In 1961, in my last year of high school in Tehran, I wrote two emotional poems inspired by current black liberation movements in Africa and America. Like most Iranians, I did not suspect that the Middle East was as guilty of racism against blacks as Europe and America were. Ironically, it was in New York, in the late ‘60s, that I came across medieval Iranian sources showing racism against blacks. I decided then to do a paper on the subject, but resisted the project for a decade. In November 1979, when Khomeini ordered the release of all blacks among the American hostages “because [blacks] are oppressed by American society” (The New York Times, November 19, 1979, A:12), I was finally prompted to undertake the present study, to set the record straight.

It has traditionally been taught that Iran, a Sunni polity for many centuries, was converted to Twelver Shi'ism virtually overnight when the armies backing the Safavid house took power in 907/1501. In recent years scholars have begun to question the manner and rapidity of the process of conversion, what it meant to be “Shi'i” or “Sunni” in sixteenth-century Iran, and what, if anything, can be said about Safavid Sunnism.

It has been noted that Sunnism in Iran was phased out only gradually. For example, there are references in the Persian chronicles to persecution of Sunnis as late as 1017/1608. Some sources suggest that Sunni influence persisted at the court of Shah Tahmasp and name prominent Sunnis during his reign. As late as the second decade of the eighteenth century, the conqueror of Isfahan, Mahmud Afghan, attempted to alter the balance of population in the city by relocating 5,000 Sunni families from Hamadan.

This article intends to give a comprehensive picture of women's participation in the scientific field in Iran in the last four decades, among students and members of academia. One major fact is that despite the legal and cultural impediments the proportion of young women in the universities has risen above 50 percent. Another is that this increase has occurred much more at the undergraduate level than at the graduate and post-graduate levels. In the academic world, women are still far outnumbered by men, particularly at the higher levels of the hierarchy. We intend to show how the discrepancies are structured between the undergraduate and the graduate levels on the one hand, and between the lower and higher levels of academic hierarchy on the other, and propose an interpretation of these two major tendencies.

Nasir al-Din Shah uttered the following words in the presence of his trusted physician, Dr. Jakob Eduard Polak.

Such words of despair reflect the court's ambivalent attitude toward European reform as well as the underlying motives for founding the Dar al-Funun, Iran's first modern European-style institution of higher learning (figs. 1 and 2).

The driving force behind the creation of the Dar al-Funun was Nasir al-Din Shah's first premier, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Khan Farahani, better known as Amir Kabir. He founded the institution with the intention of ensuring that a new generation of Iranian youth, primarily military officers, was trained in the “useful sciences.”

After dropping rapidly and steadily over two decades, fertility in Iran stabilized between 2001 and 2011 at around 1.9 to 2 children per woman, before starting to rise slightly between 2012 and 2016, then falling fairly quickly. This coincided with the implementation of the Islamic Republic’s new population policy, with its aggressive and coercive measures, one of whose goals was to reverse the downwards trend in fertility. Given changes in proximate and remote determinants of fertility in Iran, and the decline in fertility since 2016, it is assumed that this new population policy triggered a reduction in intervals between births between 2012 and 2015, leading to a slight rise in the fertility of already married couples. The other latent objective of the Islamic Republic’s new population policy is to drive Iran’s population up to 150 million inhabitants in the near future. This is utopian given Iran’s demographic dynamics, but it conceals the political and ideological goal of asserting Iran’s demographic and geopolitical significance within the region, by drawing on a novel immigration policy to make up for its low fertility.

There have been a number of important efforts to map out the languages of Iran, but until now no language atlas, or even a comprehensive and detailed country-level language map, has been produced. One of the recent initiatives which aims to fill this gap is the online Atlas of the Languages of Iran (ALI) (http://iranatlas.net). This article delineates objectives of the ALI research programme, atlas architecture, research methodology, and preliminary results that have been generated. Specific topics of interest are the structure and content of the linguistic data questionnaire; the handling of contrasting perspectives about the status of “languages” and “dialects” through a flexible multi-dimensional classification web; and the role of ongoing comparisons between language distribution assessments and hard linguistic data.

A leading force demanding change during the mid-20th century has been the university student. These demands are increasingly being backed by riot and rebellion as students throughout the world intensely challenge ongoing institutions and administrations. Few societies, regardless of geographic position, political system, or stage of economic development, have escaped recent episodes of serious student upheaval. France and Holland, the United States and Mexico, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Egypt and Pakistan, Japan and Vietnam, and Turkey and Korea have witnessed shattering outbursts of student activity. The student has become the loudest spokesman for social change and a leading catalyst for political transformation. Political elites everywhere now realize that they can no longer ignore student demands but must devise policies to come to grips with them. The substance of these demands and the consequent elite policy are two key factors that are shaping the direction and progress of nations.

From earliest times, religion has always been one of the most important factors in social cohesion and at the same time a major cause of urban factionalism and strife. The existence of opposing sects in the same city has invariably provided a breeding ground for economic, social, and political differences in the guise of sectarian disputes.

The basic elements of urban organization in the Islamic period were local government (ḥukūmat), religious solidarity (ummat), professional associations (the craft guilds, aṣnāf), and the city wards or quarters (maḥallāt). Occasionally, other social organizations rose to prominence such as esoteric fraternities, mystical and dervish orders, and chivalrous and paramilitary associations (futuvvat, Cayyārān); these too formed part of the overall social life of the city. The wards or city quarters were the centers of group activity based on kinship, or ethnic or sectarian affiliation. Iranian cities during the Islamic period saw political and social activities by the followers of the four rites of the Sunna--Shāfiᶜī, Ḥanbalī, Ḥanafī, and Mālikī--and by Shi'ite and other dissident sects such as the Zaydīs, Carmathians, Mu'tazilites, and Ismāᶜīlīs.

In The Spring Of 1997, I Attended a Memorial Dinner for My Aunt, Dr. Na‘imeh Amin. There, one of her friends from medical school, Dr. Maryam Tusi, shared pictures of herself and my aunt from their medical school days. In 1946, they had been among the first women students admitted to the University of Tehran Medical School directly from Iranian high schools. I was fascinated by what I thought I saw in three of the pictures. One showed ten young women on the steps of the medical school, looking eager and confident. Another showed men and women marching together in a street demonstration. The third was of men and women on a country outing, huddled together to fit into the picture and seemingly unconcerned about traditional anxieties regarding mixed-gender socializing. These images of women's progress and activism could have been produced by the propaganda of the Pahlavi state during its Women's Awakening project, 1936-41. In fact, the picture of the demonstration went beyond Women's Awakening propaganda and implied a new demand for gender equality that appeared in the Iranian press in the wake of the Women's Awakening.

The paper reconsiders the apocryphal stories regarding the Shahnama's initial reception to propose that it was only after long narrative poems gained currency that the Shahnama was recognized as a masterpiece. The paper analyzes the structure and themes of several histories written before and during the Samanid period and compares them with the Shahnama and the content of histories and epics produced immediately afterwards, to argue that the initial reception of the Shahnama did not depend on Sultan Mahmud Ghazni alone. It further argues that the Shahnama's aim, content, and execution differed from the histories and poetry produced in the decades immediately preceding and succeeding it, which would account for the lag in its acceptance and popularity. This led later biographers to superimpose their regret over Firdausi's treatment onto Sultan Mahmud Ghazni, who by their accounts denied him the fame and glory he deserved in his lifetime.

When I was in college (1937-41, that is the second decade of the Pahlavi era), the study of Qajar history was far less fashionable than that of earlier periods of Persian history. The earlier periods were thought of as the time frames for the political, military, or cultural achievements that one could feel good about, or else the temporal receptacles of calamities and defeats one could lament. The Qajar period, however, was not distant enough to command “historical” respectability. As might be expected in the aftermath of a fallen dynasty, the names of the Qajar kings were too much tainted by allegations of backwardness, ineptitude, corruption, and abuse of royal power to inspire sufficient interest. Social sciences had not yet made adequate headway in Persia to encourage the recording and analysis of contemporary events. Pioneers in researching Qajar history, like Abbas Eqbal, were few, and those who occupied themselves with it focused mainly on selected events of particular import, such as Persian defeats in the Perso-Russian wars, the reforms of Amir Kabir and his execution, Anglo-Russian intervention in Persian affairs, the Tobacco Régie and the Constitutional movement.

The life and works of ‘Abd Allah b. al-Muqaffa', probably the Abdala the Saracen with whose mention the Christian humanist Pico della Mirandola opens his great Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), have received some attention in modern scholarship. His life and work, however, have not been systematically studied in the context of the revolution of his time—namely, the ‘Abbasid revolution. This paper will try to show that Ibn al-Muqaffa's impressive intellectual output appears in a new light when it is properly put in this context, and is seen from the perspective of the breakdown of the Umayyad state and the ensuing process of revolution.

Beginning with their first confrontation in 1514, the Ottomans and the dynasties ruling over Iran fought over the borderlands extending from the Persian Gulf to Mount Ararat. The transformation of this indeterminate borderland into a clearly defined and increasingly monitored border took almost four centuries. It became an internationally recognized border only after seven decades (1843–1914) of intermittent work by mixed international commissions. Despite such a tangled history, a well-entrenched tradition of Middle Eastern history suggests that the Iranian–Ottoman frontier was firmly established by the Qasr-i Shirin/Zohab Treaty of 1639; and it is one of the oldest boundaries of the world. The myth of 1639 is powerfully enshrined in the historiographies and nationalisms of the countries sharing this boundary. Questioning this myth in the light of Ottoman–Iranian relations, this paper analyzes different versions of 1639 Treaty that were brought to boundary negotiations and exist in various chronicles, and suggests an alternative reading of this foundational myth.

This article presents some of the general findings and, in particular, the information on family planning practice in Isfahan City and Ostan compiled in two phases of the Isfahan Communications Project (ICP). In terms of information generated, the project had two main stages: (1) the ostan-wide sample presurvey (May, 1970), and (2) the ostan-wide mass media campaign (August, 1970-March, 1971). The presurvey was made to obtain demographic information and data on the knowledge, attitudes, and practice (KAP) of family planning among the population and their exposure to the various media. The media campaign was directed at those couples who because of their media behavior and previous experiences with contraception were thought to be predisposed to adopt modern family planning methods.

It is Generally Agreed that the Beginning of the Persian Literary Renaissance of the tenth–eleventh centuries was concomitant with the emergence of a bureaucratic tradition that had its roots in pre-Islamic Sasanian Iran. The avatars of these bureaucratic principles in medieval Perso-Islamic history—Nizam al-Mulk, Rashid al-Din, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, to name the most famous—were trained in Arabic and Persian, wrote scholarly treatises on a wide array of religious, philosophical, and scientific topics, and advocated, among other things, the need for responsible rule and consistent administration according to Islamic law and custom. These admonitions were generally directed at their Turkic and Mongol dynastic patrons whose steppe traditions were often at cross-purposes with the running of a sedentary society that depended on irrigated agriculture, commerce, public works, and systems of taxation. Prominent Persian bureaucrats and their descendents undertook these duties and were able to accrue considerable power and wealth, but often at a high cost when we read of the fates of Rashid al-Din, Saᶜd al-Dawla and Juvayni.

Trends in intra-family relationships in Iran point to fast changes in regional and class-linked cultural patterns following the rapid spread of the national culture and of modernist ideologies and practices. People redefine their responsibilities and expectations as small nuclear families increase, women aspire to higher education and employment, and the bad economic situation necessitates various adaptations. Analysis of recent ethnographic data suggests that the shift from traditional authoritarian intra-family relations to relationships based on autonomy, individuation, independence and companionship creates new intimacies but also conflicts. The prevailing ideology of “progress” in Iran likely will further weaken patrilineal ties and kin relations while strengthening ties based on friendship and collegiality.

Pre-nineteenth century Iranian history is short on numbers, or at least on reliable ones. Lack of quantitative data is perhaps the greatest obstacle confronting historians of pre-modern Iranian economy and society, and the Safavid period is scarcely better provided than earlier ages. The Safavid archives were destroyed, the Persian histories provide few hard facts, and the accounts of visiting Europeans, though often full of comment on social and economic matters, are generally unreliable when it comes to quantitative information. Safavid Iran thus presents a depressing contrast to its neighbours to East and West, where the earlier and deeper European penetration has left arich record in the archives of several European countries, while in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the survival of extensive state archives can only remind the historian of Iran of how much was lost through the destruction of their Safavid counterparts.

The early drafts of the constitution of 1979 have represented a crucial moment in the creation of the post-revolutionary Iranian state. This article makes use of primary sources of the time and recently revealed material in order to provide a systematic analysis of the events which led to the production of the key versions of the draft constitution and the reaction to them by the multitude of political movements which were then active. The aim of this study is to clarify events and processes which have been left unexplored by the existing academic literature.