Incorporated in 1872, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas – Paribas – inherited the European and international traditions of several well-established banking houses (Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt and Goüin, among others). It then became a sort of model for French-style merchant banking and, as a result, swiftly aroused historians' subsequent curiosity. The bank's unusual character intrigued them. It was a hybrid, combining continental European private banking, then in decline, major retail or commercial banking, which was growing strongly, and British merchant and American investment banking that was already setting a trend.

We analyse the money-financed fiscal stimulus implemented in Venice during the famine and plague of 1629–31, which was equivalent to a ‘net-worth helicopter money’ strategy – a monetary expansion generating losses to the issuer. We argue that the strategy aimed at reconciling the need to subsidize inhabitants suffering from containment policies with the desire to prevent an increase in long-term government debt, but it generated much monetary instability and had to be quickly reversed. This episode highlights the redistributive implications of the design of macroeconomic policies and the role of political economy factors in determining such designs.

Both states that constituted the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy issued considerable amounts of perpetual bonds from the 1870s to World War I. These bonds constituted the greater part of the state debt, which was relatively larger in Hungary than in Austria. Movements in bond prices were not uniform for different kinds of securities such as gold bonds, paper bonds and bonds of the common debt of the pre-1867 era. Price movements and movements in the spread between Hungarian and Austrian bond yields followed a stochastic trend. Most fiscal factors such as the share of the state debt, and of state expenses, in GDP, the share of state consumption in overall state expenses, the relation between the debt service and the tax revenues, or the deficit in the state budget, had little or no impact. The conversion of debt instruments reveals a high degree of efficiency on the part of investors. Political crises affected relative price movements in the short run but were unimportant in the context of the middle- and long-term development. Throughout the period, Hungarian bonds as compared to Austrian bonds had lower prices in the Vienna Stock Exchange, suggesting a preference of Viennese investors for domestic securities independently from economic and political circumstances.

This article assesses the extent to which bankers approached sovereign debt defaults during the interwar period according to norms established during the nineteenth century. Bankers treated postrevolutionary Mexico as a hybrid, that is, as a case of both developmental and revenue default, in Fishlow's taxonomy, in the interest of protecting the rights of bondholders generally. Their approach led them to reject the argument of US ambassador to Mexico (and former Morgan partner), Dwight W. Morrow, that a government could be financially insolvent. Bankers acted similarly during the debt crisis of the 1980s.

In the classical monetary debates, the Banking School held that notes would be equally demand-elastic whether supplied by many issuers or a single one. The Free Banking School held that notes would be less demand-elastic if supplied by a single issuer. These assertions have rarely, if ever, been subject to more stringent statistical testing. In this study the elastic properties of the note stock of the Swedish note banking system in 1880–95 is compared with those of the regime in 1904–13, when the Bank of Sweden held a note monopoly. Evidence suggests that notes did not become less elastic after monopolisation, thus lending support to the views of the Banking School.

This article describes the role played by Dutch banks in the confiscation of Jewish property during World War II. ABN AMRO's predecessors, then seven commercial banks, surrendered the lion's share of Jewish financial assets to the Nazis. How can this be explained? One possible answer is that the banks allowed their own, commercial, interests to prevail over those of their Jewish clients. Other factors were: strategies of deception by the German authorities, low level of resistance among Dutch Jews, German pressure on banks to release Jewish assets and, finally, the lengthy duration of the war.