Over the years I have often wondered whether Dag Hammarskjöld belonged to an age that is passing, or to one that is being born. He was a bold innovator in world affairs, and he opened up a future, having carried further than it has ever been carried before the principle of international action to promote peace. Yet he was himself the fine flower of the European tradition of civility which, if it is not dying, certainly is not flourishing today.

The central problem of our time is to achieve the effective management of the power relations of states. The world is constituted as a system of independent but interdependent states—independent in authority but interdependent in destiny. States are units of power. While power is a complex conception, for present purposes it may be construed in the narrow sense of force. Physical ability to kill, to damage, or to coerce, is the particular aspect of power which serves as the focus of this article. States are characterized by the possession, in varying degrees, of this capacity to damage or destroy each other. This power may be used in competitive struggle, producing destruction on a massive scale. It may be used unilaterally, producing enslavement and degradation of its victims. In short, both survival and freedom, both sheer existence and the higher values that enrich existence, are implicated in the problem of power. The national interest of every state, and the common interest of all men, in the preservation and development of civilization are threatened by the paroxysms of violence which states are capable of unleashing. Hence, the primacy of the task of controlling the use of force by states, of managing the power relations of states, cannot seriously be questioned.

In 1961, therefore, we shall do what we have to do. We shall help to build up Europe, which, by confederating its nations, can and must—for the sake of mankind—become the greatest potential economic, military, and cultural power that has ever existed. We shall help this assembled Europe and its daughter America to reorganize their alliance to better defend the free world and to act together in all parts of the earth.

After years of hesitation, Canada is now seriously considering full membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). The initiative for this shift in policy has come, not from officials in die Department of External Affairs, but principally from Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and especially die Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green. Both have returned within die past year from visits soudi of the Rio Grande critical of Canada's traditional neglect of its interests in Latin America.

Debates and events during the year since the publication of the last report to the General Assembly have brought to the fore different concepts of the United Nations, the character of the Organization, its authority and its structure.

The established nation-state is in full retreat in Europe while it is advancing voraciously in Africa and Asia. Integration among discrete political units is a historical fact in Europe, but disintegration seems to be the dominant motif elsewhere. Cannot the example of successful integration in Europe be imitated? Could not the techniques of international and supranational cooperation developed in Luxembourg, Paris, and Brussels be put to use in Accra, Bangkok, and Cairo, as well as on the East River in New York? Or, in a different perspective, will not the progress of unity in Europe inevitably have its integrating repercussions in other regions and at the level of the United Nations even without efforts at conscious imitation?

The problem of squaring the circle is not confined to mathematics. A somewhat similar task confronts the members of the Organization of American States (OAS) as they seek to enlarge respect for human rights and to create a firmer basis for democratic institutions in the life of the western hemisphere while maintaining the treasured principle of non-intervention. Not a new problem, it has increased in urgency in the last few years with the mounting opposition to dictatorships throughout the continent, with the increasingly communist orientation of Castro's government in Cuba, and with the political unrest elsewhere in Latin America to which Castro's victory appears to have contributed. Faced somewhat obliquely at the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Foreign Ministers in Costa Rica in August 1960, it will have to be confronted more directly at the Eleventh International Conference of American States to be held in Ecuador in May 1961. The agenda for the Eleventh Conference contains items relating both to the protection of human rights and to the preservation of representative democracy.

Les derniers mois de 1960, les premiers mois de 1961 ont suffi a provoquer, dans l'histoire des Nations Unies, un tournant spectaculaire et peut-etre decisif, bien qu'il soit encore fort difficile de discerner la direction dans laquelle l'Organisation internationale va se trouver engagée. Au moment où ces lignes étaient écrites, les changements d'atmosphere et de perspectives etaient deja impressionnants. La diplomatic sovietique a été le moteur principal de cette evolution, l'affaire du Congo, l'occasion, ou le levier, la position du Secrétariat et de son chef, l'objectif. Car on ne saurait douter que si la personne de M. Dag Hammarskjöld est aussi violemment mise en cause, c'est, à travers elle, l'institution qu'il incarne et à laquelle il avait su conferer un prestige et des moyens d'action sans précédent qui est visée et c'est ce qui fait la gravite de la crise. Aussi n'est-il pas inutile, peut-etre, au moment où, passees les premières protestations, certains commencent à penser que des changements sont inévitables, de se demander ce qui est réellement en jeu. Pour ce faire, force est de se tourner d'abord vers le passé et de considérer comment s'est formée, dans la pratique des Nations Unies, la fonction politique dont ont été charges le Secretariat et surtout son chef. Nous devrons ensuite examiner les attaques dont elle a été l'objet et apprécier les propositions de réforme qui ont été avancées.

Economic and social cooperation through the United Nations seems destined to face new challenges and alternatives in the coming years as a result of the changed composition of the United Nations membership, the increased bargaining power of the African, Asian, and other states seeking economic and technical assistance, and the precedent of UN operations in the Congo.

The traditional concept of embassies and missions abroad as custodians of the national interest is a familiar one which applies also in the context of United Nations diplomacy. The responsibility for advancing national policy through the United Nations is borne by permanent missions and special delegations–representatives who, like their counterparts in bilateral diplomacy, act in close coordination with a state department or foreign office and under the instructions of their home governments. Because of the multilateral and “parliamentary” nature of United Nations diplomacy, however, the task of UN missions and delegations is in many ways more exacting than that of their traditional counterparts.

The Soviet attack on the United Nations during the Fifteenth General Assembly, along with the Congo operation, has served to dramatize the emergence of the World Organization as a far-flung administrative instrumentality. Initially organized primarily to manage meetings and to provide clearing-house functions, the UN Secretariat has progressively taken on a wide variety of “action research” projects both in New York and in the regional economic commissions. More important still, it has become engaged in a complex congeries of field programs which now absorb roughly half the time of its professional personnel. Not only does it help to plan economic, social, and technical programs of increasing magnitude, but it undertakes to implement such programs around the globe—often in cooperation with one or more of the specialized agencies. Certain of these programs, e.g., the Special Fund and OPEX (Operational, Executive, and Administrative Personnel), owe their design in large part to ideas originating within the UN bureaucracy: spurred by the Secretary-General's leadership the staff has dared to improvise and to innovate as the political climate has permitted.

One of the responsibilities of the UN General Assembly is to encourage the progressive development and codification of international law. One method it may use in discharging diis responsibility is the convening of conferences to draft international conventions for submission to governments. The International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, draws up draft treaties which may be utilized as working documents at such conferences. This method does not differ fundamentally from die normal procedures of creating international law, since, in substance, it involves die drafting and signing of treaties. However, the General Assembly has, at least potentially, other means (the study of which is die subject of this article), which have not been fully utilized and die use of which would perhaps permit a liberalization of the creative process of developing and codifying international law. Here we shall examine, in general terms, only one of tiiese, i.e., die possibilities and limitations of purely declarative codes of customary rules adopted by the General Assembly as means of discharging that organ's responsibilities.

Charting the course of attitudes in Britain toward the United Nations is mainly a matter of defining small gradations within a fairly limited range, a range varying from sympathetic concern—and ritualistic commendation—at one end of the spectrum to barely dis uised indifference at the other. Among a small section of radical public opinion the Organization can still (August 1961) arouse fervent support, while the right-wing Beaverbrook press and its sympathizers lose few opportunities of pointing out its deficiencies. Nevertheless, during most of its fifteen years' existence, so far as public interest in Britain in its political activities is concerned, the limited impact the United Nations has had on most of the major issues of peace and war has discouraged “popular opinion” from waxing very enthusiastic-or bitter-about it; indeed, although a generally accepted part of international life, it has for long periods languished relatively unnoticed in a diplomatic backwater. Only at such moments of crisis as Korea, Suez, or the Congo, when the Organization has been forced into the mainstream of international politics has this rather tepid reaction been punctuated by heightened tension—and acrimony.

The first indications of Moscow's willingness to share its technological know how in nuclear science with other countries appeared on January 18, 1955. On that date, the Council of Ministers of the USSR published a declaration to the effect that, “attributing great importance to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the Soviet government has decided to render scientific, technical and production aid to other states in setting up experimental bases for developing research in nuclear physics and in utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.”

The permanent neutrality of Austria is not rooted in ancient traditions as is its model, the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. It was established as late as 1955 and may, therefore, give rise to the question of why, in an age of collective self-defense, such a seemingly outdated decision was taken.

Report to the General Assembly: In accordance with a resolution adopted during the fourth regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the fourth report of IAEA to the UN General Assembly consisted of the annual report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference, covering the period July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960, together with a supplement dealing with developments, including action taken by the General Conference, during the period July 1 to September 30, 1960. The report noted that during the period under review the preparatory activities of the Agency had begun to bear fruit and that in most domains the year had been the first full year of normal operations. One of the main goals of the Agency, the report continued, was to foster the safe use of nuclear power under economically competitive conditions, but in this area there were still innumerable problems to overcome. Since the cost of generating electricity from nuclear power plants, although steadily declining, was still substantially higher than that of producing conventional power except in a few special cases, the earlier nuclear power plans of a number of countries had been revised and construction of plants was not proceeding at the rate foreseen some years ago. With regard to reactor technology, the Board reported that work was being done to improve the performance of reactors and to reduce their costs of operation by detailed technical modifications, although the cost of research on advanced reactor concepts was so high that only a very few major industrial countries had the necessary material resources to conduct such research. While the Board considered it unlikely that nuclear—propelled ships would become economically competitive with conventional ships in the near future, progress had been made in this sphere in the year under review, as witnessed by the commissioning of a nuclearpropelled ice-breaker and the launching of the first nuclear merchant ship.

The second part of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from March 7 through April 21, 1961, when it was adjourned.1 Of the 90 agenda items before the fifteenth session, approximately 35 not taken up during the first part of the session were considered during the second part.

Listed below is the membership of UN bodies for 1961. Unless otherwise noted, membership expires on December 31 of the year indicated.

Its operation in the Congo has developed into a crucial test of the United Nationsframework for international collaboration. Under the authority of a Security Council mandate the United Nations has assumed an unprecedented range of military and civil responsibilities. To discharge these responsibilities, an executive agent (United Nations Organization in the Congo, ONUC) has been created under the direct supervision of the Secretary General. Within a month of its initiation, the Congo operation became the focus of a virulent stream of criticism from the Soviet bloc and other Member governments; it was soon evident that not only ONUC was under attack, but also the concept of a United Nations executive agent, the independence of the Secretariat, and die institution of die Secretary-General.

From its 921st through its 923d meetings the Security Council considered the complaint of the government of Cuba that the United States was planning direct military intervention in Cuba.Mr. Wadsworth, the representative of the United States and the first speaker, deplored the fact that because of continued provocation over nearly a two-year period the United States had been forced to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, and denied as false propaganda the Cuban charges that the United States was contemplating a military attack on Cuba. Mr. Roa, the Cuban representative, stated in his opening remarks that Cuba considered the Security Council the proper organ before which to bring its case, and that his country opposed any effort to transfer the examination of its claim to the Council of the Organization of American States. He charged, inter alia: 1) that United States materials had been air-lifted to counter-revolutionary groups in the Cuban mountains; 2) that United States Embassy officials had been engaged in espionage and in conspiracy with counterrevolutionary elements; 3) that false and harmful propaganda against Cuba was being broadcast from the United States, with the support of the United States government; 4) that mercenaries were being trained at Guantanamo Naval Base, with a view to launching a number of small military expeditions against different points of the island; and 5) that destroyers had been placed on the alert in Key West, ninety miles from Cuba. The ultimate objective of these movements, Mr. Roa added, was a military invasion of his country.