments have for maneuvering. The Japanese and Chinese administrations will find it difficult to extricate themselves from the current deadlock if each party merely continues to assert its sovereignty over the islands. This study examines the possibility of expanding both countries’ common interests in the East China Sea by focusing on the fisheries issues that triggered the 2010 incident. Japan and China have not fulfilled their obligation – as stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – to conserve biological resources in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The New Japan–China Fisheries Agreement (2000) established vast special water zones in the middle of the East China Sea instead of demarking the EEZs between the two countries. However, the Joint Fisheries Committee established in accordance with the agreement has not worked to prevent overexploitation and to maintain sustainable development of fishery stocks in the zones. Thus, this paper proposes that Japan and China launch an initiative for effective control of fishing resources in the East China Sea, most preferably in collaboration with related neighboring parties.

In a democracy, it is essential that agents respond to their principals. Because the principals have some control over the agents, the agents are supposed to be loyal to the principals’ wishes. For example, in the context of an election, voters (principals) can hire and fire their representatives (agents), while lawmakers should represent their constituency and legislate accordingly. On this basis, power is delegated from principals to agents and the chain of delegation makes government work, from voters (principals) to legislators (agents), from legislators (now, principals) to ministers (agents/principals), to bureaucrats (agents/principals), and to street-level public servants (agents).

Previous studies had no consensus on whether a ‘mandate-divide’ exists between district and party-list legislators under the mixed-member system. I argued that previous studies ignored the role of the party. This article aims to explore the legislative consequences of the 2005 electoral reform and the role of parties in Taiwan. I analyzed the roll-call votes, considering abstention and absence as potential defection, along with interviews. The data cover from the fifth to eighth Legislative Yuan, two periods each before and after the electoral reform. The findings show that district legislators tended to defect from the party line than list proportional representation (PR) members in pre- and post-reform periods. However, district legislators only tended to be absent from the voting than list PR members after the electoral reform. Mandate-divide was present throughout the period, but differences were more salient before the reform. Besides, evidence stressing the influence of parties was revealed in the interviews. Party leaders enforce various punishments to enforce party discipline. The role of party became more important after the electoral reform. District legislators have higher absence rate after the electoral reform because they need to engage more in constituency service or avoid expressing their position on controversial issues. The ruling party tends to sanction the absence when they have majority in parliament.

This paper aims to address an important yet under-studied issue – how does violence from the side of the protestors affect overseas support for a democratic movement? The importance of this question is twofold. First, while violence and radicalization are not exactly unfamiliar territories for scholars of contentious politics, they do not receive as much attention when their effects spill beyond the domestic arenas. Second, this study seeks to examine international solidarity with democratic movements at the civil society level, which differs substantially from the conventional elite-centric approach when it comes to the intersection between democratization and international relations. Against this backdrop, this paper considers the relationship between violent tactics employed by the protestors during the anti-extradition movement and the sentiment expressed by people elsewhere towards the protests. To this end, a total of 9,659,770 tweets were extracted using Twitter Application Programming Interface during the period of 1 June 2019–31 January 2020. Leveraging computational methods such as topic modelling and sentiment analysis, findings in this paper demonstrate that a majority of foreign Twitter users were supportive of the protestors while held relatively negative sentiments against the government as well as the police. In addition, this study reveals that, broadly speaking, violence might cost a democratic movement by its international support, but could also garner more attention at times. Despite its restricted scope, this paper hopefully will shed some useful light on the dynamics underlying international solidarity for a democratic movement abroad as well as the complex mechanisms of interactions between people who protest at home and those who observe from overseas.

The export of arms belongs to the most contested issues in democracies. In this article, we examine the economic repercussions of the recent easing of the Japanese arms exports restrictions. We develop a rational expectations argument to understand why some political events increase the income of the arms manufacturers, while other ones reduce it or have no effect at all. Event studies suggest that investors closely observe relevant political developments since stock prices of the six arms manufacturers companies reacted consistently to the announcements and leaks as to whether the arms export restrictions would be lifted or not.

The delineation of constituency boundaries and variations in vote distribution across districts often favor certain parties at the expense of others. Applying a hitherto under-utilized formula (Brookes, 1959; Johnston et al., 1999), this study investigates whether the mechanism translating votes into seats in Japan's single-member districts results in systematic partisan advantage that may influence election outcomes. Simulations are conducted for the 2003 and 2005 general elections under two scenarios: where the governing coalition and the main opposition party receive equal vote shares, and where their vote shares are reversed from the actual results. Components of electoral bias are then disaggregated into size and distribution effects, and the impact of malapportionment, electorate size, turnout, and the role of third party/independent candidates on overall electoral bias is examined. Results show that while partisan bias exists, disadvantages toward one party in some components are likely to cancel out benefits derived from others, producing a relatively small net effect. Furthermore, electoral bias in Japan is found to award sectoral rather than partisan seat bonuses.

Japanese sociologists’ work on Japanese society from 2005 through 2010 is critically examined. Articles published in the Japanese Sociological Review (JSR) during this period are analyzed along with books reviewed in the same journal. These publications are classified by their substantive areas and types of inquiries (quantitative, qualitative, theory, etc.). ‘Culture and social consciousness’ is the area where the largest numbers of articles and books have been recognized by JSR, followed by ‘class, stratification, and mobility’ and ‘industry, labor, and organization’. Overall characteristics of sociological studies of Japanese society in Japan are summarized. The discrepancy between contemporary social phenomena and sociological research is also noted, using an example of freeters and neets, among others.

This paper is one of the few attempts made by social scientists to measure social capital via psychometric approach, and is the only one of such kind to base its evidence on the AsiaBarometer survey data. After first reviewing the history of social capital, including its conceptual emergence and recent literatures, we expose the issue of difficulty in the measurement of social capital despite its topical popularity. We tackle this measurement issue by applying psychometric procedures to the AsiaBarometer survey data of 2004, 2005, and 2006, focusing on questions pertaining to social capital of ordinary individuals residing in the 29 survey societies. This paper is significant in two aspects. First, using simple statistical procedures, it extracts various dimensions of social capital without first knowing what dimensions to extract. In short, it does not try to measure social capital using some kind of pre-defined concepts such as those outlined in the historical review of our predecessors. Rather, it succeeds in manifesting key factors of social capital – altruism, utilitarianism, communitarianism, and concordance with prevailing regime – by mechanically processing collective responses by individual respondents towards survey questions oriented with social capital. Though the paper does not aim to establish its methodology as a widely held consensus on how to measure social capital, it does give credence and recognition to psychometric approaches as effectives means to measure social capital, which, by its very definition, calls for ‘objective’ approaches using collective data to measure ‘subjective’ notions of individual actions within networks. Second, this paper is the first systematic empirical analysis of social capital in all the subregions of Asia, i.e. East, Southeast, South, and Central. It builds on our earlier works, including the 2006 paper on social capital in Central and South Asia, and gives empirical credence to important concepts on Asian political culture.

The governance of Russia is important in a multiplicity of ways. As the successor state of the Soviet Union, it retains characteristics of a global superpower, including a nuclear arsenal and a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. As a country with land or sea borders extending from Japan and China across Central Asia to the boundaries of an enlarging European Union, Russian affairs concern neighbours across much of the globe. As a land rich in natural resources such as oil, gas and gold, controllers of these resources have significant assets in the international economy. As a political system that has made a massive turn from a post-totalitarian one-party state to a government holding free competitive elections, the Russian Federation is a leading example of a regime in transformation. Above all, as the primary institution affecting the lives of more than 140 million people, the governance of Russia is important to its citizens.

This article discusses what constituted Japan's conception of the world order, by analyzing political discourse of international order in modern Japan. It has been generally assumed that the Japanese vision of international order in the pre-World War II years was dominated by a belief in the supremacy of the sovereign state. Contrary to the conventional supposition, this paper will argue that modern Japan actually abounded in discourses of transnationalism, and that most of them cannot be seen as the product of liberal ideas but rather the result of an unstable image of the sovereign state system. Surveying the historical development of political discourse of sovereignty and colonial administration in modern Japan, the way in which the ambivalence of Japanese transnationalism had affected the theoretical construction of the international order will be elucidated. Keeping in mind that previous studies on the genealogy of international relations have focused exclusively on the paradigmatic debate over the League of Nations, this article will also pay more attentions to the fact that rearrangement of empire had occupied the significant place in building the image of the world order. Based on the historical considerations mentioned above, the conclusion will offer generalized consideration of what constituteｄ Japan's conception of the world order.

Political scientists generally consider that the incentive for legislators to switch parties lies in their desire to be re-elected. While some scholars attribute defection to the legislators’ popularity and strong connections with their constituents which enable them to be re-elected without relying on party labels, others assert that legislators switch if they perceive that staying put might threaten their chances of re-election. In this paper, we find that the two assumptions, to some extent, contradict each other. More surprisingly, the two contradictory hypotheses cohabit under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. From an analysis of the switching in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, the empirical evidence shows that because of fierce intraparty competition in the multimember districts, not only barely elected but also top-ranked legislators switched party affiliation in order to avoid the loss in votes or even seats to their copartisans and to maximize their chances of re-election.

The aim of this study is to analyze the different impacts of the determinants of free trade agreements (FTAs) based on the stage of the FTA discussions. By disaggregating the FTA formation process into four stages, this study finds that the influence of industry interest groups has a positive impact on FTA formation in the first stage, when two countries initiate the discussion by establishing a joint study. In contrast, it has a negative impact in the last stage, when signed FTAs need to be ratified in order to enter into force. Political institutions emphasized in the existing studies are likely to be significant in the initial stages, but lose their significance as the process moves forward. The findings of this study collectively support the hypothesis that a given FTA is the result of sectoral politics where interests and the power of industries have a significant influence on trade policy decision-making.

When the Soviet Union fell in 1990, three of its 15 components, the Baltic States, joined the European Union, and a fourth, Moldova, may well join in the future. The other 11 quickly became presidential republics, following the lead given by Boris Yeltsin, the president of the largest among them, Russia. By 1994, all 11 were headed by a president elected by universal suffrage. These ex-Soviet countries contribute significantly to the number of presidential republics in the world. Presidential republics form a clear majority, being predominant in Latin America and Africa, alongside the ex-Soviet Union. They are rare in Europe, the main cases being France, Romania, and, though seemingly temporarily, some Balkan states; in Asia, outside the ex-Soviet Union, they are a small minority.

Like many presidential republics elsewhere, those in the ex-Soviet Union are mostly authoritarian, but with variations: this is primarily so in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan and Belarus. These presidencies have been very stable, with some of their leaders, especially in Central Asia, being repeatedly re-elected, often without opposition. There has been a regular turnover in Armenia (but less so in Georgia) and in Ukraine (but not in Belarus). The Russian case is peculiar, as is well known: Putin became prime minister because he could no longer be constitutionally re-elected as president, at least without a break. The power of these presidents has varied over time: outside Central Asia (except Kyrgyzstan) and Azerbaijan, where they have been uniformly strong, their strength has declined in Georgia, increased in Russia and Belarus, and had ups and downs in Armenia and Ukraine.

China's authoritarian regime under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains resilient and responsive to domestic and international threats to its survival, especially considering the inherent instability of other authoritarian regimes. What strategies allow the CCP to stay in power? How do institutions help the CCP to sustain one-party rule, if at all? How does the regime maintain centralized rule over its vast population and territory? Finally, how does the regime respond to the people's demands and dissatisfactions? This review essay discusses how the growing literature of comparative authoritarianism helps (or does not help) us to answer these questions. It discusses three books – one on comparative authoritarianism and two on Chinese politics. In How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse, the authors (i.e., Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz) test various hypotheses exploring the issues regarding the central political processes that shape the policy choices of authoritarian regimes, such as seizing power, consolidation of elites, information gathering, and how dictatorships break down. Are their findings consistent or contradictory with observation of Chinese authoritarian politics? To answer this question, we draw empirical evidence from Bruce Dickson's The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival and Min Ye's The Belt Road and Beyond: State Mobilized Globalization in China, 1998–2018. These books suggest why China's authoritarian regime remains resilient.

The constructivist turn in the study of world politics provides new impetus to studies of the political deliberations of human agents. The co-constitution of agents and structures implies the non-acceptability of accounts that fail to consider the interpretations human agents provide to structural conditions. But neither can we accept the reverse. Studies of the interpretations of political agents should adequately account for the structural constraints on those interpretations. This paper illustrates how easily agency studies can underestimate structural constraints by reference to a most serious and scholarly account of agency in the Vietnam War commitment decisions, Yuen Foong Khong's Analogies at War: Korea, Munich Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. The argumentative burden resides with those who offer accounts that hold or imply that agents acted from non-structural motives.

On 19 December 2012, Park Geun-Hye won the presidential election in Korea. How should we understand the surprising comeback of ‘the strong man's daughter’ in a country that has been touted as having experienced a successful transition from dictatorship to democratization? To answer this question, it is necessary to reformulate modernization theory, of which Korea has been cited as a ‘dream case’. Modernization theory is overly process-oriented; a process of economic growth leads to a successful democratization with a temporal gap. However, when we take into account the question of agency, which was missing in modernization theory, a series of interesting questions arise. First, who led the process of modernization in the Korean case? Second, who led the process of democratization? Finally, what happens if the temporal gap between modernization and democratization is relatively short so that ‘modernizers’ and ‘democratizers’ occupy the same political landscape? In such a scenario, we should expect a society deeply divided between the two agencies of modernization theory. The recent return of ‘the strong man's daughter’ is the latest symptom of increasing social divisions between modernizers and democratizers in contemporary Korean society.

A recently published paper in this journal (Choi, 2021) establishes a statistical link between, on the one hand, Islamist terrorist campaigns – including terrorist attacks and online propaganda – and, on the other the growth of the Muslim population. The author explains this result by stating that successful campaigns lead some individuals to convert to Islam. In this commentary, we intend to reply to this article by focusing on the impact of terrorist attacks on religious conversion. We first show that Choi's results suffer from theoretical flaws – a failure to comprehensively unpack the link between violence and conversion – and methodological shortcomings – a focus on all terrorist groups over a period where Islamist attacks were rare. This leads us to replicate Choi's analysis by distinguishing Islamist and non-Islamist terror attacks on a more adequate timeframe. By doing so, we no longer find empirical support for the relationship between terror attacks and the growth of the Muslim population. However, our analyses suggest that such a hypothesis may hold but only in contexts where the level and intensity of political violence are high.

This article examines the gender gap in political participation in Japan. Although previous studies indicate that women may face several external constraints on political participation, this idea has not been tested systematically. Using the Japanese component of the Asia-Europe Survey, the article demonstrates that work experience and age have very different impacts on participation across the sexes. It argues that men and women encounter very different working conditions and family circumstances at certain stages of their lives, which create a gender gap in political participation.