Whilst much of the literature focuses on debating polygamy as a harmful practice, the purpose of this paper is to consider a different form of harm by exploring judicial responses to this relationship and the women who engage with it. Over the years, the courts have been faced with numerous questions on the recognition and regulation of polygamous marriages. Commencing with an overview of existing literature on polygamous marriage, I situate and explain the post-colonial feminist-inspired conceptual framework that underpins my judicial discourse analysis of English case-law in this area spanning from 1866 to the present day. A post-colonial feminist lens exposes the racist, orientalist, imperialist and sexist attitudes permeating judicial language in relation to polygamy and its participants. These patterns of discourse subordinate women in polygamous marriages, leaving them in a vulnerable position. With time, these discourses seemingly fade but, through a closer reading of recent cases, it becomes evident that they are still present, albeit in a subtler form as a matter of public policy, morality and ‘good’.

This paper critically examines the ways in which the European Court of Human Rights represents applicants' religious and cultural practices in its legal discourse. Borrowing tools from critical discourse analysis and incorporating insights from the anti-essentialist critique, the paper suggests that the Court has most problematically depicted the practices of Muslim women, Sikhs and Roma Gypsies. The analysis reveals that, by means of a reifying language, the Court oftentimes equates these groups' practices with negative stereotypes or posits them as the group's ‘paradigmatic’ practice / way of life. The thrust of the argument is that these sorts of representation are problematic because of the exclusionary and inegalitarian dangers they carry both for the applicants and for their groups. In negatively stereotyping applicants' practices and in privileging certain group practices over others, these types of assessment underestimate what is at stake for the applicants and potentially exclude them from protection. Moreover, these types of reasoning risk sustaining hierarchies across and within groups. The paper concludes by sketching out an approach capable of mitigating stereotyping and essentialising risks.

This paper uses Teubner’s reinterpretation of Ehrlich’s idea of ‘living law’ in his paper on ‘Global Bukowina’ as a test case of what is involved in making a classical author speak to current issues. It argues that interpretation is a form of appropriation and that the process of re-contextualising ideas involves an unstable compromise between establishing what an author meant and what an author means.

This article analyses the structures and substances of personal systems of family law based on religious affiliation within their social, political and historical contexts, and explores the varied ways in which they implicate the human rights of those governed by these systems, and the way international law and jurisprudence of human rights respond to these challenges. This analysis suggests that looking at the specific manifestations of personal family law systems in concrete contexts illuminates significant human rights implications which have not received sufficient attention in mainstream human rights discourse, for various legal, cultural and political reasons. The contexts which this article will draw on are personal family law systems in Israel, India, Lebanon and Morocco, which comprise a varied sample of family law structures and legal, cultural, social and political contexts.

In this paper, I examine the current geographical location of Portuguese courts and the effects this territorial redefinition has had on the relationships between the justice system and the territories/populations in a context in which external and internal political factors, rather than a mere need to improve the justice system, have played a major role. Such an analysis entails three key elements: the geographic impacts on access to justice, in view of the emblematic presence of the state in the territories, both contrasted with the conflict between specialisation and the proximity of jurisdiction.

In this paper we examine the concept of vulnerability as it relates to the materiality of systems, the exclusion of human physical corporeality, and social exclusion in Luhmann's theory of social autopoiesis. We ask whether a concept of vulnerability can be included in autopoiesis in order to better conceptualise social exclusion and the excluded, with a view to understanding how, if at all, the dangers posed by this exclusion are mitigated by autopoietic processes. We are emphatically not returning to the human subject over operational systems, but seek instead to develop an understanding of the embodied nature of humans and their vulnerability within an autopoietic framework. We argue that the awareness of the risks to social functional differentiation posed by unmanaged exclusion – disenchantment, disassociation and, most drastically, dedifferentiation – provided by our analysis indicates why hyper-exclusion must be mitigated.

Trials of complex fraud cases have raised numerous contentious issues in terms of procedural fairness and public resources expenditure. This paper examines the management of complex fraud trials through the lens of managerialism in the criminal justice system, analysing its effects upon procedural efficiency of the trial. The paper draws on qualitative data gathered from observations of insider-dealing trials, and interviews with prosecuting and defence lawyers and a trial judge. The findings reveal that, in practice, although dangers to procedural efficiency are constantly present throughout the trial, its successful management depends on a combination of factors vested in the actors involved and the strategies used. Whilst the increased efficiency of the trials is a reflection of managerial approaches in case management, this does not necessarily indicate a negative development in the area of the control of business misconduct, and managerialism may not be necessarily entirely undesirable in the criminal justice system.

The present paper argues that the Doing Business indicators, their legitimacy (their ability to be defended through some logic or justification arising from standards) and the wider notions of legitimacy (the standards) that they promulgate are all best understood as social or, better still, ‘econosociolegal’ constructions. It tracks their, primarily post-financial crisis, re-co-construction within and beyond the World Bank from servant of the private sector and discipliner of states to something approaching social champion. But it warns that the perceptions of legitimacy that have been generated by those indicators may well linger.

Faith schools have (re)gained an increasingly prominent place within the public education system in the UK. Whilst the former Labour government expanded the number of state-funded faith schools during its terms in office, they continue to be supported by the current coalition government. The expansion of faith schooling has continued despite widespread opposition attributing much of the religious divisions and lack of community cohesion within society to faith schooling, particularly after ‘race riots’ in the north of England in 2001. This article does not seek to contribute to the largely polarised debate arguing either for or against faith schools. Instead, I explore how religion circulates in governmental discourse supporting faith schools and the sociopolitical work it does through law. I focus on the key contention put forward particularly by the former Labour government that faith schools, contrary to being divisive, can actually play an important role in the promotion of community cohesion, precisely because of the values and ethos of these schools. I examine how this governmental discourse is influenced by social capital and communitarian theories that highlight the role of Christian or church school values in fostering citizenship and community cohesion through education. I suggest that the influence of these theories on government policy has led to church schools becoming a benchmark for other schools to emulate, especially where they embody state/British values which are sometimes posited as being universal and secular. Rather than the expansion of faith schools being a policy that supports schools of all faiths, Muslim schools in particular have been singled out as posing a potential ‘threat to the nation’ and the social cohesion within it. In addition, I argue that the often invisibilised normative influence of de-theologised Christian/secular values plays a role in regulating the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ religion. The potential effects of delimiting religion through the discourse of values, coupled with the engendering of citizenship and belonging of children from minority religious/ethnic backgrounds within the education system, might also be viewed as effectively resulting in a form of ‘racial upliftment’. My analysis draws on critical religion and race perspectives that remain largely absent within socio-legal scholarship on law and religion and indeed citizenship. One exception is more recent scholarship on gender and the banning of Muslim religious dress in schools and other public spaces, and the recognition of certain areas of Muslim family law within Western legal systems. However, analyses that attend to the contingent ways in which religion can circulate and be produced through law relating to children are urgently needed alongside those attending to gender.

This article considers and assesses pseudo-public spaces, considering both physical and non-physical spaces. Presenting perspectives from law, geography, architecture and communication studies, it is argued that there are links between the conditions pertaining to shopping centres, redeveloped city centres, Internet service providers and websites. Particular attention is paid to unfulfilled claims regarding the promise of new spaces, or inconsistencies as between the form and substance of a given space. The owners of pseudo-public physical spaces use legal tools such as the right to exclude from private property, while the owners of pseudo-public virtual spaces often base the relationship with a user on contractual agreements; in both cases, concepts of fundamental rights are also affected, if not often vindicated. The consequences of these approaches are assessed, drawing on critical legal geography and the history of ‘common carriers’ and other forms of regulation.

The rule of law as a globally recognised concept is multi-faceted (Chesterman, 2008). In the common-law tradition, it is conceived through a formal and substantive framework. In essence, it centres on the supremacy of the law over the arbitrary exercise of power and the formal legality of the law (Tamanaha, 2004, p. 115; Cotterrell, 1992, p. 157). The rule-of-law concept has been criticised as being of unique European origin, where plural social organisation and universal natural law constitute its two preconditions (Unger, 1977, pp. 80–110). It has, however, been advocated around the world as one essential principle leading to modernity, where the legitimacy of the law based on the formal and substantive rule of law serves as a strong symbol for a modern society (Deflem, 1996, p. 5).

In a number of European countries there are fears that foreign, particularly Islamic, family law is becoming entrenched. All parties to this discussion see themselves as under threat. Migrant populations claim their right to cultural identity, while their host countries' domestic populations see a risk to social cohesion. Family law brings the underlying tensions into sharp focus. Cultural and religious identity and family law are interrelated in a number of ways and raise various complex issues. European legal systems have taken various approaches to meeting these challenges, many of which have been apologetic, and few of which have been informed by theory. I propose to examine this complexity and indicate areas in which conflicts may arise by analysing a family-law case involving migrants living transnationally. I will include questions of international private law, comments on the various degrees of consideration accorded to cultural identity within substantive family law, and remarks on models of legal pluralism and the dangers that go along with them. I will conclude with an evaluation of approaches which are process-based rather than institution-based.

Lord Neuberger describes open justice as a procedural principle requiring that ‘what goes on in court and what a court decides is open to scrutiny’ (Neuberger, 2011). The prime rationale given for this principle is that it is a safety check on procedural fairness. Such a conception of open justice applies on only a superficial level in inquests into use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state. This paper examines the practice of, and rationales behind, opening up use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state to scrutiny through inquests. They suggest a primarily intrinsic rather than instrumental link between openness and inquests’ purposes, which requires a reframing of traditional conceptions of open justice in this context. It is further argued that recognition theory can provide the normative link between openness and justice in these circumstances – a link that is implicit in the term ‘open justice’ but rarely explored in inquests.

Privacy rights are growing apace, as can be seen from a continuing stream of judgments from UK and European courts, the rise of special interest privacy groups and other institutions tasked to protect privacy. Privacy has – its proponents suggest – at last arrived as a fully fledged legal right. However, despite these advancements, I suggest that privacy is becoming less prevalent in society; primarily because of technological and cultural changes, but also because the technical legal implementation of privacy is highly problematic. In this article it is argued that this seeming paradox should be more critically examined by socio-legal researchers who, to date, have done little to test the assertions and assumptions of the privacy lobby. This article maintains that there is a need for more investigation of the basis and assumptions behind data protection and privacy law and that a more robust analysis of the claims and rhetoric for these rights will change our attitudes towards privacy developments. The sociological conception that ‘underlying all social interaction there seems to be a fundamental dialectic’ will be used to undermine the legal notion of privacy as an individualistic ‘fundamental right’.

In 2001, the Legal Services Commission (LSC) introduced a new pilot, the Family Advice and Information Network (FAInS), which recognised that family law clients typically face a cluster of legal and non-legal issues. Family lawyers involved in FAInS were encouraged to address a client’s legal problems, and then refer the client to other services for assistance with non-legal issues. In this way, family law clients were to be offered a holistic service, with the lawyer acting as a ‘case manager’ who helped match services to their client’s individual needs. This article presents data drawn from an evaluation of FAInS, and shows that lawyers did not regularly refer their clients to other services, with referrals largely being limited to mediation. We conclude that family lawyers are not necessarily the most appropriate gatekeepers, and propose a number of alternatives for providing a multi-agency approach to resolving family law issues.

The largely unfettered realm of hardware and software code offers limitless possibilities in expanding the use and influence of information and communication technologies. As transcendent technologies they are unrestrained by the divergent equivalence of human categories of difference such as gender, race and class, or conceptual binary oppositions such as good/evil, happy/sad, freedom/oppression. Whilst a material grounding in earlier forms of embodied social experience remains an essential precondition of interaction with virtual systems, it is suggested that the virtual world is in the process of transforming the real world or, at least, subordinating it as slave to the machine world. This shift has fostered an imbalance of power between human and the posthuman, and consequently the epoch of the machine is often alleged to be both modern miracle and monster. Just as at a human level, rational thought processes restrain ideas which are unruly and require control, ICT advancements have proliferated to the point where these technologies also need to be classified, constrained where necessary, and diluted into the real world in real time. In this current climate of endless technological transformation, along with the growth of mass surveillance technologies together with the expansion of regulatory state powers, it is clear that any further innovations cannot be left to market forces without first considering the groundwork for the development of an appropriate monitoring mechanism. Before an appropriate set of regulatory mechanisms can be explicated, it is first necessary to consider the nature of the evolving transgressive human–machine relationship and the possible implications for humanity in the modern hypermediated world.

The Indian government has recently introduced legislation to regulate ‘altruistic’ surrogacy while banning ‘commercial’ surrogacy amidst the criticism that India has become the ‘baby factory’. In the past decade, academic discourse has raised socioethical and legal issues that surfaced in the unrestricted transnational commercial-surrogacy industry. Most of the literature and ethnographic studies centred on the issues of informed consent, autonomy, decision-making and exploitation. With the proposed legislation, the Indian government has shown its will to regulate surrogacy, including the medical intermediaries as well as the contract between the intending parents and the surrogate mother-to-be. The present paper addresses the legal and socioethical context in which India introduced the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019. It examines the extent to which the proposed law responds to the legal challenges and socioethical concerns that surfaced in the course of unregulated transnational commercial-surrogacy arrangements in India. It argues that, even though the proposed legislation addresses and responds to some of the legal and ethical concerns such as informed consent and legal parentage, it stops short of ensuring the welfare and well-being of the surrogate. Second, the legal certainty of parentage and the child's rights comes at the cost of the physical and psychological well-being of the surrogate. Finally, it argues that, by presupposing the surrogate as an autonomous agent and yet imposing the requirement of marriage, the Bill overlooks the sociocultural realities of patriarchal hierarchies entrenched in Indian society – that, in its conception of ‘family’, the focus on the ‘traditional’ family not only presents a narrow view of the heteronormative family and perpetuates the patriarchal notions of gender roles, but also fails to take into consideration maternal pluralism in surrogacy arrangements, undermines the modern family and, above all, discriminates against the single person's and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) communities’ right to found a family. Since many countries that served as centres for international commercial-surrogacy arrangement (such as Cambodia, Thailand and Nepal) have recently started to take steps to prohibit or limit transnational surrogacy arrangements, the analysis of Indian law in the present paper will provide a useful context within which these countries can effectively regulate surrogacy while safeguarding the surrogate's rights and interests.

This article examines how the adoption of children under Hindu law in India is regarded by British private international law and immigration law. Through an analysis of case-law, it focuses particularly on how British judges regard the legitimacy of exclusion by the British immigration control system of children who have been adopted under a ‘foreign’ legal system which essentially permits private adoption arrangements. Examining the background to the regime of Indian Hindu law adoptions (which applies to Sikhs as well as Hindus), and the private international law and immigration rules which apply to such adoptees in the UK, the article finds some evidence in the judicial decisions of a more activist, human-rights-based, plurality-conscious position being taken. However, tracking the case-law further, the article concludes that such activism has not been followed through in more recent decisions leaving the conflictual position between transnational adopters and British legal systems largely unresolved.

The long history of suicide as a criminal offence still has a significant contemporary effect on how it is perceived, conceptualised and adjudged. This is particularly the case within countries where suicide is largely determined within a coronial system, such as Australia, the UK and the US. This paper details the outcomes of a study involving semi-structured interviews with coroners both in England and Australia, as well as observations at inquests. It focuses around the widely held contention that the suicide rates produced within these coronial systems are underestimations of anywhere between 15 to 50 per cent. The results of these interviews suggest that there are three main reasons for this systemic underestimation. The first reflects the legacy of suicide as a criminal offence, resulting in the highest standard of proof for findings of suicide in the UK, and a continuing stigma attached to families of the deceased. The second is the considerable pressure brought to bear upon coroners by the family of the deceased, who, because of that stigma, commonly agitate for any finding other than that of suicide. The third involves the rise of ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’, wherein coroners take on the responsibility of the emotional well-being of the grieving families, which in turn affects the likelihood of reaching a finding of suicide. The conclusions drawn by the paper are also twofold: first – with respect to the stigma of suicide – it will take a lot more than simple decriminalisation to change deeply held social perceptions within the community. Second, given that suicide prevention programmes and policies are based on such deeply questionable statistics, targeted changes to coronial legislation and practice would appear to be required.

Political liberalism suggests state power must be exercised and justified on terms all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse, independently of their comprehensive identities or worldviews. For Rawls, a democratic community cannot be united by any shared ends or identities other than those connected with the political conception of justice itself. Republican political thought often seems to undermine this ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’ through its stronger demands of social cohesion and participative civic virtue. Conversely, however, it generally seeks to define citizenship independently of any non-political commonalities citizens might be assumed to share. This theoretical tension was reflected in recent French republican discourses on Islam, gender and national identity. France's recent prohibition on public face-veiling coincided with an officially orchestrated debate on national identity which seemed to challenge the traditional republican conception of national identity as a purely civic and political construct. While couched in republican terminologies, these recent discourses seemed to understand the principle of laïcité, or constitutional secularism, as a bulwark for the pre-political dimensions of national identity. Accordingly, this article outlines how these discourses on religion and gender illuminated tensions and contradictions within the prevailing republican account of national identity.