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De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Extract
In 1961, therefore, we shall do what we have to do. We shall help to build up Europe, which, by confederating its nations, can and must—for the sake of mankind—become the greatest potential economic, military, and cultural power that has ever existed. We shall help this assembled Europe and its daughter America to reorganize their alliance to better defend the free world and to act together in all parts of the earth.
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- Copyright © The IO Foundation 1961
References
1 New Year's address by President de Gaulle to the French people. Translation by Service de Presse et d'Information, Ambassade de France.
2 The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Vol. 3, Salvation, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960, p. 150, 164, 169–170Google Scholar. Salvation was completed shortly before De Gaulle returned to power in France.
3 October 13, 1960. Translation by Service de Presse et d'Information, Ambassade de France.
4 Press conference, March 16, 1950, quoted in La France Sera La France (statements of Charles de Gaulle), Paris, Le Rassemblement du Peuple français, 1951, P. 238, 239.
5 Press conference, March 25, 1959. Translation by Service de Presse et d'Information, Ambassade de France.
6 So Sulzburger, C. L. reported in The New York Times, March 9, 1960.Google Scholar
7 Le Monde, December 24, 1960.
8 Reported in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, December 1960 (Vol. 15, No. 10).
9 Quoted by Massip, Roger, “De Gaulle, Europe, and NATO,” Western World, 02 1960 (Vol. 3, No. 2), p. 14.Google Scholar
10 Speech of October 13, 1960, to the National Assembly, op. cit.
11 See Dulles' offer to the NATO Council, December 1957, in Department of State Bulletin, 01 6, 1958 (Vol. 38, No. 967), p. 8–12.Google Scholar
12 Quoted by Kelly, George, “Political Background of the French A-Bomb,” Orbis, Autumn 1960 (Vol. 4, No. 3), p. 301.Google Scholar
13 It was rumored and denied that future tests would not take place in the Sahara. By conducting the experiments in the area of Reggan, France emphasizes its national claim to the Sahara and indirectly its determination not to make that energy-rich territory once more a part of Algeria.
14 According to Tournoux, J. R, “Force de Frappe,” Revue de Paris, 12 1960, p. 110.Google Scholar
15 Speeches and Press Conferences No. 152. Translation by Service de Presse et d'Information, Ambassade de France.
16 The arrest by United Kingdom authorities early in 1961 of five persons accused of spying for the Soviet Union hardly lessened American distrust of foreign security systems.
17 For the events leading up to the agreements and the agreements themselves, see The New York Times, March 15, May 7, and July 18, 1959.
18 It was reported that Spaak went so far as to tell De Gaulle France would get atomic weapons of its own when it accepted nuclear missiles under joint control. The New York Times, July 23, 1960.Google Scholar
19 Text of communiqués in The New York Times, December 19, 1960, and May 11, 1961.Google Scholar
20 “Force de Frappe,” op. cit., p. 118.
21 Contre-Amiral, Lepotier, “Pourquoi la ‘force de frappe’?” Revue de Défense Nationale, 03 1960, p. 429.Google Scholar
22 The best military justification for small, national, nuclear deterrents has been advanced by General Gallois, Pierre M.. See his Stratégic de l'Age nucléaire, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1960.Google Scholar
23 Quoted by Maurice, Megret, “Questions et réflexions sur le programme français de force nucléaire,” Politique Etrangère, No. 1, 1960, p. 17.Google Scholar
24 “Forces aeriennes françaises,” January 1961Google Scholar. Quoted in Le Monde, January 17, 1961.
25 Tournoux, “Force de Frappe,” op. cit., p. 114, 115.
26 Relevant is General Challe's claim at his trial that “you can count those who flatly refused to follow us on the fingers of your two hands.” Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 30, 1961.
27 See François, Gromier, “Une conception archa¯que,” Cahiers de la République, 11–12 1960 (No. 28), p. 15–31.Google Scholar
28 Lepotier, op. cit., p. 420.
29 See discussion among Francois Gromier, Paul-André Falcoz, Pierre-M. Gallois, and Raoul Girardet in Cahiers de la République, op. cit., p. 31–42.
30 Speeches and Press Conferences No. 156, October 1960.
31 Speeches and Press Conferences No. 128, March 26. 1959.
32 English Translation of “France's First Atomic Explosion,” p. 4, 5.
33 “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country,” Foreign Affairs, April 1961 (Vol. 39, No. 3), P. 358.Google Scholar
34 Revue de Défense nationale, December 1960, p. 2045.Google Scholar
35 Speeches and Press Conferences No. 141, September 30, 1959.
36 “Goals and Means of NATO,” Foreign Affairs, April 1961 (Vol. 39, No. 3), p. 427, 420.Google Scholar
37 Ibid., p. 425–426.
38 Speeches and Press Conferences No. 152, September 5, 1960.
39 Ibid.
40 French Affairs No. 103, May 31, 1960.
41 Le Monde, January 14, 1961. Note the reiteration of "third force" theme, basic to French attitudes toward European unification since World War II.
42 For commentary on the draft of EPC, see Karp, Basil, “Draft Constitution for a European Political Community,” International Organization, 05 1954 (Vol. 8, No. 2), p. 181–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The “draft” perished in the rubble of the Defense Community.
43 Le Monde, January 19, 1961.
44 Under the constitution of the Fifth Republic, Premier Debré should have represented France. It is a significant commentary on the nature of the system that on this, as on other important occasions like the summit conference, De Gaulle chose to speak for France.
45 André Fontaine in Le Monde, February 10, 1961.
46 The New York Times, February 9 and 12, 1961.
47 May 19, 1961, postponed, significantly enough, to July.
48 Communiqué (unofficial translation) in The New York Times, February 12, 1961.Google Scholar
49 Fontaine, op. cit.
50 The New York Times, February 17, 1961Google Scholar. The dispatch, it should be noted, came from Bonn, possibly further evidence that all West German authorities do not share Adenauer's enthusiasm for the “Little Europe of the Six.” It is also interesting to reflect that the economic and military issues involved in De Gaulle's proposals have led the Dutch to exactly the same position that the French Socialist leadership adopted eight years earlier regarding the Defense Community: a Europe with the United Kingdom might be organizationally weak, but a Europe without the United Kingdom would be dangerous.
51 Whose inaccurate description is quoted the author does not reveal.
52 Alastair, Buchan, NATO in the 1960's, London, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1960, p. 43.Google Scholar
53 The New York Times, November 19, 1959.Google Scholar
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