By ratifying the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2018, Ireland has undertaken inter alia the obligation to implement ‘an inclusive education system at all levels and lifelong learning’, as required by Article 24. However, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the practice of inclusive education in Ireland in terms of admission policies, funding, school choice and reduced timetabling. This paper investigates whether, and to what extent, the current approach to special educational needs (SEN) in Ireland complies with the aim of ensuring an inclusive educational system in which children with disabilities are valued and empowered. Ireland is an interesting case-study due to its history of marginalisation of children with disabilities and its relatively recent engagement with the concept of inclusive education. By using a socio-legal approach, drawing on qualitative interviews with key stakeholders in education combined with a legal analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources, it examines the current practices relating to the education of children with disabilities in Ireland.

The context of this paper is the several innovative reforms since the Australian government changed the family-law system more than forty years ago with the enactment of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Whilst no-fault divorce was introduced over four decades ago, the watershed effect of replacing a blaming culture with a collaborative problem-solving approach to family disputing has provided a stepping stone for a progressive pathway to less adversarialism in family conflict. This narrative resonates throughout the family-law system today. It also continues to guide the justice discourse in family matters. This paper focuses on developments in the family-law system canvassing several legislative amendments that demonstrate the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a means of improving access to justice in relation to family disputes in Australia. It is argued that, in the family-law system, justice and ADR are inextricably linked. In support of this contention, the growth, development and evaluation of family dispute resolution is considered; access to justice issues that arise are highlighted. Finally, it reviews ramifications for the future considering recommendations from the recent inquiry into the family-law system.

The paper compares the involvement of four regional economic courts in legal disputes mirroring constitutional, political and social crises at national or regional levels. These four judicial bodies of the EU, the Andean Community, the East African Community and the Central American Integration System have all faced varied forms of resistance to their involvement and their general authority. By comparing these four case-studies from across the globe, the paper identifies institutional and contextual factors that explain the uneven resistance. While the regional economic courts in Central America and East Africa were subject to backlash from the Member States, their counterparts in Europe and Latin America avoided backlash but at the price of achieving only a narrow authority.

Since Lon Fuller published his 1930 trilogy of essays on the topic, students of the legal fiction have focused on identifying additional examples of fictions or challenging Fuller's classic taxonomy. But Fuller did more in these essays than propose a definition and a classification system; he also argued that legal fictions are examples of a more general phenomenon found in many systems of specialised language usage. Drawing on work done in the intervening decades on related issues outside the law, this paper develops this insight in new directions, seeking to understand in more detail one of Fuller's principal concerns: the points at which legal language stops communicating, points that may shift over time but will never completely disappear. The analysis indicates that the currently prevailing understanding of legal fictions as, in essence, consciously counterfactual propositions is historically contingent and incomplete; that legal writers have generally used the ‘legal fiction’ label to signal those writers' sense of the futility of further justification to a non-legal audience (even when they are using the term in a justification likely to be read only by a legal audience); and, contrary to the assumptions of many post-Fuller theorists, that the boundaries of the legal vocabularies recognised as self-justifying may have become less distinct over the past century.

I argue that law is not best considered an essentially contested concept. After first explaining the notion of essential contestability and disaggregating law into several related concepts, I show that the most basic and general concept of law does not fit within the criteria offered for essential contestation. I buttress this claim with the explanation that essential contestation is itself a framework for understanding complex concepts and therefore should only be applied when it would yield a greater understanding of uses of the concept to which it is applied. I then show that, even if law meets some basic criteria of essential contestation, applying the appellation does not helpfully illuminate the most general concept of law and therefore it should not be used, while allowing that it might be more useful for the related concept of the rule of law.

States utilise international law to create opportunities within global markets for private transnational economic actors, such as multinational oil companies, to invest and/or operate within foreign jurisdictions. However, there is a lack of directly enforceable international mechanisms against these private actors when they cause environmental damage abroad. International law responses to this problem range from the establishment of international compulsory compensation schemes, the proposed expansion of the doctrine of state responsibility to include liability for private actors, and more recently through litigation in the home states of multinational oil companies. However, both international jurisprudence and US, Dutch and British domestic case-law reveal an ambivalence towards holding such private transnational economic actors legally accountable in their home state jurisdictions for violations committed abroad. Certain states (the US and France) that have suffered environmental damage from the activities of multinational oil companies have responded by reasserting their domestic regulatory powers to require immediate clean up and compensation, prior to domestic judicial litigation. Other states (Nigeria) are unable to achieve the same level of effective enforcement due to their weaker political and economic bargaining positions.

This paper attempts first to explain Bentham's distinction between a fiction and the name of a fictitious entity, and to relate that distinction to his rationale for the critique of legal fictions. A second goal of the paper is to investigate the tensions involved in Bentham's ontology and epistemology, and more specifically the tension between the objectivist and subjectivist Bentham. It is argued that Bentham's objections to legal fictions were traceable to their use in deceptive or fallacious argument, whilst his logic provided a means of rehabilitating the use of the names of those fictitious entities which could be explicated through his technique of paraphrasis (that is, explained in terms of real entities), in relation to which both meaning and truth might be exchanged. This realist perspective differs markedly from that of Fuller, who, following Vaihinger, rejects the attempt to replace fiction with truth. There are significant areas of agreement between Bentham and Fuller, on the figurative nature of much language, and even, in certain contexts, on the utility of the self-conscious deployment of fictions. However, in the context of law and morality, it appears that his development of a route to truth through paraphrasis makes Bentham the enemy of fictions, since, in this field at least, truth and utility stand or fall together.

There is currently no mechanism – no journal, no learned society – somehow integrating Portuguese sociology of law, despite a considerable academic production. In an attempt to appreciate globally and substantially this production, this paper takes as a starting point the theory of semi-periphery formulated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos in the 1980s, and revisits the findings of socio-legal research carried out in Portugal over the recent decades in the light of that theory. The conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise is that the theory of semi-periphery – provided it is upgraded in order to better take into account features of recent processes of globalisation – still supplies a valuable framework for the reflection on the social, economic and political conditions that favour uses of the law as a tool for human groupings to govern themselves.

The Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 found that people’s experiences and self-knowledge were mislabelled as a ‘lack of insight’. Insight, a psychiatric concept, is defined as an ability to recognise one’s mental illness, awareness of one’s symptoms and compliance with treatment. Across different jurisdictions, legal scholars have raised concerns about the influence of insight on legal provisions for psychiatric care and mental capacity assessments, given its prevalent use in psychiatry and its absence from statutory criteria. However, outside of these findings, little is known about people’s lived experiences of ‘insight’ and the law. This article draws on narrative and photo-elicitation interviews with psychiatric survivors to argue that insight is an extra-legislative proxy for regulating involuntary detention and other coercion masked as consent. Finally, this article draws on the capabilities approach to deliver a justice argument for creating real opportunities to provide informed consent in mental health settings.

The impact of ‘bad’ science on judicial decision-making is a thorny aspect of the relationship between science and law. This study employs doctrinal and empirical analysis to explore two Italian judgments that asserted a causal link between childhood vaccines and autism. Using a combination of actor–network theory and legal pragmatism, we uncovered a network of actors and institutions internal and external to the legal system enabling these impactful decisions that went on to contribute to a crisis in vaccination coverage in Italy. These include trial strategies, resources, communication practices between arms of government, awareness and responsiveness of institutional actors, and institutional mechanisms governing the integration of scientific expertise into the legal process. By forensically analysing how a ‘zombie idea’ received a patent of legitimacy in the Italian context, this study provides useful lessons for legal systems grappling with complex and contested public health matters.

I will start this review with a lengthy statement, setting out what I believe is the importance of a rights agenda. The language of rights can make visible what has too long been suppressed. It can lead to new stories being heard in public. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow (1987, p. 52) has put it: ‘Each time we let in a new excluded group, each time we listen to a new way of knowing, we learn more about the limits of our current way of seeing.’

The article aims to test the boundaries of traditional notions and understandings of citizenship and security in transitional societies through the framing of a given question – should paramilitary ex-prisoners be allowed to join the police? The question, considered through an examination of the particular experience of Northern Ireland, acts as a springboard to the deconstruction of broader traditional and transitional assumptions around citizenship and the delivery of security in societies seeking ways out of violent conflict. The article is ultimately concerned, not so much to deliver a final answer to the specifics of the question posed in all contexts, but to problematise notions of citizenship and State to the point where broader questions need to be asked around accepted and preconceived notions of inclusivity, citizenship and security.

Bountiful, British Columbia is Canada’s only openly polygamous community. Public discussions about Bountiful suggest that the only form of marriage practised there is polygamous, and that this is usually harmful to women and children. This article suggests that this monolithic representation of marriage in Bountiful misses the conjugal pluralism that exists in this community. Part I sets out the typical portrayal of marriage in Bountiful offered by Canadian public and political discussions. Part II contrasts this portrayal with five stories about marriage in Bountiful that the author observed or was told about while conducting field research. These stories indicate that conjugal heterogeneity is both existent and accepted in Bountiful. They also suggest that, in becoming and being a wife in Bountiful, women can experience varying degrees of choice and agency. All of this is relevant to exploring how a fuller recognition of the conjugal diversity and choices that may exist in a place like Bountiful might affect formal juridical approaches to polygamy.

This article explores a primary source of legal studies, case-law, as a form of narrative in the context of indigenous land rights, and considers how this narrative negotiates pre-colonial land claims in a post-colonial context. Its case-study is the South Pacific island country of Vanuatu, a small-island, least-developed, nation-state, where laws introduced under Anglo–French colonial administration are still retained and sit uneasily alongside the customary forms of land tenure which govern ninety percent of all land in the islands. The article looks at the traditional and changing role of narrative presented as evidence by claimants and their witnesses against a context of rapid social and economic change, and asks whether the metamorphosis of narrative signals the future survival or imminent demise of customary indigenous land rights and what that might mean for these island people faced by the pressures of development.

Long at the margins of international law, property is now among the key challenges facing international law- and decision-makers. A ‘shrinking’ planet and a polycentric international law regime provide the backdrop for contestation between different property concepts and claims. While presenting important commonalities in legal concepts and normative content, international investment law and international human rights law protect different and possibly competing rights, reflect different balances of commercial and non-commercial considerations, and embody different standards of legal protection. As the frontiers of natural resource extraction expand, natural resource investments can bring different property concepts and claims directly into tension. In this context, the articulation between investment law and human rights law influences the ways in which international law mediates competition for the world's natural resources, redefining the balance between public and private interests and reshaping spaces for the lawful exercise of state sovereignty.

In many parts of the world, the adoption of alternative dispute-resolution (ADR) processes was premised on creating better access to justice for citizens, particularly those with lesser means (Woolf, 1996; Access to Justice Advisory Committee, 1994). ADR's foundational link with access to justice is in relation to not only justice as a process for the resolution of disputes, but also justice in relation to equality of access and equitable outcomes. This Special Issue focuses on the relationship between ADR and access to justice in various contexts and jurisdictions, including Australia, China, England and Wales, Scotland and Singapore, and within the family-law system in Australia. The papers engage in a critical discussion of ADR's contribution to access to justice in the resolution of disputes and, in particular, the extent to which ADR has contributed to improved access to justice. In doing this, the papers highlight the role of access-to-justice discourse in the development and growth of ADR; where available, review evaluations of access to justice in relation to ADR initiatives; and, finally, reflect on the future of ADR and access to justice.

Whilst much of the literature focuses on debating polygamy as a harmful practice, the purpose of this paper is to consider a different form of harm by exploring judicial responses to this relationship and the women who engage with it. Over the years, the courts have been faced with numerous questions on the recognition and regulation of polygamous marriages. Commencing with an overview of existing literature on polygamous marriage, I situate and explain the post-colonial feminist-inspired conceptual framework that underpins my judicial discourse analysis of English case-law in this area spanning from 1866 to the present day. A post-colonial feminist lens exposes the racist, orientalist, imperialist and sexist attitudes permeating judicial language in relation to polygamy and its participants. These patterns of discourse subordinate women in polygamous marriages, leaving them in a vulnerable position. With time, these discourses seemingly fade but, through a closer reading of recent cases, it becomes evident that they are still present, albeit in a subtler form as a matter of public policy, morality and ‘good’.

Death investigation and coronial practices have undergone significant social, political and legal scrutiny in recent years. A wave of coronial reform has occurred across jurisdictions, including in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada and New Zealand, with a concomitant focus on the adequacy of death investigation law and policy. Taking key coronial developments in the UK and Australia as its starting point, this paper explores a legal jurisdiction undergoing immense legal and policy reform to illustrate why coronial law and practice is of increasing scholarly interest. It begins by tracing the contentious landscape of UK coronial law reform, which has also resonated internationally, thereafter examining key controversies that refocused attention on the value of the jurisdiction, before discussing contemporary coronial issues including, publicity, human rights and death prevention.

This paper critically examines the ways in which the European Court of Human Rights represents applicants' religious and cultural practices in its legal discourse. Borrowing tools from critical discourse analysis and incorporating insights from the anti-essentialist critique, the paper suggests that the Court has most problematically depicted the practices of Muslim women, Sikhs and Roma Gypsies. The analysis reveals that, by means of a reifying language, the Court oftentimes equates these groups' practices with negative stereotypes or posits them as the group's ‘paradigmatic’ practice / way of life. The thrust of the argument is that these sorts of representation are problematic because of the exclusionary and inegalitarian dangers they carry both for the applicants and for their groups. In negatively stereotyping applicants' practices and in privileging certain group practices over others, these types of assessment underestimate what is at stake for the applicants and potentially exclude them from protection. Moreover, these types of reasoning risk sustaining hierarchies across and within groups. The paper concludes by sketching out an approach capable of mitigating stereotyping and essentialising risks.

This paper uses Teubner’s reinterpretation of Ehrlich’s idea of ‘living law’ in his paper on ‘Global Bukowina’ as a test case of what is involved in making a classical author speak to current issues. It argues that interpretation is a form of appropriation and that the process of re-contextualising ideas involves an unstable compromise between establishing what an author meant and what an author means.