This study analyzes how the colonial rice trade in prewar Japan affected its rice market, considering several government interventions in the two rice futures exchanges in Tokyo and Osaka. We explore the interventions in the futures markets using two procedures. First, we measure the joint degree of efficiency in the markets using a time-varying vector autoregression model. Second, we examine historical events that possibly affected the markets and focus on one event at a time. The degree of efficiency varies over time within our sample period (1881-1932). The observation, together with historical analysis, leads to the following conclusions: (1) the two major markets in Tokyo and Osaka were nearly efficient; (2) government interventions involving the delivery of imported rice from Taiwan and Korea often reduced futures market efficiency; finally, (3) this relationship continued as long as the quality difference between imported and domestic rice existed. The government interventions that promoted domestic distributions of the colonial goods resulted in confusion in the commodity markets, and decreased efficiency of the markets in the metropole.

Legal restrictions theory suggests that interest-bearing money would dominate if there were no legal impediments precluding competition with non-interest-bearing currency. There are very few historical examples with meaningful issues of interest-bearing currency, however, and these tend to occur during extreme circumstances like civil war. The Ottoman Empire in the 1840s offers an unusual opportunity to observe large-scale issuance of interest-bearing notes under stable conditions over an extended period of time. This experience features government-issued interest-bearing money circulating in the absence of legal restrictions – with the data pointing to a liquidity preference favouring the smaller denominations most useful in daily transactions.

This article explores the economic issues related to financial crises at insurance companies, using an example from the Great Depression, the National Surety Company. National Surety was a large and diverse American insurance company that experienced a major crisis in 1933 due to losses from its guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. I find that policyholders were able to stage a massive run on the company by demanding the return of their unearned premiums. A key dynamic of the crisis was that policyholders at an insurance company have a dual role as holders of liabilities and as providers of income. In addition, I establish that government officials believed National Surety to be systemically important, due to the size of its insurance business and because many of its counterparties were societal actors that these officials sought to protect. As a result, the New York State Insurance Commissioner used emergency powers to reorganize the company, with the goal of providing continuity to its business lines outside mortgage-backed security insurance.

The article discusses Italy's integration into the international capital market following the First World War. Abundant inflows of foreign capital subsequently clashed with the stringent monetary policy that accompanied the Lira revaluation and consequently were partially sterilised. During the aftermath of the world crisis, foreign funds withdrew from Italian firms as a consequence of the precarious equilibrium in which the gold bloc countries found themselves, once other currencies devalued or became prone to devaluation. The resulting isolation from the world financial market raised the need for a domestic solution to the liquidity crisis, and the creations of IMI and IRI are viewed as part of the resultant process of the Italian credit system's overall restructuring.

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Since these restrictions were aimed at containing money rather than credit growth, their focus was on net credit creation by the financial sector. We document the rationale of these credit restrictions and how their implementation evolved in line with the evolution of the financial system. We study the impact on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the adoption of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal. Indeed, we do find evidence of a significant effect of credit restrictions on inflation.

Qing China represents a counterfactual to the early modern European history of fiscal expansion in the wake of warfare. In response to the staggering costs of suppressing the White Lotus Rebellion (1796–1804), the Jiaqing Emperor sought to solve the empire's fiscal problems by tightening bureaucratic control over an overstretched system of treasury finance. However, Jiaqing's policy of austerity and retrenchment was not simply an expedient in times of fiscal strain, but deeply rooted in ideological struggles over taxation that began in the eighteenth century. It was an expression of hardline fiscal conservatism, which held fixed revenue quotas sacrosanct and which I call quota-ism. This policy had dire consequences for the ability of the Qing regime to respond to external shocks and to fulfill its sovereign tasks – war, river conservancy and famine relief. It contributed to the bankruptcy of Qing government finance by the time of the Opium War.

This bibliography covers publications that appeared during 2005 and 2004 when they were not known before the deadline of last year's bibliography. In that case the year of publication is mentioned in the citation.

This article explores the financing of early industrial corporations using newly constructed panel data from Imperial Russian balance sheets. We document how corporate capital structures and dividend payout policies reflected internal agency issues, information asymmetries with external investors, life cycle considerations, and other frictions present in the Russian context. In particular, we find that widely held, listed and more profitable corporations were less reliant on debt financing. Asset tangibility was associated with lower debt levels, suggesting that Russian corporate debt was short-term, collateral was largely irrelevant, or agency problems dominated. Finally, we find that many of these same issues, for example ownership structure and access to securities markets, also mattered for financial performance and that dividends may have compensated investors for poor legal protections.

In the second half of the 1970s, following the so-called ‘Carnation Revolution’ and when a global wave of privatisations started, the Portuguese government nationalised most of the companies listed on the Lisbon Exchange. A few years later the shareholders of nationalised companies were paid indemnities. The nationalisations radically changed the Portuguese corporate scene and led to very important wealth transfers. Contrary to what is usually assumed, we conclude that this transfer was detrimental to holders of large shareholdings, but favourable to small shareholders and, on average, akin to fair compensation based on market exchange.

This article reviews the political economy of Manchuria under the rule of Zhang Zuolin, which resulted in the economic instability that occurred during the winter of 1928. One can conjecture that the economic instability did not occur only because of the arbitrariness of the political and military regional government. The instability appears to be related to an ongoing seasonal demand for monies, which was relatively high between the months of September and March, since it corresponded to the period of commerce in soybeans − the region's main economic activity −, the migration of seasonal workers, and also the festive period of the Chinese New Year. The analysis was conducted based on primary materials published by the South Manchuria Railway Company, such as currency issuance and the variation of the exchange rate of the major currencies in circulation among foreign and Chinese currencies.

Simon Ville and Grant Fleming, Financial intermediaries and the design of loan contracts within the Australasian pastoral sector before the Second World War

This paper examines the pooling and separating contracts designed by Australasian financial intermediaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We show that, after an initial screening process, these agents altered interest rates and collateral requirements to separate out risk types to reveal additional information on borrowers. In multi-period contracts, agents opted for flexible contract structures which permitted changes in individual or community-wide circumstances.

We employ a panel data research design to examine the determinants of investment returns in the Swedish property fire insurance industry from 1903 to 1939 – a period of great economic and political uncertainty. Contrary to expectations, we find that mutual fire insurers generated systematically higher investment returns than stock fire insurers. Investment returns are inversely related to leverage but positively related to liquidity, showing that firms adopting a more precautionary investment strategy attain higher returns.

Joseph Brennan, as secretary of the Irish Department of Finance (1923–7) and chair of the Irish Currency Commission (1927–43), was a pivotal influence on Irish banking and currency affairs. Yet, within the existing literature, his adherence to conservative British norms is seen as providing a ‘bleak prescription’ for the Irish economy. However, such a view ignores the fact that Brennan was far from dogmatic on banking and currency issues and underplays his incrementalist, and often internationalist, approach to the development of Irish monetary institutions. Brennan's actions up to the early 1940s were based on the realities of Ireland's slowly receding economic and intellectual dependency on Britain, a ‘dependency’ often misrepresented in the existing literature as a more primitive, pre-Keynesian, conservative approach. However, rather than acting as a restraining influence on Irish economic development, the policies Brennan advocated enabled Ireland to avoid the instability associated with many smaller, emerging nation states in the 1920s and 1930s. The focus on continuity – which guaranteed currency and banking stability – represented the realities of Ireland's reliance on the sluggish British economy in the decades after independence. Brennan's achievement, in helping to sustain banking and currency stability notwithstanding economic uncertainty, a fragile political environment (and suspicious banking interests), deserves wider acknowledgement.

This article examines the geo-economic consequences of the financial panic of October 1907. The vulnerability of the United States, but also of Germany, contrasted with the absence of a crisis in Great Britain. The experience showed the fast-growing industrial powers the desirability of mobilizing financial power, and the article examines the contributions of two influential brothers, Max and Paul Warburg, on different sides of the Atlantic. The discussion led to the establishment of a central bank in the United States and institutional improvements in German central banking: in both cases security as well as economic considerations played a substantial role.