For lawyers in general, and international lawyers in particular, democracy is a neglected concept. Discourse is dominated by the ideas of human rights for individuals and minority or self-determination rights for groups. Those who seek greater protection for vulnerable members of a community argue for the recognition of new rights, or the more effective implementation of existing rights. They do not argue for more democracy. Indeed, given that claims for human and minority rights are not made only against authoritarian governments, but also democratic ones, there must exist an implied assumption that democracy is, by itself, not capable of protecting the interests of vulnerable minorities. Moreover, as the form of government which apparently venerates the will of the majority, democracy might be considered by some as being downright hostile to the interests of individuals and minorities.

Lord Casey's sad testament to an organisation which was perceived as “on the way to becoming not much more than a paper connection” is hardly encouraging to someone intent on studying the institution. It would appear that the Commonwealth of Nations as a contemporary discussion point is even less fashionable today than it was 30 years ago. It has recently been written that in our generation those few individuals with an opinion about the Commonwealth view it as an “anachronistic organization whose retirement to the pages of history is long overdue”. The situation of an Australian attempting to write about the Commonwealth is confused by the need to distinguish it from the “Commonwealth of Australia” by such adjectives as the “British” Commonwealth or the “Commonwealth of Nations”.

In 2001 Ireland commenced litigation against the United Kingdom (UK) over the construction and operation of a plant to produce mixed oxide fuels at the Sellafield nuclear complex in north-west England. This litigation, which had been only partially concluded at the time of writing, raises a series of fascinating and often complex issues of both international and EU law. These include the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between different international tribunals; the division of competence between the EC and its Member States in relation to participation in treaties; and the use of litigation as a strategy for settling inter-State disputes. The aim of this article, apart from giving a snapshot of the position that the increasingly tortuous course of this litigation had reached by January 2004, is to explore these issues. The article begins by setting out the background to the litigation and giving a quick overview of its course so far. It then explores in more detail the questions of overlapping jurisdiction of international tribunals and of EC law raised by the litigation, before concluding with a few, rather speculative, thoughts about Ireland's choice of litigation as a strategy.

The Council should not commit itself to procedures which in practice might prove to be excessively rigid, since each dispute with which the Council has to deal has unique characteristics. Attention has been drawn to the danger that any premature formalization of the procedures of the Council might impede the latter in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Charter.1

The subject of this article is public participation in the NAAEC. It will be analysed against the background of certain other international conventions that make provision, in one way or another, for public participation in relation to environmental protection, in particular, the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the ‘Aarhus Convention’) and the 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland and Sweden (the ‘Nordic Convention’). The 1950 European Convention of Human Rights will also be referred to in so far as it secures public participation and from the point of view of its effectiveness in assisting in the enforcement of national environmental law. Reference to these instruments will, however, be limited to that which is relevant to the present essay.

The texts of two brief judgments by district judges at Bow Street are reproduced below. In each case, an application was made for proceedings against a serving foreign official to answer allegations in England of conduct which constituted crimes against international law which were within the jurisdiction of the English court, even though committed abroad and by non-UK nationals. In each case, the judge decided that the official was protected by the law of State immunity rationae personae against the proceedings and the applications were dismissed.

An issue has recently arisen in international criminal law concerning the gravity of the offences listed in the Statutes of the International Tribunals: Should offences be ranked according to their seriousness and, hence, as entailing heavier or lighter punishment? Should the same act when charged as a crime against humanity or genocide be punished more severely than when charged as a war crime?

This paper examines whether the evolving jurisprudence on necessity as developed by the WTO adjudicatory bodies reflects the same balance between trade liberalization and regulatory autonomy as that contained in the WTO treaty texts, particularly with regard to the GATT. It is argued that a divergence can be observed which raises questions of competence, legitimacy and transparency. Specific amendments to the prevailing test are also proposed in order to achieve what the author suggests is a textually consistent, and thus legitimate, necessity test of equal efficacy.

With its judgment in Leyla Şahin v Turkey,1 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has once again addressed the place of religion within the European Convention system. The Court considers two types of cases. The first focuses on individuals but has repercussions on the relationship between State and religious communities. The Court is much more individualistic in these cases, in that it focuses more on the individual and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Court emphasizes values such as the prevention of indoctrination, neutrality, secularism and laïcité, especially in relation to Islam. The Court tries to promote and enforce a normative order of secularism but this has unfortunate consequences for religious freedom. The second deals with the compatibility of entire domestic regimes regulating religious affairs with the Convention, including questions of legal personality and registration, leadership and property ownership, positive obligations of the State towards the protection of religious communities against third parties, and freedom of religious choice. The aim is to promote tolerance, religious diversity, pluralism and a market place within religious beliefs. It will be shown that these two strands in the caselaw do not always sit happily together.

This article examines the legacy of the ground-breaking judgment in Aydin v Turkey in which the European Court of Human Rights held that rape could constitute torture. Ten years on, it examines jurisprudential developments in the conceptualisation of torture in the specific context of the offence of rape. It is argued that while all rapes should be found to satisfy the minimum threshold for Article 3, rape does not per se satisfy the severity of harm criterion for torture. Nonetheless, where the severity of harm is established, the case is made that the purposive element of torture is satisfied in all cases of rape. Finally, in relation to the scope of State responsibility for rape, particularly by private individuals, the article suggests that while the Court's achievements in recognizing rape as a serious harm are considerable, there remain further avenues for jurisprudential development which would ensure that rape as a form of torture is recognized in a wider range of situations and circumstances than is currently the case.

The worldwide repercussions of the Enron collapse have placed the effectiveness of the EC's system of securities and investment services market regulation, particularly with respect to disclosure, market transparency, and auditor independence, under a harsh spotlight.1 But the regime was already undergoing a sea change that may have longstanding repercussions for how EC securities and investment services markets are regulated. In particular, sweeping changes have been made to the way in which EC securities and investment services measures are adopted. These changes have set the stage for a dramatic change in the detail, regulatory sophistication, and degree of intervention in Member States' system of the EC securities and investment services regime. They have not, however, required a Treaty revision but are based on the comitology process for delegated law making.