The occurrence and unpredictability of speculative bubbles on financial markets, and their accompanying crashes, have confounded economists and economic historians worldwide. We examine the ability of the log-periodic power law model (LPPL-model) to accurately predict the end dates of speculative bubbles on financial markets through modeling of asset price dynamics on a selection of historical bubbles. The method is based on a nonlinear least squares estimation that yields predictions of when the bubble will change regime. Previous studies have only presented results where the predictions turn out to be successful. This study is the first to highlight both the potential and the limitations of the LPPL-model. We find evidence that supports the characteristic patterns as proposed by the LPPL-framework leading up to the change in regime; asset prices during bubble periods seem to oscillate around a faster-than-exponential growth. In most cases the estimation yields accurate predictions, although we conclude that the predictions are quite dependent on the point in time at which they are conducted. We also find that the end of a speculative bubble seems to be influenced by both endogenous speculative growth and exogenous factors. For this reason we propose a new way of interpreting the predictions of the model, where the end dates should be interpreted as the start of a time period where the asset prices are especially sensitive to exogenous events. We propose that negative news during this time period results in a regime shift and the bursting of the bubble. Thus, the model has the ability to predict sensitivity to exogenous events ex ante.

The article is based on a unique data set of securities traded on the Madrid Bolsa and the Zurich Börse between 1902 and 1925. We examine the pricing of liquidity and demonstrate that the liquidity level of securities was an important determinant of cross-sectional returns. Factors that are usually found important in contemporary markets, such as securities' sensitivity to market-wide liquidity shocks and market movements, turn out to have been irrelevant in the early twentieth century. In addition, the illiquidity of the Madrid market appears to have modestly slowed capital raising there. Our results suggest that market liquidity was an important determinant of the growth and development of financial markets.

To investigate the link between monetary reforms and prices on the art market, this article focuses on the aftermath of the Gutt plan, a monetary purge implemented in Belgium just after World War II. On the basis of an original database of close on 3,000 artworks sold between 1945 and 1951, this article shows that, following the implementation of the Gutt plan, real prices on the art market experienced a massive drop suggesting that real prices on the art market are significantly influenced by money supply.

It is established historical knowledge that the Bank of Japan (1882) was modelled upon the Banque Nationale de Belgique (1850). In this article, I point out how Japan's recurrent frustration with foreign dependence nurtured a social Darwinist view of international politics and finance: Japan's capability to survive in the world was believed to be dependent on its capability to assimilate foreign knowledge and institutions. In the field of finance, Matsukata Masayoshi, Japan's most enlightened financial policy maker at the time, turned to Belgium. I explain that Matsukata was dedicated to the emulation of Belgium's financial infrastructure, in which several public institutions would each be responsible for a specific area of the credit system. I indicate how efforts to adopt Belgian institutions and banking ideas proceeded meticuluously; yet, in the end, Japanese and Belgian finance developed along quite distinct pathways.

A convertible US-dollar monetary union was the least controversial component of the US financial revolution of the early 1790s. Although the fiat paper currencies of the colonies before 1776 sometimes worked reasonably well, the founders had good reasons for the constitutional ban on their continuance by US states. The ban, a surrender of states' sovereignty over money, at the time proved to be relatively uncontroversial for two reasons. One is that the financial revolution lightened the fiscal burdens of states by assuming their debts and making them part of the national debt. The other is that states quickly learned that chartering banks could accomplish virtually all of the legitimate purposes of state fiat money issues, and possessed additional economic and political advantages.

We examine the relationship between prices and interest rates for seven advanced economies in the period up to 1913, emphasising the UK. There is a significant long-run positive relationship between prices and interest rates for the core commodity standard countries. Keynes ([1930] 1971) labelled this positive relationship the ‘Gibson Paradox’. A number of theories have been put forward as possible explanations of the paradox but they do not fit the long-run pattern of the relationship. We find that a formal model in the spirit of Wicksell (1907) and Keynes ([1930] 1971) offers an explanation for the paradox: where the need to stabilise the banking sector's reserve ratio, in the presence of an uncertain ‘natural’ rate, can lead to persistent deviations of the market rate of interest from its ‘natural’ level and consequently long-run swings in the price level.

We identify similarities and differences in the scale and nature of the banking crises in 2008-9 and the Great Depression, and analyse differences in the policy response to the two crises in light of the prevailing international monetary systems. We find that the scale of the banking crisis, as measured by falls in international short-term indebtedness and total bank deposits, was smaller in 2008-9 than in 1931. However, central bank liquidity provision was larger in the flexible exchange rate environment of 2008-9 than in 1931, when it had been constrained in many countries by the gold standard.

This article examines immigrant banking in the United States as a pervasive, cross-ethnic development from its heyday during the 1880s and 1890s through its gradual decline, beginning around 1907, until the mid-1920s. Unlike traditional bankers, immigrant bankers usually operated out of other commercial enterprises, such as groceries, bakeries, saloons, booksellers, boarding houses, and pedlars' carts. Located within the economic and social fabric of immigrant neighbourhoods, these ethnic entrepreneurs were crucial financial intermediaries for new immigrants, most notably eastern and southern European immigrants, and they eventually became important investors and property holders in developing urban ethnic enclaves within American cities. As they flourished, however, operators of mainstream banks looked to expand their own business into immigrant communities. By increasing their own services and exploiting growing fears of immigrants and loan sharks, opponents of immigrant bankers passed laws that spelled the end to this important form of popular banking in the early twentieth century.

In this article we re-evaluate the hypothesis that the development of the financial sector was an essential factor behind economic growth in nineteenth-century Germany. We apply a structural VAR framework to a new annual data set from 1870 to 1912 that was initially compiled by Walther Hoffmann (1965). With respect to the literature, the distinguishing characteristic of our analysis is the focus on different sectors in the economy and the interpretation of the findings in the context of a two-sector growth model. We find that all sectors were affected significantly by shocks from the banking system. Interestingly, this link is the strongest in sectors with small or non-tradable-goods-producing firms, such as construction, services, transportation and agriculture. In this regard, the growth patterns in nineteenth-century Germany are similar to those in today's emerging markets.

This article challenges the ‘regulatory license’ view that reliance by regulators on the output of rating agencies in the 1930s ‘caused’ the agencies to become a central part of the fabric of the US financial system. We argue that long before the 1930s, courts began using ratings as financial-community-produced norms of prudence. This created ‘a legal license’ problem, very analogous to the ‘regulatory license’ problem, and gave rise to conflicts of interest not unlike those that have been discussed in the context of the subprime crisis. Rating agencies may have had substantial responsibility for the Great Depression of the 1930s.

British government bonds formed the deepest, most liquid and most transparent financial market of the nineteenth century. This article shows that those bonds had long periods, extending over decades, of anomalous behavior, in which Consols, the largest and best known of these instruments, were noticeably overpriced relative to equivalent securities which offered the same interest rate and the same guarantee of payment. This finding and similar ones for other comparable pairs of British gilts appear to provide the most extreme counterexamples documented so far to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and to the Law of One Price, and point the way to further investigations on the origins and nature of the modern economy.

The article aims to present an explanation for the complete absence of public municipal banks in the Southern Low Countries, and particularly in its two main principalities Flanders and Brabant, between 1400 and 1800. The reasons were complex, lying in a combination of the presence of adequate substitutes such as money changers, cashiers and town exchange offices (stadswissels) and countervailing factors (adverse economic conditions, insufficient financial resources, special interests of persons and lobbies). It is also argued that strong government control of the Antwerp urban debt prevented the local authorities from experimenting with a municipal bank.

In this article, using new estimates of the size of the UK's capital market, we examine financial development and investor protection laws in Britain c.1900 to test the influential law and finance hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that there was not a close correlation between financial development and investor protection laws c.1900 and that the size of the UK's share market is a puzzle given the paucity of statutory investor protection. To illustrate that Britain was not unique in its approach to investor protection in this era, we examine investor protection laws across legal families c.1900.

I reconstitute the spending obligations and revenue sources of colonial New Jersey's provincial government for the years 1704 through 1775 from primary sources using forensic accounting techniques. I identify and analyze the methods for raising revenue to meet normal peacetime and emergency wartime expenses. I calculate the provincial tax burdens imposed on New Jersey's citizens. I identify how Britain interfered with New Jersey's fiscal structure. I estimate what the revenues and tax burdens would have been without this interference. New Jersey paid for war expenses by issuing bills of credit, spreading the tax burden of redeeming these bills into the future. New Jersey paid its yearly administrative costs with current property taxes and with current interest earnings from loaning paper money. In the absence of British interference and wars, New Jersey could have driven tax burdens to zero by using interest earnings to pay for all its provincial administrative costs.

The UK annuity market is one of the largest in the world and of considerable importance for research on pensions, and understanding the decumulation phase in defined-contribution pension schemes. Time-series data for UK annuity rates has hitherto been unavailable. This article presents data for the period 1957 to 2002 and describes how the data were constructed.

We estimate historical stock returns for Swedish listed companies in a newly constructed data set of daily stock prices that spans more than 100 years. Stock returns exhibit all the familiar characteristics. The growth of the public sector depressed the stock market, and the process of globalization revitalized it. Banks played an important role in the early development of the stock market. There was little trading in the past, and we examine the effects on return measurement from missing data. Stock selection and the replacement of missing transaction prices through search back procedures or limit orders make little difference to a value-weighted stock price index, while ignoring the price effects of capital operations makes a big difference.