This article is part of a larger international investigation of the effects of a country's legal origins on the style of business regulation. We employ an innovative ‘leximetric’ methodology to numerically code the protective strength of Australian corporate law for both shareholder and creditor protection for the period 1970 to 2010. This leximetric methodology has been used in a prominent international debate concerning the development of legal rules and the effects of different styles of regulation on a range of economic outcomes—the legal origins debate. Drawing on similar data compiled by Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems in five other countries (France, Germany, India, the UK and the US) for the period 1970 to 2005, we compare changes in the level of protection afforded to Australian shareholders and creditors with developments in other countries. Our analysis finds that in Australia there was a sustained upward trend in shareholder protection, but not in the case of creditor protection. Compared to the five other countries, the level of protection afforded to shareholders under Australian law was relatively high, and this was the case for the level of protection afforded to creditors as well. We also examine the extent of convergence and divergence in shareholder and creditor protection among the countries in the study. We find persistent divergence in shareholder protection, with the extent of divergence in 2005 similar to that in 1970. For creditor protection, we find increasing divergence among the countries over the period of study. Our findings are not supportive of legal origins theory.

This article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.

This article seeks to make sense of two seemingly contradictory aspects of the General Assembly's practice: its history of recommending to States that they impose unilateral sanctions; and its series of resolutions denouncing unilateral coercive measures as illegal. It examines the seeming discrepancy between the customary international law position regarding unilateral sanctions, and the position asserted by the Assembly, and argues that on a nuanced reading of the Assembly's resolutions, these positions are not so divergent as is often supposed. The article concludes by examining the scope for the Assembly to make future sanctions recommendations, consistently with its prior condemnation of unilateral coercive measures.

This article examines how the European Court of Human Rights has clarified its jurisprudence on how the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention Article 13 exceptions are to be applied in a manner that is consistent with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It also analyses recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights on how the courts in the EU are to handle child abduction cases where the courts of the habitual residence have made use of their power under Article 11 of Brussels IIa.

The participation of the Freedom Party in the Austrian government has given rise to exceptional reactions both in Austria and internationally. The imposition of a freeze in bilateral diplomatic relations by Austria's European Union partners has been particularly notable, amounting to an unprecedented response to the election of a new government in another Member State. This note seeks to describe the development of events and assess the status of the 14 Member States' actions under international law, in particular in the light of any developing norms concerning non-intervention, respect for human rights and the right to democratic governance.

Fundamental issues sometimes hide themselves behind what to an untrained eye might look like a technical and somewhat dry debate. Thus, a layman hearing Community lawyers' talk about the legal basis of legislation might be excused for not realising that the issue may be that of the role of the European Parliament in the European Union, and therefore the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions. The debate about the function of the concept of discrimination in the law on the free movement of goods, services and persons in the Community is one of those discussions which has more to offer than meets the eye. What the debate is really about is the balance of powers between the member States and the Community and the federal nature of the Community legal order as well as, incidentally, the balance between market principles and other values embodied in legislation. Translated by specialists in the free movement of goods in the Community, it has become, in the context of Article 30 of the Treaty: should we read a “rule of reason” within Article 30, or can Cassis de Dijon be explained in terms of indirect discrimination?

Recognition in contemporary international law is generally seen as a declaratory act. This is indeed the only plausible explanation in situations where a new State emerges consensually and in the absence of territorial illegality. Unilateral secession and territorial illegality, however, create different legal circumstances in which the applicable rules of international law imply and even presuppose that (collective) recognition could have constitutive effects. This article therefore suggests that the interpretation of the legal nature of recognition and non-recognition should not start on the premise that recognition always merely acknowledges the fact of the emergence of a new State. This is not to say that States cannot exist without being recognized. Rather, the legal effects of recognition may depend on the mode of a certain (attempt at) State creation.

In the period between 1980 and 1995, both Europe and the US made huge investments in Latin America. The process of democratization in Latin America, especially in the countries marked by a tradition of military dictatorship, has reinforced the belief in political and economic stability. The economy has displayed considerable growth and, partly stimulated by the IMF and the World Bank, several countries are embarking on privatization on a grand scale.2 Political and economic cooperation between the countries is taking the place of political and military rivalry. The time is ripe for a new attempt at integration on this continent. The overtures between Argentina and Brazil led to the establishment of Mercosur. Its economic (Mercosur is the fourth largest trade bloc in the world after the US, the EU, and Japan) and political importance have been recognized, especially by the EU. As early as 1996,3 an Interinstitutional Cooperation Agreement was concluded, an interregional framework agreement for cooperation between the EU Member States and Mercosur States parties.4 Since then, the EU-Mercosur Bi-regional Negotiations Committee (BNC)5 has already had ten meetings at which topics such as the free movement of goods, public procurement, investments, services, e-commerce, and conflict resolution were discussed. The US has never appreciated the attempts at integration in Latin America and has always striven to conclude separate free trade agreements with each individual country. The recent free trade agreement with Chile is a clear example.6

This article will propose that comparative law as a discipline should now consolidate itself as an independent subject with its own internal structure. This is not to say that its teachers and professors should abandon, or at least fully abandon, their “gift of freedom”.1 Nor is it to confuse comparative law with other more specific law subjects which may be taught in a comparative way.2 What this article will propose is that comparative law be envisaged as a subject basically operating at two levels (or consisting of two parts). At one level it consists of the now considerable literature on the subject, including of course the work which envisages the subject in terms of legal families. At another level, however, comparative law should be envisaged as being concerned with the theoretical underpinning of the terms “comparative” and “law”. This part, in other words, would deal with these terms as instruments of knowledge. What is it to have knowledge of “law”? And what contribution does “comparison” make to this epistemo-logical question?

The history of clashes over extraterritorial jurisdiction between the United States of America and other States in the Americas, Europe and elsewhere is a long one. That history is commonly traced back to the antitrust claims arising from the Alcoa case in 1945, in which the “effects” doctrine was advanced in the peculiar and objectionable form in which it is applied, not simply to acts which constitute elements of a single offence but which occur in different jurisdictions but, rather, to the economic repercussions of acts in one State which are felt in another. The conflict persisted into the 1950s, with the clashes over US regulation of the international shipping and paper industries. In the 1960s and 1970s there were further clashes in relation to the extraterritorial application of US competition laws, notably in disputes over shipping regulation and the notorious Uranium Antitrust litigation, in which US laws were applied to penalise the extraterritorial conduct of non-US companies, conducted with the approval of their national governments, at a time when those companies were barred by US law from trading in the United States. It was that litigation which was in large measure responsible for the adoption in the United Kingdom of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, which significantly extended the powers which the British government had asserted in the 1952 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act to defend British interests against US extraterritorial claims.

This article offers a critical assessment of the role of international human rights law in the regulation of genome editing. Given the rapid scientific developments in the field of genetics, it is important to explore the implications of the human rights framework for the research into and the clinical application of genome editing. The broader normative question is whether the existing human rights standards are sufficient to address the challenges posed by this new technology. It will be argued that while international human rights law does not prohibit genome editing, it imposes important restrictions upon it. However, existing human rights are arguably insufficient to regulate germline genome editing as there are significant loopholes in the protection of embryos. Nor do they fully address the wide-ranging implications of the new technology for society and humankind. It will be suggested that new standards are needed, ideally set out in a new international instrument and supported by an institutional framework, which address the specific challenges posed by this new technology.