This article challenges the rhetoric of hardening, according to which international standards become binding through WTO endorsement. The analysis of the system of presumptions set up in the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement reveals that international standards are actually used as a ‘ceiling’ rather than a ‘floor’ benchmark of protection, contrary to their original spirit. They represent a codified and agreed yardstick for least trade-restrictive measures, a minimum compromise between the regulatory regime and the trade litigation machinery. It follows that their nature—at least within the WTO system—is irreversibly distorted; they are treated as facts rather than as safety or quality devices.

In November 1995 a draft resolution was presented to the 28th General Conference of UNESCO which, among other matters, dealt with the organisation's future activities in the field of the underwater cultural heritage.1 In conjunction with this resolution, the text of a draft Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage prepared by the International Law Association (ILA) was presented to the General Conference as the possible basis for a new international convention on the subject.2 Annexed to this draft Convention text was the Charter for the Protection and Management of the Underwater Cultural Heritage prepared by the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)3 to accompany the ILA draft Convention and serve as a set of criteria of good practice to be applied by States parties to the Convention. The General Conference adopted the draft resolution without any change and this therefore forms the basis for future deliberations within UNESCO over this issue, the question whether to draft an international convention on the basis of the ILA draft text having been a central part of the deliberations. Subsequent to the adoption of the resolution, meetings have been held between UNESCO and various bodies with an interest in the issue (such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International Oceanographic Commission as well as the UN Law of the Sea office). Following these consultations, it was agreed to hold a joint meeting of representatives of these organisations with chosen experts in order to examine the ILA draft Convention along with any other material relevant to a new legal instrument for the protection of the underwater cultural heritage.

There was a time when international law was perceived as consisting of a manageable corpus of rules over a finite, ascertainable subject matter, relevant to the relations of States with each other.

This article examines the legality of the options that may be open to a State that is unwilling to accept a legal obligation created by a human rights treaty it has already ratified. It briefly addresses the subject of ‘derogation’ from human rights treaties before looking in detail at denunciation of the same. It proceeds to examine the legality of strategies such as entering a late reservation to a human rights treaty and of denouncing the treaty with the sole purpose of entering a new reservation to it.

The article critically reviews the litigation framework of the Chinese International Commercial Court (‘CICC’) using a comparative approach, taking as a benchmark the Singapore International Commercial Court (‘SICC’)—another Asian international commercial court situated within the Belt and Road Initiative (‘BRI’) geography. It argues that the CICC, despite being lauded as a visionary step toward an innovative, efficient and trustworthy dispute resolution system, does not live up to those grand claims on closer scrutiny. The discussion shows that the CICC is in many respects insular and conservative when compared with the SICC. The distinctions between the two litigation frameworks may be explained by the differences in objectives. Whereas the SICC was created to compete for international judicial business and bolster Singapore as a leading dispute resolution hub, the CICC is presently designed to provide a legal safeguard in BRI disputes with Chinese elements. This article also identifies major challenges confronting the CICC and sets out proposals for change.

International law prohibits slavery and slavery-like practices under treaties that have been in force for more than a century. Yet, contemporary forms of slavery are one of the prevailing challenges for the international community, with 40.3 million people in modern slavery on any given day in 2016. The State has been largely overlooked as a perpetrator or accomplice in the global movement to eradicate modern slavery. The hand of the State can however be found in contemporary cases of modern slavery. This article identifies five scenarios of State involvement in modern slavery and aims to uncover and bridge the responsibility gap.

The case law generated in just over two years' operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), enables stocktaking rather than definitive appraisal.1 This article begins by recalling the markedly contrasting roles in United Kingdom law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) before and after the HRA, the better to appreciate judicial approaches to, and use of, the HRA in the areas surveyed. The second part of the article focuses on judicial use of key provisions of the HRA to interpret primary legislation said to conflict with one or more Convention rights and on judicial use of the power to make a declaration of incompatibility. It considers a selection of decisions, principally of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal, which raise important points regarding the purpose and scope of the HRA as a constitutional document and indicate judicial uncertainty as to how the HRA should be conceptualised, interpreted and applied. With this emerging picture of a cautious and uncertain judiciary in mind, the final two sections of the article give detailed consideration to the post-HRA jurisprudence within two discrete areas of English law. Part III explores the impact of the HRA on judicial approaches to the clash between the freedoms of expression and assembly, on the one hand, and public order, on the other. Part IV considers the ‘use and abuse’ of the HRA and of Article 8 ECHR in private law family disputes. Finally, certain tentative conclusions as to the perhaps disappointing story of the HRA so far, will be proffered.

Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is generally perceived to be of a rather ‘specialist and technical nature’. However, for the many UK and EU citizens, families and businesses who work, live, travel and do business abroad, the current European framework for choice of law, jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement is of paramount importance. The article, therefore, explores how that framework might look like after Brexit and explores the merits and demerits of the various ways forward. It argues that the best option for both the UK and the EU would be to agree on the continued application of the existing EU instruments or to strive for conclusion of a new agreement that closely replicates these instruments. If no such agreement can be reached the UK should decide to apply the Rome I and Rome II Regulations unilaterally and sign the Lugano Convention of 2007 as well as the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 2005.

The law applicable to arbitration is not the law applicable in arbitration. The latter determines arbitrators' decisions. The former refers to the source of their authority: the legal order that governs arbitration. According to the territorialist thesis, an arbitration can have no foundation other than that of the legal order of the particular State in which the arbitration takes place. This outdated conception is disproved by the simple factual observation that a plurality of legal orders may give effect to arbitration. Some French scholars promote the notion of an autonomous arbitral order. Inasmuch as they ultimately seek to establish this order by positing its recognition by the very State orders from which they claim autonomy, their idea is circular and in effect no more than a dressed-up variant of ordinary horizontal pluralism. But the model of horizontal pluralism fails to account for important orderings of arbitral activity. Arbitration in modern society is accurately perceived as a complex, three-dimensional form of pluralism, in which legal orders (i) are not exclusively those of States and (ii) frequently overlap.

The recognition of foreign judgments lacking reasons raises several policy issues. Reason-giving is perceived by the European Court of Human Rights as critical to ensure an effective access to justice. Yet, foreign judgments often lack reasons because the defendant failed to appear before the foreign court, and it may be right to sanction this strategy of foreign court avoidance. Finally, the European Union has begun to implement its policy of efficiency of cross-border enforcement, which commands states to recognize such judgments irrespective of any other consideration. This article explores whether these conflicting issues can be reconciled.

This article argues that judicial independence is a poor indicator of the capacity of courts effectively to resolve commercial disputes. Judicial power is a more accurate measure because it assesses whether courts have sufficient jurisdiction, discretionary authority and enforcement powers to make decisions over socially meaningful commercial problems. In fact, judicial independence may reduce the power of newly emerging commercial courts in socialist-transforming Asia, which need politics to protect them from interference by powerful governments and private investors. This article explores the trade-offs between judicial power and political patronage by inquiring into the circumstances where patronage may slide into interference. It also investigates the conditions in which judges are most likely to acquire or arrogate discretionary powers to understand politics on their terms. Finally, this article analyses the highly polarized views in this region about what constitutes valid judicial determinations. The message for international agencies contemplating judicial reforms is that reducing political influence and promoting law-based decisions will not uniformly generate popular support and legitimacy for courts.

The Warsaw conference, 2013, marked the halfway point from the Durban conference, 2011, that launched negotiations towards a 2015 climate agreement and the Paris conference, 2015, slated as the deadline for these negotiations. As such, the Warsaw conference needed to register a step change in the process—from the airing of differences to negotiating them. It also needed to create the conditions necessary to reach agreement in 2015. This article analyses the outcome of the Warsaw negotiations with a view to determining the extent to which it paves the way for a 2015 climate agreement. In particular, this article explores the divisions over, prospects for and contours of a likely 2015 agreement. The 2015 agreement is likely to be shaped by the resolution Parties arrive at on three overarching issues. These are: architecture—whether the agreement will be ‘top-down’ (prescriptive) or ‘bottom-up’ (facilitative) or a hybrid version of the two; differentiation—the nature and extent of it, and in particular whether it will eschew or replicate the Kyoto model of differentiation and related vision of equity; and legal form—whether the 2015 agreement will be legally binding, and if yes, as is likely, which elements of the 2015 package will be in the legally binding instrument and which elements will be in non-binding complementary decisions. The Warsaw outcome will therefore be analysed with a view to providing insights into the likely architecture and legal form of as well as treatment of differentiation and equity in the 2015 agreement.