In Table 2 of the above publication (Cinnirella 2008) the coefficient for ‘Service’ in the column ‘Recruited before 1820’ should read ‘1.83’, not ‘91.83’.

Foreign exchange reserves have assumed considerable importance in the ongoing debate over risks to the international financial system and how it should be reformed in the wake of the great global credit crisis of 2008. The worry is that China's accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the associated global imbalances were a factor setting the stage for the crisis. The worry for the future is that the country's huge volume of dollar reserves and the incentive this provides for portfolio diversification have disturbing implications for the stability of the dollar. One manifestation of the interest that the media and policy makers have taken in this topic is the frequency of references to ‘historical lessons’ that shed light on possible future developments. For example, one finds frequent reference to how the pound sterling was dethroned by the dollar as the leading international reserve currency and to the implications of this historical episode for what might happen next.

Time-budget studies done among contemporary primitive people suggest that the first farmers worked harder to attain subsistence than their foraging predecessors. This makes the adoption of agriculture in the Stone Age one of the major curiosities in human cultural history. Theories offered by economists and economic historians largely fail to capture work-intensification among early farmers. Attributing a key role to human metabolism, this study provides a simple framework for analysing the adoption of agriculture. It demonstrates how the additional output that farming offered could have lured people into agriculture, but that subsequent population increase would eventually have swallowed up its benefits, forcing early farmers into an irreversible trap, where they had to do more work to attain subsistence compared to their foraging ancestors. The framework draws attention to the fact that, if agriculture arose out of need, as some scholars have suggested, then this was because prehistoric foragers turned down agriculture in the first place. Estimates of population growth before and after farming, however, in the light of the present framework seem to suggest that hunters were pulled rather than pushed into agriculture.

This article challenges the conventional view that the gold standard was stabilized by quasi-automatic central bank intervention and/or private arbitrage whenever the spot exchange rate reached the ‘gold points’. New archival evidence on the central bank of Austria–Hungary between 1896 and 1913 documents the use of sophisticated instruments such as foreign exchange forward and repo (sale-repurchase) contracts and a quest for market dominance both with respect to reserves held and the share in market turnover. The resulting change in the working of the foreign exchange market is shown to have supported the conduct of monetary policy, underlining the importance of market micro structure in the design and conduct of monetary policy. The picture that emerges is that of a much more ‘modern’ approach to exchange rate stabilization during the classical gold standard than is traditionally recognized.

Between 1660 and 1830, Parliament passed thousands of Acts restructuring rights to real and equitable estates. These estate Acts enabled individuals and families to sell, mortgage, lease, exchange and improve land previously bound by inheritance rules and other legal legacies. The loosening of these legal constraints facilitated the reallocation of land and resources towards higher-value uses. Data reveal correlations between estate Acts, urbanization and economic development during the decades surrounding the Industrial Revolution.

There is a lively ongoing debate, led by Stephen Epstein and Sheilagh Ogilvie, about the economic effects of institutions (particularly guilds) on the pre-industrial economies. The focus of the controversy is an article published by Ogilvie in which she points out that there is a new trend, as Epstein puts it, a ‘modern consensus’, aimed at the ‘rehabilitation of guilds’. Based on her study of the Württemberg worsted industry and supplemented with a variety of examples from all over Europe, she develops a theoretical framework outlining the reasons for the economic inefficiency of the guilds. She challenges the view that guilds had a tangible effect on market failures with regard to (1) product quality, (2) innovation and (3) training. She also examines (4) the link between guilds and social capital. This article suggests that the first two issues are the most relevant for an analysis of the economic effects of the activities of the Silesian merchant guilds on regional growth in the eighteenth century. The focal point of this argument is the difference between craft guilds and merchant guilds and thus refers back to the earliest studies by Ogilvie on corporative institutions.

This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and/or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations.

This article traces links between the monetary regime and some institutions of the labour market in Denmark over the past century. The results indicate that elements of the labour market are endogenous. The longest wage contract terms are found towards the end of the pre-World War I classical gold standard period – characterised by price-level stability – and during the period since the mid 1990s that has seen a firm fixed exchange-rate policy and low and stable inflation. The shortest contract lengths are observed in the interwar period with high inflation volatility. Inflation indexation of wages was used most extensively in the Bretton Woods period and during the soft peg period of the 1970s when inflation was high and rising. The degree of nominal wage rigidity in the economy is therefore not necessarily approximately constant, as it is otherwise assumed in many New Keynesian models.

Historical experience is often invoked in the modern debate on competition among reserve currencies, yet little is known about quantitative aspects or institutional features of reserve management. By drawing on newly obtained data on foreign exchange reserves, especially those broken down by currency, this article explores the competition between the British pound sterling and the US dollar for the status of leading reserve currency in Japan during the interwar period. We find that competition between these two currencies remained undecided and that their relative status alternated repeatedly. Historical materials and the results of econometric analysis suggest that the key factors explaining a choice of reserve currencies are trade volumes and the currency denomination of external debt. The latter criteria supported maintaining sterling's status as a reserve currency for the interwar period, reflecting its considerable share in debt service generated through issues that had been launched when London was the sole international market. The stability of potential reserve currencies is shown to be crucial as well. We also find evidence of institutional factors, which include taxation, foreign exchange controls and restrictions on financial activities.

French reserves policy during the interwar years has been heavily criticised because of its consequences for other countries. This article presents new monthly data on the Bank of France's foreign reserves currency composition between 1928 and 1936, and identifies the motivations behind reserves policy. The Bank of France's aim was to limit the risk of capital loss on its foreign portfolio. The determining factor in its portfolio allocation decisions was the credibility of reserves currencies on the exchange market. Credibility issues explain both the sale of pounds against dollars during 1929 and 1930 and the massive conversion of foreign holdings into gold from 1931 on. However, due to the huge volume of its reserves, the Bank also had to consider the effects of its own actions on the market. Its cooperative attitude towards sterling in the months before British devaluation can be explained through its market position. The Bank of France's portfolio choice was that of a large player in a low-credibility international monetary system.

This article studies the importance of demand and supply factors in the Swedish fertility transition using county-level data and panel regressions. Fertility started to decline around 1880 when marital fertility began a continuous decline. A gradual diffusion of parity-specific control was important in this process. The fertility of the oldest age groups declined fastest, even though the decline started in all age groups over 25 at about the same time. This development was connected to broader socioeconomic and demographic processes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as mortality decline, urbanisation, industrialisation and expansion of education.

During the ‘Golden Age’, the high investment rates reached by the European countries have been considered crucial in explaining growth. The literature about the Golden Age has emphasized supply-side explanations based on structural change, the reconstruction effort and the catch-up hypothesis, but also demand-side explanations focused on the effects of demand stability for promoting high rates of investment. In this article we have focused our attention on the evolution of the user cost of capital for explaining the high rates of investment. Our hypothesis is that the increase in investment rates was propelled by the decline in the user cost of capital, the consequence largely of the drop in the relative price of machinery. The embodiment of new technology and the reductions in trade barriers explain this decrease in the relative price of machinery.

In this article, I test whether there is any evidence of price convergence on intercontinental commodity markets prior to the nineteenth century. I gather price data on eleven commodity markets important to early modern intercontinental trade. The main conclusion is that many of the commodity markets do show signs of price convergence even prior to the nineteenth century. The question of an early globalisation can thus not be dismissed as easily as has often been done so far.

Much as Paul David described the invention of the mechanical typewriter – it was invented 51 times before being patented by Christopher Sholes in 1867, licensed to the Remington Company and successfully commercialized – the connections between the gold-exchange standard and the Great Depression have been discovered repeatedly. They were discovered by Ehsan Choudhri and Levis Kochin in a seminal article in 1980. They were discovered by Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs in articles published in 1985 and 1986. They were discovered by James Hamilton in an insightful article published in 1988. They were discovered by Peter Temin in his Robbins Lectures published in 1989. They were discovered by the now chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in his 1994 Journal of Money Credit and Banking Lecture. Moreover, these contributors to the contemporary literature had important antecedents, including Robert Triffin in the 1950s, Ragnar Nurkse in the 1940s, and Leo Pasvolsky in the 1930s.

The article re-examines Sweden's price-level targeting during the 1930s which is regarded as a precursor of today's inflation targeting. According to conventional wisdom, the Riksbank was the first central bank to adopt price-level targeting, although in practice giving priority to exchange-rate stabilisation. Based on Bayesian econometric techniques and the evaluation of new archival sources, we come to the conclusion that defending a fixed exchange rate is hard to reconcile with the claim of adopting price-level targeting. This finding has implications for the prevailing view of the 1930s as a decade of great policy innovations.

Canada has perhaps the longest track record of adhering to a floating exchange rate regime, but it may well also have been the first country to adopt a managed float during the 1950s. In spite of criticisms levelled at the Canadian government's decision to float the dollar, the remarkable feature of the behaviour of the exchange rate during the so-called float is the relative stability of the nominal exchange rate, and the small volatility in its movements. This article stresses the impact of foreign exchange intervention in limiting exchange rate appreciations and in moderating exchange rate volatility, using newly found, and heretofore unused, intervention data. Until now, all studies of Canada's experience with the float have relied on official foreign exchange reserves data. A counterfactual experiment also suggests that nominal exchange rate levels, and variability, would have been different had there been no foreign exchange market intervention.

This article analyses the long-term development of the skill premium in western Europe in a global perspective, on the basis of data on wages of skilled and unskilled construction workers in more than a dozen European countries and regions, and in a number of non-European countries such as India, China, Japan, Russia, Korea and Indonesia. It shows that already in the late medieval period the skill premium in western Europe had fallen sharply and became, from the fifteenth century onwards, much lower than in most other parts of the world economy. Only in southern China, and perhaps also in nineteenth-century Japan, did the skill premium fall to an equally low level. The explanation for these global patterns focuses on factor proportions, the quality of institutions and demand-related factors. Moreover, it is argued that the skill premium measured in this way is also a predictor of long-term economic performance.

We provide the first econometric study of foreign exchange market intervention for the UK during the sterling crises from 1964 from 1967. We use daily data on spot and forward dollar/sterling exchange rates and reserve movements which allows a more precise description of the loss of credibility during four currency crises. Reserve losses are consistent with exchange rate crises. External assistance given to sterling throughout this period shored up the reserves and allowed the sterling peg to be maintained.