This article studies how the emergence of new political elites and changes in land tenure relationships shaped the socio-economic profile of local credit markets in the Ottoman Balkans between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. By using probate inventories and court records for the cities of Salonika (including Karaferye), Vidin and Ruse, I compare how the expansion of tax-farming institutions and the concentration of land ownership influenced the social characteristics of lending activities. I find that, in spite of institutional and political similarities, the evolution of local credit markets did not follow a homogeneous pattern. Contrary to the consensus view in the existing literature, local political and military elites, which most tax farmers and large landowners belonged to, did not play a dominant role as moneylenders. Civilians (such as merchants and artisans) together with other social groups, including janissaries and religious functionaries, provided the bulk of informal credit to local communities (including elites) in the three urban areas.

Malmö diskont, a Swedish bank, was forced to close in 1817 after 14 years of operation because of a bank run. At the time, it was one of only three private commercial banks in Sweden. Eventually, all three banks succumbed to bank runs. The purpose of this article is to study the 1817 banking crisis from a new perspective by attempting to answer the following research question: why did Malmö diskont go under? Institutional theory is used here as a research tool. The assumption is that institutions set the limits for individuals' actions and sometimes direct them towards particular actions. The conclusions are derived from analysing the institutional framework at the time and how it interacted with Malmö diskont. The crisis evolved in two stages. The first stage occurred when the financial position of Malmö diskont severely deteriorated in the interaction between institutions and actors in 1817. The implementation of a bailout and a new institutional structure would have been necessary to save the bank. This conclusion complements earlier theories related to monetary or credit overexpansion as to why banking crises occur. The second stage occurred when the Swedish government allowed Malmö diskont to fall in October 1817.

Trade credit - the credit provided by suppliers to firms - can be seen as the second-best solution when financial development fails to keep pace with economic growth. This article analyses trade credit between Catalan cotton manufacturers and their clients in nineteenth-century Spain. Spanish historiography has suggested that trade credit had a detrimental effect on the profitability of the cotton firms. Based on an analysis of the archives of several firms, as well as judicial and notary sources, we present a more optimistic interpretation of the system. Manufacturers were, in fact, acting as their customers' bankers because they were in the best position to perform this function. They built up a good information structure, managed the credit risk efficiently and got positive returns from this activity.

The economic advisers of the 1924 Dawes Committee enacted currency and banking reforms as a means of resolving financial and geopolitical problems. Although the committee members stated that they had no plans to resolve the Ruhr occupation, evidence from the technical advisers demonstrated the opposite. Economists Edwin Kemmerer, Joseph Davis and Arthur Young sought to appease Franco-Belgian demands for a resolution to the reparations debate by balancing the German budget and reorganising the banking system, thereby also addressing the question of military occupation. This research delves into the advisers’ reports on public finance, currency stabilisation and the gold standard, arguing that their attempts to assuage reparation-related concerns rested on major reforms to German central banking.

This article analyses the economic, political and cultural factors that influenced the decision of policy-makers in Yugoslavia to join the gold exchange standard in the midst of the Great Depression in June 1931. The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, the economic reasons why policy elites and interest groups endeavoured to adopt the gold exchange standard are examined by looking at debates in Yugoslavia's central bank, correspondence between governmental institutions and the views of policy elites as depicted in various economic newspapers. Subsequently, the article analyses how the beliefs in economic benefits analysed in the previous part were formed, considering the state of economic knowledge in the country, as well as pressures exerted by foreign lenders such as the Bank of England, the Banque de France and the Bank for International Settlements. The third part analyses reasons for legal stabilisation that go beyond economic rationales, considering how the government employed the prestige involved in legal stabilisation for its political agenda, and how cultural attachments to ‘gold core countries’ made sharing their monetary system a matter of cultural integration.

In December 1933, John Maynard Keyes published an open letter to President Roosevelt, where he wrote: ‘The recent gyrations of the dollar have looked to me more like a gold standard on the booze than the ideal managed currency of my dreams.’ This was a criticism of the ‘gold-buying program’ launched in October 1933. In this article I use high-frequency data on the dollar–pound and dollar–franc exchange rates to investigate whether the gyrations of the dollar were unusually high in late 1933. My results show that although volatility was pronounced, it was not higher than during some other periods after 1921. Moreover, dollar volatility began to subside towards the end of the period alluded to by Keynes.

For most of its history Amsterdam securities trading was entirely unregulated and spread over various venues frequented by different social groups, handicapping price transparency. A public price current emerged only in 1796 and then with wide bid-ask spreads to protect margins. To combat the confusion a curious pricing method, the mid-price system, emerged during the nineteenth century. Tied to a market microstructure centring on hoekmannen (market makers), this system transited effortlessly from a public market into a monopoly by 1913, self-governing, still without any government regulation, and offering wide rent-seeking opportunities.

The French government currently honors a very unusual debt contract: an annuity that was issued in 1738 and currently yields €1.20 per year, payable to the descendants of its original recipient. I tell the story of this unique debt, which serves as an anecdotal but symbolic summary of French public finances since the eighteenth century. Created by a powerful nobleman for one of his servants, it survived the turmoil of the French Revolution, became part of the public debt and has been scrupulously honored to this day, even though its value has been eroded away by decades of inflation.

A century ago the US commercial banking system was exceptional in two ways. It was by good measure the largest commercial banking system of any country. And it was different from the commercial banking systems of other leading countries in having tens of thousands of independent banks with very few branches rather than the more typical pattern of a far smaller number of banks with many branches. Today, a century later, the US system is more normal than exceptional, dominated by a small number of very large banks with extensive branch systems. This article describes the US banking-structure transition from exceptional to normal. It closes with an interesting contrast of US and European banking developments.

Hong Kong is one of the world's top five international financial centres, but this is mainly due to banking activity in the territory. The stock exchange is relatively poorly developed, ranking only tenth by market capitalisation in 2002. In common with emerging stock markets in Asia and elsewhere, the Hong Kong exchange tended to be used as a speculative outlet for both small and large investors, which led to wide fluctuations in prices. This article explores how the development of the exchanges in the 1960s and 1970s, and the combination of self-regulation and poor external supervision contributed to weaknesses in the stock market in Hong Kong.