In 2015, frustrated by the slow pace of negotiations in the International Maritime Organisation, the EU issued Regulation 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting, and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport. Echoing the controversial Aviation Directive, the Regulation is intended to support a unilateral market-based measure, and includes emissions from outside EU territory. This raises the question whether, according to international law, the EU has jurisdiction to regulate such ‘extraterritorial’ circumstances. In exploring the appropriate jurisdictional bases, we argue that neither the Law of the Sea Convention, nor world trade law definitively decide this issue. We therefore devote more detailed attention to the customary international law of State jurisdiction supplementing these regimes. We seek to build on the existing analysis by examining climate change as a ‘common concern of mankind’. We argue that this emerging concept has distinct legal implications that can and should be accommodated within the interest-balancing exercise underlying the jurisdictional analysis.

The issue of women's under-representation in politics continues to be controversial and pressing in countries all over the world. According to the Inter Parliamentary Union, only 14.7 per cent of the world's legislators are women.1 In no country do women achieve parity with men in terms of parliamentary representation. The record of many of the world's most developed countries is particularly poor. Looking at lower houses of the legislature, in the US women's representation is only 14 per cent, in the UK 18 per cent, France 12 per cent and Italy 10 per cent. These countries are considerably out-performed by others such as South Africa and Argentina, both at 30 per cent.2

On 4 August 1995 the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, at its sixth session, adopted without a vote the text of the Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.1 The title is often shortened to “the Straddling Stocks Agreement”. To date, the Agreement has been signed by 29 States.2 It marks a significant clarification and development in the rules of international law relating to fishing on the high seas, within the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The paper offers the first comprehensive treatment of the applicability and regulation of belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflicts. It introduces three approaches to the topic (‘extralegal’, ‘permissive’ and ‘restrictive’ approaches) which all enjoy some support among States and scholars. The paper shows that international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties, IHL customs and other legal sources do not make it possible to decide between these approaches, as they are either silent on the topic or allow for several interpretations. It is the assessment of extralegal considerations and of the general framework of IHL which allows us to conclude that belligerent reprisals are inapplicable in non-international armed conflicts (‘extralegal’ approach). Yet, there are signs indicating that a gradual shift toward the ‘restrictive’ approach could be under way. The paper cautions against a premature acceptance of this approach drawing attention to its limits.

On 29 November 1996 Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“the ICTY”) handed down its sentence in the case of Dražen Erdemović. This was a decision of historie significance for a variety of reasons, the most obvious being that it was the first sentence passed by an international war crimes tribunals, applying international law, since the International Military Tribunals which sat at Nuremberg and Tokyo between 1945 and 1948; it was also the first time a truly international tribunal bas concluded the trial of a minor war criminal, as opposed to a senior military commander or political leader. In addition, it was the first sentence handed down by the ICTY, which has been plagued sincc its first days of operation by problems in securing evidence and witnesses, not to mention the presence of the accused. Now the ICTY has shown, in the face of widespread criticism and accusations of impotence, that it can actually perform the task assigned to it. The doubt about such a judgment is that the Erdemović case is not perhaps the best basis on which to assess the ICTY's performance, so singular were the accused's conduct and, indeed, the circumstances in which he found himself before the Tribunal. Essentially, had it not been for the accused's voluntary surrender and his extensive co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor, and the co-operation of the judirial authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in transferring Erdemović to The Hague, the case would probably never have happened at all.

On 17 January 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down its judgment in Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom.1 Abu Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric once described as ‘Osama bin Laden's right-hand man in Europe’, was convicted in absentia in Jordan for various terrorist offences.2 He alleges, however, that part of the evidence against him had been obtained under torture. In 1994 he was granted refugee status and permitted to remain in the United Kingdom (UK) temporarily. Qatada later applied for indefinite leave to stay. While his application was pending, he was arrested in October 2002 and detained without charge or trial under the now-repealed Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In March 2005 he was released from detention and put under a ‘control order’ under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. A few months later, the UK government sought to deport Qatada to his native Jordan, having first concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Jordanian government that he would not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The deportation order was challenged before English courts, but ultimately upheld by the House of Lords in RB (FC) and Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department and OO v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2009.3 In contrast, the ECtHR ruled unanimously that the UK could not lawfully deport Qatada to Jordan. The decision was criticized by Home Secretary Theresa May as ‘unacceptable’ and predictably led to several Conservative backbenchers in the House of Commons calling on the government to withdraw from the ECHR.4

This article proposes a model of treaty-based veil piercing for civil liability claims by victims of human rights harm inflicted by businesses. The primary inspiration for this model comes from investment treaty provisions dealing with corporate investors. Our examination of investment law for this purpose exposes the double standard in the treatment of the corporate veil between these two remedy regimes, and offers a way to address this. The test we propose for lifting the veil in order to allow victims to claim against the parent company in a corporate group is one of ‘legal control’. It aims to capture cases where the parent did not necessarily take an active role in the subsidiary's business, but it is still treated as being in control of the subsidiary by virtue of its direct or indirect ownership or ability to appoint management.

International investment law can be criticized for its understanding of sovereignty. Informed by the works of Koskenniemi, this article reimagines ‘sovereignty’ based on a host State population exercising its right to economic self-determination. Recent transparency initiatives in international investment law support this conceptualization of sovereignty. Further, the stance taken aligns with the continuous evolution of the international investment law regime. The establishment of a different perspective on sovereignty in international investment law highlights the need for an alternative understanding of this term if international investment law is to achieve widespread approval.

In December 2004, Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights added its voice to the call for a greater parliamentary role in the making of treaties. In its report on Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Joint Committee included a one-page chapter on ‘Increasing Parliament's involvement in the adoption of human rights treaties’, expressing the view that it was desirable for Parliament to become more involved prior to ratification on the grounds that effective parliamentary scrutiny would serve to ‘enhance the democratic legitimacy of human rights obligations incurred… by the Executive pursuant to the prerogative power.’1 Motivated by this concern, the Committee has undertaken, on its own initiative, an extensive review of the UK's treaty commitments in the human rights field with a view to securing greater parliamentary support for these obligations through the mechanism of public scrutiny.2

Several recent detentions of generic pharmaceutical products transiting through the European Union (EU) for suspected infringements of intellectual property rights raised serious concerns for public health advocates and threatened to expose systemic problems existing in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The detentions not only garnered international attention, but India and Brazil formally began WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the EU. The parties recently reached a mutually agreed solution to the matter and the proceedings have been halted, leaving unanswered the complex legal and technical questions raised by the detentions of pharmaceuticals in transit. Despite a solution being reached in this dispute, the matter will undoubtedly resurface in the near future for a number of reasons. For instance, the EU is attempting to export its laws to its trading partners through the negotiation of free trade agreements and in other forums such as the recently concluded Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement which increases the likelihood that similar detentions will occur at some point in the future. Moreover, recent trends in international intellectual property law indicate a move towards increased protection and enforcement in at least the short and medium term. The issue therefore offers the opportunity for rich legal analysis into an underexplored, yet increasingly important, aspect of WTO law.

It is the greatest honour for me to be invited to give the Wilberforce Lecture this year, on Lord Wilberforce's ninetieth birthday. In my generation, he has provided an inspiration for us all—an example which we may strive, but never succeed, to emulate. His brilliant intellect the modernity of his outlook, his capacity to look beyond the immediate problem to the more fundamental issues, his readiness to innovate—all coupled with a disarming informality of address—make him at the same time one of the most profound lawyers, and one of the most attractive men, of his generation. It is a privilege for me to have known him. I am his admiring, but still struggling, disciple.

1. The adoption of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (‘the Convention’)1 was a response to rising casualties among UN peacekeepers and other personnel as a result of their increasing deployment to dangerous situations following the end of the Cold War. It requires States parties to: prohibit attacks on UN personnel and others associated with UN operations; prosecute or extradite perpetrators of such acts; take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety of such personnel; and promptly release any who are captured or detained.

International courts and tribunals have played a predominant role in the development of the law of maritime delimitation.1 In fact, since the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, eleven judgments concerning maritime delimitations were given by international courts and tribunals. Owing to the richness of international decisions, one may currently speak of ‘case law’ in the field of maritime delimitations. Thus it is indispensable to consider the evolving process of the law of maritime delimitation on the basis of the practice of international courts and tribunals.