This article represents Talebof ’s thought on the modern idea of liberty defined in terms of selfishness, selflessness, and selfhood. First, a brief background is set forth in an attempt to show some of the influences on Talebof by others of the Iranian intelligentsia and European philosophers. Having set the stage, his philosophy is represented systematically, as against chronologically. This approach helps to reveal a shortcoming in Talebof ’s philosophy regarding the modern idea of liberty. The shortcoming is evident: Talebof defined liberty in terms of selfishness and selflessness, but then did not dig deep enough to methodically examine selfhood as a more fundamental basis for liberty. The article argues that this shortcoming was caused by a number of factors, including philosophical poverty coupled with natural tendency for reification, and anxiously pragmatic ethos caused by lawlessness under the Qajars and exposure to the hegemonic West. In short, this paper defines the modern idea of liberty, describes Talebof ’s understanding of it, and explains the obstacles that prevented Talebof from setting out a more comprehensive examination of the modern idea of liberty.

The present article aims to shed light on the professional activities of the historian and mathematician Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Alī Yazdī and his afar-nāmah. In so doing, two questions are addressed: (1) Did Yazdī’s expertise in mathematics influence his historical narrative? (2) Did Yazdī simply expand on Niām al-Dīn Shāmī's afar-nāmah, composed some twenty years earlier? Comparing the frequency of quantitative and qualitative data in Yazdī's and Shāmī's afar-nāmahs, the article finds that although Yazdī made an effort to incorporate quantitative data in his history, his narrative is not particularly informed by his expertise in arithmetic. This seems, at first glance, a byproduct of a predominant tradition in the Islamic-Iranian historiography, which makes extensive use of literary techniques. The comparison between the two afar-nāmahs, however, suggests that both Yazdī and Shāmī subscribed to a notion of “accuracy” which bore little resemblance to its modern counterpart manifested in quantitative precision. Finally, the article concludes that the allegation of plagiarism against Yazdī is unfounded.

Pantheism is generally defined as “all is God and God is all (I) but it can therotically assume two different forms. First, it is said that the finite and temporal world is nothing in front of God, and it is swallowad up by the sole absolute Reality of God, or in the second instance, God is considered as dissolved in the world, poetically sung or scientifically demonstrated as a Whole, in which an immanent Life-Energy acts. In both cases, however, what most sharply distinguishes pantheism from non-pantheism (or theism) is the fact that God is always considered by pantheists as something impersonal; pantheists generally affirm the superiority of their view on theistic “inferior” forms of religion pointing out that (a) calling God a “person” restricts and diminishes His greatness, as it necessarily implies a body and a limitation, (b) pantheistic piety is not a feeling of devotion of an Ego to a Thou, but rather the sensation of being a part belonging to a Whole, a wave in the immense sea of Being.

Even when Mohammad Reza Shah became an autocrat by the early 1960s, systemic constraints on his power persisted. One was government officials. They certainly accepted the shah’s governmental centrality. But in parallel they inventively created more elbowroom for themselves than they are normally credited for, shaping everyday administration and co-shaping policies. The article substantiates this argument in two steps. First, it looks at Iran’s Sāzmān-e bimeh-hā-ye ejtemāʿi-ye kārgarān (Workers Social Insurance Organization [SBIK]), drawing principally on French-language International Labor Organization (ILO) archival files. Although the shah had a well-publicized stake in social insurance expansion, the SBIK influenced policy strategy, sometimes against his explicit wishes; also, it handled routine operations and relations with the ILO independently from him. Second, the article zooms out to analyze Persian-language Harvard University Iranian Oral History Project interviews with high-ranking officials, alongside other published and unpublished sources, to show how government officials maintained some autonomy vis-à-vis the shah. Their strategies included self-effacement, the agreement on a unified cabinet policy position before a royal audience, resignation threats, open pushback, and gifts, including favors, to third parties.

It would be premature to declare the Cold War over in the summer of 1969. The Cold War rhetoric continues to abound in the United States in the debates over Vietnam and the ABM; dangers of Soviet-American confrontation are serious in the Arab-Israeli conflict; and Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia is of the Cold War mold. But, as symbolized by Richard Nixon's acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, there is widespread agreement among American leaders that an era of negotiation and rapprochment with the Soviet Union has been entered. The indications are already strong that for Iran this portends an era in which the Soviet-American conflict will not influence very significantly Iran's internal affairs.

As this new era begins, there are already signs that the Cold War world view, including the Soviet-American confrontation in Iran, is about to be drastically revised by a new generation of students of the Cold War.

James Reid's objections to my analysis of tribalism rests on his identification of tribalism with the “uymaq system” of early Safavid Iran. Thus, he includes under the rubric “tribalism” the entire ensemble of social, economic, and political relations dominated by a tribal khan and his family. He argues that during the sixteenth century “pastoral, agricultural, and even urban forms of production were subjected increasingly to the command of various families of chieftains, who controlled them for their own benefit.” Indeed, he is correct, for tribal leaders dominated villages and towns in one form or another throughout Iran until the twentieth century. However, because farmers, tradesmen and, artisans fell under the domination of the tribal khans, they did not necessarily become tribal.

Reid's uses of the terms “tribalism” and “uymaq” are idiosyncratic and inconsistent.

The legendary King Midas was the first Near Eastern ruler to cherish the belief that untold mineral wealth would enable him to realize all his dreams and ambitions. But just because all he touched turned into gold, he soon discovered he could no longer eat. The moral of this legend may be coming home to various regimes in oil-rich countries, which are encountering problems of agricultural decline, overrapid rural-urban migration, inflation, increased income distribution gaps, and so forth. Nowhere have the expected achievements to result from oil income been more touted than in Iran, where the “White Revolution” (later the “Shah-People Revolution”) and the “Great Civilization” proclaimed from the throne since the early 1960s were not only to provide social and economic well-being for all, but also to put Iran among the world's top industrial powers before the end of the century (whether it was seriously going to be among the five top world powers varied from statement to statement, but this was said at one time).

The Philosopher of Rey, Mohammad-e Zakariya-ye Razi and his Ismaili adversaries, Abu Hatam-e Razi and Naser-e Khosrow, share a political understanding of religion according to which religion is a theologico-political system of domination. However, they are at odds over the political philosophy appraisal of religion qua a system of authority. The paper explicates the latter disagreement in part based on Razi's and his opponents' conflicting ideas about the nature of the faculty of Reason and its distribution among men. Consequently, the paper underlines a democratic implication of Razi's thesis on the makeup of the human intellect.

The International Society for Iranian Studies (ISIS) fortieth anniversary celebration at the University of Toronto provided an opportunity to research and record the development of Iranian studies at the university. Iranian studies emerged in 1961 as a major sub-field of the newly established Department of Islamic Studies (now the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations (NMC)). Presently, the university has a diverse and yet cohesive cadre of academic talent and offers a breadth of courses, which makes it unique in Canada. The language-based discipline of an earlier generation of scholars has become the present multi-faceted program of today, addressing a wide variety of academic and community interests. The University of Toronto academic tradition, the scholarship of early faculty, and the immigration of Iranians have contributed to shaping Iranian studies in Toronto.

Sa'di's (d. 691/1292) encounter with the idol of Somnāth is among the most popular stories of his Būstān and frequently mentioned in biographies of him. Jāmī apparently believed the account, as have a number of scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who nevertheless have expressed reservations and doubts regarding certain elements of the story, particularly Sa'di's “confused” allusions to different religious traditions. In E. G. Browne's words:

This essay parts with the compartmentalized way in which scholarship tends to view Iran’s military predicament in the Safavid era by examining the perennial threat the Ottomans posed to the country largely in isolation from the recurring conflict between the Safavids and their other main adversaries, the Mughals and Uzbeks, respectively. The security dilemma facing Safavid Iran, it is argued here, was acute as well as multifaceted, and should be approached as such. All three of its direct neighbors were Sunni and two, the Ottomans and the Mughals, were capable of mobilizing far greater military resources than Iran. The main strategic concern of the Safavids was to prevent these neighbors from joining forces and engaging them in a two-front war. This study examines balancing the strategies employed by the three most consequential Safavid shahs, Esma‘il I (1501‒24), Tahmasb (1524‒76), and ‘Abbas I (1587‒1629), to avoid becoming the target of a simultaneous or combined assault by their neighbors. This analysis provides the backdrop to the rational decision the Safavids made in 1639—to end the threat of a two-front war by concluding a lasting peace accord with their most formidable enemies, the Ottomans.

The Armenian general Smbat Bagratuni's remarkable rise to military and political preeminence in the late sixth- and early seventh-century Sasanian Empire presents a fascinating historical question: how did a liminal figure, a Christian from a frontier region, become the “Joy of Ḵusrō” and “Warrior of the Lords” of king Ḵusrō II Aparvēz (590–628 CE)? This essay argues that Bagratuni's accomplishments were rooted in Sasanian patterns of political decentralization, provincial regionalism and strategic politics. The Sasanians were ethnically Persian, but Parthian and Armenian aristocrats from the periphery of the empire played a central role in upholding the regime. Granting titles, wealth and personal support, the king sought to turn aristocratic families against each other to enhance royal authority. Simultaneously, regional aristocrats like Smbat Bagratuni used royal patronage to advance their local interests, often at the expense of the royal center. The life of Smbat Bagratuni illustrates how complex negotiations of individual and collective identity shaped relations of “center” and “periphery” in Sasanian Iran.

Approximately Sixty Entries in Volumes I-VI of Encyclopaedia Iranica deal with painting and calligraphy in Islamic Iran. While Priscilla Soucek has contributed many of these, other authors include Dorothea Duda, B.W. Robinson, Barbara Schmitz, M. Dabirsiaqi, A.S. Shahbazi and Thomas Lentz. Anthony Welch, Jennifer Scarce, G. A. Pugachenkova, Soucek, and Robinson have also written general entries on art in Iran in the Islamic period. Rather than treat each entry individually, this review will assess the contribution of each author, characterizing his or her approach and noting some but not all of the entries on painters and calligraphers and their work. Additionally, this review will consider James Allan's article on ARMOR, May Beattie's on the ARDABIL CARPET, Dorothy Thompson's on silk (ABRĪŠAM), and 34 articles on CARPETS and CLOTHING.

Taken as a whole, the 34 entries by Priscilla Soucek validate her reputation as an extremely rigorous scholar of Iranian painting and calligraphy. Professor Soucek's entries raise our hopes that she will eventually publish the definitive book on these fields.

In a previous paper, on the basis of the definition of feudalism as a mode of production, it was shown that the extra-economic obligations of Iranian peasants in the period between the fourth and the seventeenth centuries resembled those obtaining under feudalism, though these obligations exhibited, also, certain peculiarities that could be attributed to the specific conditions of Iranian history. In the present paper, I will examine the other aspect of the exploitative feudal relations in Iran for the same period, i.e., the economic obligations of peasants to landlords and the state in the form of feudal rent. I will examine, more specifically, the extent of and the forms in which rent was exacted from the peasants by the landowning class and the state during the period in question.

This article focuses on the development of the tobacco industry in Iran during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It uses this discussion as an entry point to inquire about the early modern Iranian economy. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources, it makes several historiographical interventions. In explaining what the development of a completely new agrarian industry means in Iranian society, the paper suggests that innovation and intensification may not have been completely absent in agriculture and that in contrast to the way some of the available literature tends to argue, the Iranian economy may not have experienced continuous decline in all sectors throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition, this article contends that the tobacco industry helped bring about the rise of merchants and landowners in Iranian society, and with that the further development of mass consumption and ever-increasing cycles of production and accumulation that expanded the commercialization of agriculture, domestic and international trade networks, and Iran’s agrarian economy.

One of the most exceptional among the world renowned historical treasures is the repository of valuables of the olden shahs of Persia found in the Jewels Museum in Tehran. The outstanding jewel among those kept there is the diamond called Daryā-ye Nur, weighing about 182 carats. The history of this stone, according to the literature on the subject, starts in seventeenth century India, in the city of Golconda. Analysis of primary sources, however, allows for the supposition that this stone may have a longer history.

To the memory of my ustad, K. Allin Luther, in appreciation of his teaching and example.

Abu'l-Fazl Muhammad B. Al-Husayn Bayhaqi (385-470/995-1077), A Khurasanian scribe of the Ghaznavids, wrote a history of this Perso-Islamic dynasty (388-582/994-1186) in his work referred to as the Tārīkh-i Bayhaqī (composed in 450/1058). The Ghaznavids ruled in an area now comprising eastern Iran, Afghanistan, and northern India. With the loss of greater Khurasan to the nomadic Saljuqs at the battle of Dandanqan on 9 Ramadan 431/24 May 1040, the empire was reduced to parts of Afghanistan and northern India, chiefly the Punjab. The downfall of the Ghaznavids in Khurasan also divides the period of the first three kings from those of the later ones. Bayhaqi himself organized the history of the Ghaznavids in terms of “principal” (aṣl), versus “minor” (far˓) territories. For Bayhaqi the principal territories are Khurasan and Jibal, but especially Khurasan, as opposed to the minor territories in India. He wrote his history when he was an old man and after 29 years had passed from the loss of Khurasan. The only surviving volumes of Bayhaqi's history of the Ghaznavids cover the reign of the third Ghaznavid ruler Mas˓ud (421—31/1030-1040), who lost Khurasan to the Saljuqs.

At the zenith of the Women, Life, Freedom (WLF) protests in October to December 2022, the call for (general) strikes became a rallying point for activists who were seeking to increase the protests’ social reach and political strength in the face of increasing state repression. Therefore labor provides an advantageous analytical lens for exploring some of the constraints and potentials of the social dynamics of the WLF protests.

As an acclaimed work of twentieth-century Persian fiction, Sadeq Hedayat's The Blind Owl has stirred much scholarly contemplation. Identical characters obscure the work; the resemblance amongst them seemingly originates in some mysterious old man. The paper first demonstrates how every male character resembles this old man. Thereafter, he is argued to be non-existent; all the characters, therefore, become Baudrillardian simulacra bound together through family resemblances. A language-game is then fashioned to represent the family. The metamorphosis of the narrator is followed to manifest how this language-game haunts the characters—other language-games. The paper hopefully sheds some light on an ambiguous aspect of the work and provides a model as to how one language-game takes over another.