Metallic yarns, particularly those wrapped with gold and silver, have been used throughout much of recorded history to create fabrics and garments of surpassing beauty which exemplified splendor and opulence. Extant examples are valued not only for their beauty, but also for their historical significance. The physical assessment of these fabrics usually includes a visual examination to ascertain the weave structure and fibre colors. Optical microscopic examination can add to this information, but it is limited at higher powers of magnification by an increasing loss of depth of field.

In this intervention, we discuss the ongoing protest movement and the quasi-revolutionary situation in Iran with the goal of offering contextual as well as background analysis. Our objective is to examine the current wave of revolutionary politics in the frame of a longer history, that is, the one of the “unaccomplished” 1979 revolution. We do not argue that the current movement is in continuity with the so-called Islamic revolution; rather, we ask what afterlives of the 1979 revolution and successive waves of mobilizations reverberate within the current situation. We do so from a political transformative vantage point, which we understand as inherently feminist, in that we refuse to recognize any hierarchy between the struggles, the issues, and the demands as expressed by the protesters. Indeed, we understand liberation as a collective project resulting from the intersection of struggles, demands, and issues. Following this line of reasoning, we interrogate the current moment along three thematic axes: the social composition, the prospects for political convergence, and the genealogy, or the ideational connection, of the current struggle with those of the past.

From 1927 to 1932, wide-reaching negotiations took place between Reza Shah’s court minister, ‘Abdolhossein Khan Teymurtash, and the British Legation in Tehran, the aim of which was to resolve all outstanding issues and to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of a general treaty. This article examines these Anglo-Iranian negotiations with a particular focus on the thorniest issues—Iran’s territorial claims in the Persian Gulf, particularly its claims to sovereignty over Bahrain, Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. Though an agreement was never reached, an examination of the content and conduct of these negotiations offers some valuable insights into the unique features of Iranian nationalism and Iranian ambitions in the Persian Gulf during the Reza Shah period.

Despite the nature of American influence in postwar Iran, and despite the fact that Iranian studies has grown into a flourishing field in the United States, scholars have not explored the field's origins during the Cold War era. This article begins with the life of T. Cuyler Young to trace the critical genealogy within the field as it developed, in cooperation between American and Iranian scholars, during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. It proceeds to analyze two cohorts of American scholars whose political inclinations ranged from liberal reformism to revolutionary Marxism. As revolutionary momentum swelled in Iran in the late 1970s, critical scholars broke through superpower dogmas and envisioned a post-shah Iran. However, Cold War teleologies prevented them from fully grasping Iranian realities, particularly Khomeini's vision for Iran. This article argues that the modern field of Iranian studies in the United States was shaped by multiple generations of critical voices, all of which were informed by historically situated encounters with Iran and expressed through a range of methodological and theoretical perspectives.

The period of reasonably free and vigorous political party activity in Iran was remarkably brief when viewed in the perspective of the very long history of that ancient land. Beginning slowly after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, party activity became steadily more intense until August 1953 when it was suddenly suppressed. But as brief as this period was, these twelve years witnessed patterns of political party development which deserve comparison with the experience of other developing states.

The term “developing” has been in vogue throughout the post-World War II era. But for all that the term remains a vague one. Why Iran with its recorded history of over twenty five hundred years should be classified as “developing” while the United States with a history of less than two hundred years should be classified as “developed” is not immediately obvious.

A decade ago, amidst general enthusiasm for nation-building activities, Samuel Huntington raised the question of whether political institutions might not decay as well as grow. Although he provided but a few guidelines to symptoms of institutional decay, he did introduce a healthy measure of skepticism into the literature on political development. This skepticism is particularly warranted in the case of representative institutions.

Throughout much of the Middle East, the life of both political parties and legislatures at the national level have tended to be more formal than real. Institutionbuilding has been attempted at the local level, too, although local politics has received far less attention from students of comparative politics. This essay discusses the roles of political representatives at the local level and the impact of the political milieu upon the way in which these roles are shaped and interpreted by their occupants.

On his return to Qom on March 7, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini announced during a remarkable speech the intention to create a ministry having as its main task amr bi'l ma'ruf wa nahi ‘an al-munkar, or to promote the good and forbid the bad. What is so astounding about this is the fact that a government institution charged with this task has long since ceased to exist. Moreover, the charge of amr bi'l ma'ruf has been historically associated with an official known as muhtasib. In view of the planned resurrection of this office, a historical analysis of the functions of the muhtasib and his office, the hisba or ihtisab, would seem to be in order.

Before describing the historical development of the function of muhtasib, two questions are posed. The first is: Does a direct relationship exist between pre-Muslim officials such as the Byzantine agoranomos and the Muslim muhtasib?

The article examines the parameters of the irregular army in Qajar Iran, including its assembly, numbers, and provisions, as well as the army's organizational structure: its administration and the divisions of the ad hoc forces (provincial militia and tribal cavalry) and of the standing forces (the shah's bodyguard and artillery corps). Until the creation of the so-called regular army units in Iran at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the irregular army was regarded as the only military force in the service of the Qajar dynasty. Despite the existence of a “regular army,” irregular forces, particularly tribal cavalry, continued to play a significant role in Iran's military system throughout the nineteenth century. By understanding the features of the irregular army—its role in Qajar society, its organizational and social structures, its ethnic composition, and other characteristics—we can better understand the character of the state itself.

In May 1844 a young merchant from Shiraz, Sayyid ᶜAli Muhammad, made the claim that he was the Bāb (Gate). To his contemporaries the term referred to an intermediary between the community of believers and the messianic figure of Islamic eschatology, the Mahdi. By 1848 the religious movement that formed around him had attracted tens of thousands of adherents. The September of that year saw the beginning of the Shaykh Tabarsi episode in Mazandaran, which became the first of four major clashes between the Babis and the Qajar state.

The purpose of this article is to investigate the background, immediate circumstances, and events of the Shaykh Tabarsi conflict. It examines those developments, both in the political sphere and within the Babi community, that led to the outbreak of open warfare in 1848, and focuses on the question of the objectives of the Babi participants in the conflict.

This paper argues that the designation of heterodoxy for the socio-religious movements of late antique Iran such as Mazdakism is a misnomer. It suggests that the designation of Mazdakism and similar movements as heterodoxies is in fact the product of an early Islamic assessment of post-Sasanian Zoroastrian attempts to create a Zoroastrian orthodoxy which did not exist under Sasanian rule. Pressured by the Abrahamic religions surrounding them, the followers of Weh Dēn in this period felt the need to demarcate and clarify their beliefs, and to make their own beliefs comprehensible to their neighbors and rulers. What was then left out of this attempt was labeled a deviation, and heterodoxy, whose fundamental disagreement with Zoroastrian orthodoxy was then reflected back in time.

By the time the Fifth Development Plan was adopted in 1973, Iran had already experienced more than three decades of governmental efforts towards economic development. These efforts first started in the early 1920s and culminated, in the postwar period, in the country's First Development Plan. Before discussing the second and subsequent plans, it will be useful to review the main features of the initial efforts at planning in Iran.

The development policies of the government during the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941) did not constitute development planning as the term has come to be understood in the postwar economic literature. The prewar policies were restricted to partial investment programs for the public sector only, with little consideration concerning the activities of the private sector. Furthermore, even the public sector programs did not reflect any explicitly defined set of policy objectives.

This study examines the Jamshid of Ferdowsi's Shahnameh and its later reception, specifically the Islamic refashioning of Jamshid in fourteenth-century Shiraz, as evidenced in the ghazals of Hāfez (d. 1389), and the lyric poetry of Khvāju-ye Kermāni (d. 1352 or 1360), and ʿObeyd-e Zākāni (d. 1371). Hāfez, Khvāju, and ʿObeyd used literary devices such as talmih (allusion) and ubi sunt to both engage with and reshape the past, and this refashioning of the past was employed to legitimize their patrons’ authority to rule from Shiraz. The article culminates in an exploration of the mytho-political dimensions of the conflation of Jamshid with Solomon and the intimate association of this composite figure with Fars in the Ilkhanid and post-Ilkhanid periods. Poetry is treated here as a productive force that both shapes and is shaped by the socio-political circumstances of its composition, performance, and reception. In order to locate the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century reconfiguration of Jamshid within its geo-mythological context, use has been made of the concept of lieu de mémoire as a means through which to unpack the trans-historical cultural impact on Shiraz of the ancient Achaemenid and Sasanian ruins that surround the Islamic city; ruins that have for more than two millennia embedded a sense of proximity to history in the land and peoples of Fars.

There is, in France, a pronounced awareness of an “Iranian world” that can be identified in terms of cultural, linguistic, ethnic (Aryan peoples) or geographic (highlands, cold winters) characteristics common to the civilizations of all Iranian-speaking peoples living in Afghanistan, Iran, Kurdistan or south central USSR, in particular, Tajikistan. This “world” stands in contrast to the Arab, Indian and Turkish ones. The notion of a Middle East extending from Casablanca to Kabul does not exist in French. Newspapers usually refer to the Moslem lands to the south and east of the Mediterranean as the “Arab world,” as if Turkish- and Persian-speaking peoples were peripheral minorities therein.

Owing to its colonial and military heritage, France has long given special importance to the Maghrib (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), the Near East (Lebanon and Syria, in particular) and, as a result of the Napoleonic campaigns and Champollion's expeditions, Egypt.

During the Constitutional years (1906–11) the legal status of the Jews and some other religious minorities improved, even if only to a limited extent. Can one assume that this change in the legal status of the Jews reflected changes in the public's actual treatment toward the Jews in reality during the days leading up to the Constitutional Revolution in 1906? To an extent, the answer is in the affirmative. The present article argues, however, that the real life situation of the Jews in the years leading up to the Constitutional Revolution was still often one of abuse and occasional persecution. To prove this contention, section I of the article presents some such cases. Section II establishes some of the reasons for the attacks on the Jews—not only religious, but also economic and socio-political ones, as well as briefly suggesting certain recurring paradigms surrounding it. Section III looks at one case study from November 1905 in the city of Shiraz. Finally, this preliminary research ends with some concluding remarks.

Today, the term “Ziegler carpet” is synonymous in the trade with a type of late nineteenth century Persian, made-for-export weaving categorized as decorative (figs. 1 - 2). The Ziegler enterprise in Sultanabad (now Arak) was the earliest known effort to organize carpet manufacture in Iran with foreign capital. This Manchester-based firm operated initially as a commission house, representing European manufacturers in the export and sales of printed cottons in the Near and Middle East; they subsequently developed extensive commercial interests in Iran, including investments in opium and other cash crops. Shortly after their first agency was established in Iran in 1867, Ziegler's expanded into the manufacture and trade of Persian carpets; and the company played a significant role the tremendous increase in carpet exports from that country during the late nineteenth century — the so-called Persian carpet “boom”.

This article focuses on Persian linguistics with the emphasis on grammar and word formation in the twentieth century. After presenting a brief overview of the history of the study of grammar in Iran, I discuss the recent trends in linguistics from diachronic to synchronic aspects. In Persian diachronic linguistics, we will see that most works focus on the reading, and deciphering of the old texts. In synchronic studies, there are three main stages: 1) traditional linguistics, 2) structural linguistics, and 3) generative or formal linguistics. I show how each one of these stages affects Persian linguistics in the twentieth century. Finally, I conclude the article by looking at the current state of Persian linguistics and the future prospects for the field.