This article offers an architectural blueprint for the study of economic connections between warfare in the early modern period and the long-term growth of Europe's competing national economies. It surveys and critically investigates the concepts derived mainly from economic theory and the statistical evidence accessible in primary and secondary sources for the investigation of this meta-problem for students of economic theory.

The Exchequer bills were a key component in Britain's financial revolution of the 1690s. Using a range of archival sources not examined in previous work, this article argues that closer study of how these bills were given credit and circulation between 1696 and 1698 can offer a more nuanced reading of the mechanisms which helped to create credible commitment in this period. Though proper institutional design did help to give the bills credit, it was only one part of a wider series of informal measures used by the Treasury to secure subscribers for the fund for circulating the bills and to manage the emission of bills to prevent high discounts. This reflects the fact that credit and confidence in this period were influenced by a wide range of factors, including commercial advantage, patriotism and the example offered by other investors, all of which could be manipulated by the Treasury to promote the credibility of the Exchequer bills. Proper institutional and financial incentives were therefore not the only factors which could create credible commitment in Britain's financial revolution.

This article examines Britain's temporary import surcharge introduced in October 1964, a largely overlooked but significant dimension of the 1964 sterling crisis. Import surcharges (temporary supplementary tariff) were illegal under GATT rules and aroused fury among trading partners. Britain's surcharge is placed in context by consideration of the use of import surcharges by other countries under Bretton Woods as currency crisis management and balance of payments measures, notably Canada's import surcharge of 1962–3 that inspired Britain's. Developed by the Conservative administration from 1963, a 15 per cent surcharge was introduced by the newly elected Wilson government as a radical alternative to deflation or devaluation to help correct the record balance of payments deficit and meet the gathering sterling crisis. As a currency crisis management measure the surcharge worked in Canada but in Britain it made matters worse and was soon supplanted by conventional measures. Deemed a failure and discredited, the surcharge was eventually lifted in November 1966 ‘unwept, unhonoured and unsung’ (Financial Times). Nevertheless, while in place the surcharge provided significant temporary assistance to the improvement of Britain's balance of payments.

The Spanish wording in the title is borrowed from a book by Joseph de la Vega published in Amsterdam in 1688. The book consists of a series of dialogues between a philosopher, a merchant and a shareholder, and is usually recognised as being one of the first analytical attempts to describe the different kinds of financial operations taking place in Amsterdam at the end of the seventeenth century. This paper tries to provide new textual evidence for a better understanding of the importance of Vega's book, both in the form of a detailed description of options and futures markets and as an appraisal of decision-making processes in a context of risk and uncertainty. It also considers some of the ethical implications of the individual strategies associated with the gambling and speculation activities taking place at that time on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.

The financial strains of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had a significant impact on the Bank of England. In its position as banker to the state and manager of the state's debt, it experienced a significant increase in workload and thus was forced rapidly to expand its workforce. From a complement of around 300 in the mid 1780s, the number of clerks employed had increased to over 900 in 1815. Using a unique set of records preserved in the Bank's archives, this article investigates the backgrounds and skills of the men recruited during the expansion of the early nineteenth century. It finds a significant gap between the skills required by the Bank and the skills possessed by its potentialworkforce.

Continental pawnbroking institutions, Monts-de-Piété, were introduced in Ireland in the 1830s and 1840s but did not establish a permanent status. Irish social reformers believed that a Mont-de-Piété system would reduce the cost of borrowing for the poor and also fund a social welfare network, thus negating the need for an Irish Poor Law. This article explores the introduction of the Mont-de-Piété charitable pawnbroker in Ireland and outlines some reasons for its failure. It uses the market incumbents, private pawnbrokers, as a base group in a comparative study and asks why the Monts-de-Piété were the unsuccessful ones of the two. The article finds that the public nature and monopoly status of Monts-de-Piété on the Continent realised economies of scale and gave preferential interest rates on capital, as well as enabling the Mont-de-Piété loan book to be cross-subsidised. These conditions were not replicated in Ireland, hence the failure of the Monts-de-Piété there.

This article explores the process of the formalisation of the Swedish financial market, through an analysis of commercial bank lending in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The analysis shows that the incorporation of Swedish business around the turn of the century led to a shift from lending primarily backed by name security to an increased use of mortgage and shares as collateral – after the severe stock market crash in 1920/1 mortgage lending surpassed lending against shares as collateral. We interpret this change as an important part of the formalisation process of the financial system, as it standardised the valuation process and allowed creditors to exit on a secondary market. Our statistical testing points to increased financial wealth and liquidity represented by the broad money supply, plus population growth and urbanisation, as important forces behind this formalisation.

In its Asian operations the Dutch United East Indies Company (VOC) (1602–1798) acted both as a territorial ruler and as a trading company. The company shipped large amounts of precious metals to Asia, both in the form of bullion and as coins, to pay for its trade and to provide currency for the areas under its control. The Company faced the problem that silver coins rapidly disappeared from circulation, as demand for silver was high in Asia. The Company attempted to manage the problem with a monetary policy using a unit of account, modelled after the policy of the Dutch Republic. It turned out that the two purposes of the money of account system, viz., putting the bookkeeping on a systematic basis and managing the currency in circulation, were conflicting. The first demanded a fixed unit of account, the second demanded a flexible policy of linking and de-linking the unit of account to real coins. Although the Company managed to muddle through this dilemma, it only succeeded in finding temporary solutions.

German bankers are renowned for their central position in the German model of ‘coordinated capitalism’ and for their elevated social status. Over the last 130 years, no other part of the entrepreneurial elite in Germany has displayed more power and stability. This article uses the concepts of social and human capital to explain this success and how German banking changed its patterns of recruitment, training and careers in response to general political and social trends. It also applies these concepts to the transformation of German banking from personal to managerial and, after 1970, to global capitalism. A conservative approach prevailed that integrated new demands but did so very cautiously. At the end of the twentieth century these features began to operate against German banking and weaken its international competitiveness, as the stock of specific social capital had created an inward-looking mindset.

Hong Kong SAR is well known as one of the few economies to operate a form of currency board as the basis of its monetary system. This system arose out of colonial status and has been retained except for a period of floating from 1975-83 to the present day, with some amendments. This article explores the evolution of the Exchange Fund during a period of global exchange rate instability showing that the abandonment of the monetary anchor in 1975 was part of a series of innovations to the use of the Fund as the colonial government sought to manage the exchange rate risks posed by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.

Before the founding of the Federal Reserve, bank clearinghouse associations served as an emergency lending facility during the National Bank Era (1863–1913). This article clarifies the operation of clearinghouse loan certificates during panic periods. If clearinghouse loan certificates do not circulate among the general public, then they bear similarities to interbank loans among clearinghouse member banks. In general, the central clearinghouse organization does not act alone as a lender of last resort to make loans from the central clearinghouse to individual member banks.

This special issue of the Financial History Review contributes to the vast literature on the political economy of monetary unions. Inspired by the recent events in Europe, it reaches back in history to consider an earlier experiment in forming a monetary (as well as economic and political) union. In this historical case the pivotal event was the ratification of the United States Constitution in 1788, two centuries before the Maastricht Treaty. Between formal independence in 1781 and the implementation of the Constitution reforms in 1789, the fledgling country was organised politically into a loose confederation of thirteen, virtually sovereign states. Despite the nominal powers granted to the national government under the Articles of Confederation, it lacked the direct means to collect taxes and to enforce its policies. Consequently, during this brief period, state governments could and did pursue their own economic and monetary policies.

This article challenges the conventional view of the existence of a pure floating regime in France during the mid 1920s. Our study, based on the archives of the Bank of France and the French Ministry of Finance, as well as a thorough examination of the exchange rates (FRF/USD) and (FRF/GBP) during the 1920s, reveals that the French authorities did intervene on several occasions. From these first direct actions, as well as some other abortive attempts, several lessons can be drawn about the effectiveness of interventions on a ‘modern’ exchange rate market.

Until 2008, Ireland's banks had a solid reputation. Its two long-established banks could trace their origins back to the beginnings of joint-stock banking in 1825. Few banks of consequence had failed in the interim. The last such failure, the focus of this article, was that of the Munster Bank in 1885. That event tells us much about the history of Irish banking before recent events.

By the mid nineteenth century, German miners relied on their own job-related social insurance scheme providing them with sickness, invalidity and survivorship insurance benefits. Addressing the period from 1867 to 1913, this article investigates whether the mineworkers' insurance funds, the Knappschaften, could effectively minimise their exposure to the actuarial risk inherent in their operations – and, in fact, inherent in all such insurance schemes – by increasing the scale of pooling. Contemporary observers of the Knappschaften tended to focus on whether financial stability could be improved by exploiting economies of scale, rather than by improving the pricing techniques themselves. Evidence suggests that actuarial risk was minimised at around 5,000 contributors in a Knappschaft's pension insurance section and at about 1,000 contributors in its sickness insurance section.

The British monetary authorities tried to encourage lower long-term interest rates through their government debt management operations between 1962 and 1964, following the Radcliffe report's recommendation that they should have an objective for long-term rates, and with the intention of supporting the government's pursuit of faster economic growth. The implementation of the policy was complicated by the Bank of England's role as a market maker in the government securities market, and beset by misunderstandings among the monetary authorities. The policy was abandoned when the conditions of strong market demand for bonds on which it depended changed. The article describes how the policy was developed and implemented, and the impact of political preferences on it.

On the basis of a novel dataset, the article investigates the anatomy of financial crises in Norway from 1830 to 2010. First, nine significant crises are identified. Second, the article examines spillover effects on the real economy. We find a clear but not symmetric relationship. Third, the article investigates key patterns in credit and money volumes. Major financial crises typically occurred after substantial money and credit expansion, causing financial instability.