The newars are the indigenous inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley, a bowl-shaped plateau about fifteen miles across at a height of approximately 4,000 fest in the Himalayan foothills. It is a plateau in that the major rivers in the immediate area (the Trisuli and the Sunkosi) pass it by at a much lower level. The Valley is surrounded by a rampart of hills rising to 7 or 8,000 feet; according to local belief and myth, and according to geology, the Valley was once a lake. Its soil is exceptionally fertile by Himalayan, or indeed any, standards. Thanks to this, and to the Valley's strategic position astride trade routes to Tibet, it has a long and distinguished history. Written records (inscriptions) begin in the fifth century A.D. and give evidence of a high and literate civilization derived from the Indian plain. The inscriptions are written in a chaste and pure Sanskrit not met with in later periods, but the place-names reveal that the bulk of the population spoke an ancient form of the presentday Newars' language, Newari (Malla 1981 (1). Whereas most of the rest of Nepal remained thinly inhabited and rustic till the modern period, the Kathmandu Valley was able to support a division of labour and a sophisticated urban civilization impossible elsewhere in the Himalayan foothills between Kashmir and Assam.

TheIdea of explaining natural phenomena by appealing to laws of nature is one that is thoroughly familiar to the modern mind. This idea does not perhaps appear quite as natural as it did a century ago, when Engels proclaimed to the mourners at Marx's funeral that just as Darwin had discovered the law of development of organic nature so Marx had discovered the law of development of human history. Twentieth-century historians do not in general conceive their task as including the formulation of laws of history, and the discoveries of modern physics since Maxwell have for the most part been expressed in terms of principles and equations rather than laws. Nevertheless, despite these changes, we are still quite accustomed to thinking in terms of laws of nature; and just because it seems natural it is easy to assume that it is natural for human beings seeking to explain the phenomena of nature to do so by enquiring after the laws by which these phenomena are governed.

This paper seeks to provide a sociological account of one aspect of a highly significant redefinition of the moral boundaries of English society: a redefinition which saw the transformation of insanity from a vague, culturally defined phenomenon afflicting an unknown, but probably small, portion of the total population into a condition which could only be authoritatively diagnosed, certified, and dealt with by a group of legally recognized experts and which was now seen as one of the major forms of deviance in English society. Where in the eighteenth century only the most violent and destructive amongst those now labelled insane would have been segregated and confined apart from the rest of the community, by the mid-nineteenth century, with the achievement of lunacy ‘reform’, the asylum was endorsed as the sole officially approved response to the problems posed by all forms of mental illness. In what follows, I want to focus attention rather closely on one centrally important feature of this whole process—and that is just how that segment of the medical profession which we now call psychiatry captured control over insanity; or, to put it another way, how those known in the early nineteenth century as mad-doctors first acquired a monopolistic power to define and treat lunatics. I shall begin, though, with some general remarks on the sociological importance of the issues I shall be raising here.

After World War II, Israel and Germany adopted curiously similar policies of ethnic immigration, accepting as immigrants only putative co-ethnics. The objective of this article is to account for the main variation between the two cases, the resilience of Jewish immigration in Israel, and the demise of ethnic-German immigration in Germany. The very fact of divergent outcomes casts doubt on conventional accounts of ethnic immigration, which see the latter as deriving from an ethnic (as against civic) definition of nationhood. We point instead to the possibility of ‘liberal’ and ‘restrictive’ contention surrounding ethnic immigration, and argue that for historical and geopolitical reasons the political space for such contention has been more constricted in Israel than in Germany.

This study analyzes a major shift in the Israeli discourse of generalized exchange as reflected in key role models and images of social involvement, voluntarism and public good provision. It highlights the progressive decline of the image of the pioneer or ‘halutz’ and the parallel emergence of the image of the ‘freier’, a vernacular model of a sucker, as a meta-comment on the pioneer model and on Israeli existence in general (2).

The paper addresses the issue of the nature and determinants of variations between countries in the severity of the implications of unemployment for psychological well-being. It focuses on ten countries in the European Union over the period 1983 to 1994. It establishes that there are consistent differences between countries over time. It then examines a number of potential explanations, in particular relating to the level of unemployment, the social composition of unemployment, the strength of the work ethic in the society and the characteristics of welfare institutions. It concludes that such differences cannot be accounted for in terms of the level of unemployment or its composition in terms of age and sex. They are also unrelated to measures of employment commitment. Rather the severity of the impact of unemployment has to be understood in terms of the interaction between the characteristics of the welfare regime and the composition of the unemployed with respect to household position.

The transnational turn in international migration research since the early 1990s has sparked vigorous debates among migration scholars. Yet the political aspects of transnational migration have been under-studied when compared to social, cultural and economic processes. This is particularly astonishing because the very term transnational suggests the importance of national borders and nationally-bound polities as opportunities and restrictions of exchange, reciprocity, solidarity and hierarchical control for processes involving non-state actors to varying degrees. The goal of this analysis is to take stock of some developments in the general study of transnationalization and treat the aspects of politics, policy and polity as a specific case of this broader conceptual and empirical effort. This effort also identifies questions for further research and offers methodological venues for the study of transnationalism arising out of international migration.

The relationship between morality and economy has been muddied in the course of disciplinary specialization. While dominant paradigms in economics abstract from the moral dimension, recent approaches to morality and ethics in anthropology neglect the material economy. E. P. Thompson’s “moral economy” has been an influential bridging concept in recent decades, but recent inflationary usage has highlighted shortcomings. Following an overview of the disciplinary debates, the moral dimension of economic life is illustrated in this paper with reference to work as a value between the late 19th and early 21st centuries in Hungary. Contemporary workfare is explored with local examples. It is shown how discourses of work and fairness are being extended into new ethical registers to justify negative attitudes towards a new category of migrants.

The historical and contemporary development of certain informal and formal articulations of Muslim social and political identities and forms of association in Muslim-majority and Arab societies has facilitated the emergence of a public sphere and limited the coercive power of state authority. This article suggests how a greater focus on religious ideas and forms of association can enhance the concept of the public sphere so that it better accounts for developments in these societies and in European societies themselves.

This article criticizes two theoretical approaches to ethnicity and ethnic conflict. One emphasizes the intense solidarity generated by the ethnic bond and explains this in terms of a deep, quasi-kin feeling. The other emphasizes the contingency and situatedness of ethnic feeling and the fluctuating character of ethnic “groupness”. We adopt an alternative strategy, locating ethnicity as one factor among many, which may form a path-dependent self-reproductive system generating communal opposition and ethnic conflict.

This paper examines changing German and Korean policies towards transborder coethnics (Germans in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and Koreans in Japan and China) during the high Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The paper contributes to the emerging literature on transborder forms of membership and belonging by highlighting and explaining the selective, variable, contingent, contested, and revocable nature of states’ embrace of transborder coethnics. The explanation highlights the relationship of transborder populations to predecessor polities; changing geopolitical contexts and domestic political conjunctures; the constitutive, group-making – and group-unmaking – power of state categorization practices; and the enduring institutional legacies and unintended consequences of such practices.

This article demonstrates that among violent Islamists engineers with a degree, individuals with an engineering education are three to four times more frequent than we would expect given the share of engineers among university students in Islamic countries. We then test a number of hypotheses to account for this phenomenon. We argue that a combination of two factors – engineers’ relative deprivation in the Islamic world and mindset – is the most plausible explanation.

Central to the study of ‘armed forces and society’, whether the approach be that of sociology, political science or legal doctrine, is the question of how unique the military really is—and ought to be. Over the last four decades or so, a number of authors have evinced keen interest in, and written more or less extensively on such matters as the objective, normative and subjective dimensions of military life, functional, structural and cultural features of military organization, civil-military relations, and the patterns of long-term change affecting them.

Exceptional cases are at odds with the typical: they stand out as bizarre and rare. What then could justify their systematic analysis? Elaborating the analytical distinction between anomalies, exceptions and outliers, this paper outlines three potential epistemic contributions of exceptional cases. First, exceptional cases reveal the limits of standard classification categories. In so doing, they problematize usual classificatory grids. Their input is critical. Second, exceptional cases point to new classes of objects. They acquire paradigmatic status when they exemplify the characteristic features of these new classes with utmost clarity. Third, exceptional cases magnify relational patterns that in more mundane contexts lack visibility. Here their contribution is heuristic. These three contributions become possible when we put at bay normative expectations of what should happen, and specify cases by reference to an analytical space of constitutive dimensions. To underscore the general significance of these observations, I draw on examples borrowed from different quarters of the social sciences: the sociology of organizations, ethnomethodology, comparative historical sociology and the history of science.

One of the most persisting cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Émile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is ‘pulled’ by the prospect of future rewards, whereas the latter is ‘pushed’ from behind by quasi-inertial forces (Gambetta 1987). The former adapts to changing circumstances, always on the lookout for improvements. The latter is insensitive to circumstances, adhering to the prescribed behavior even if new and apparently better options become available. The former is easily caricatured as a self-contained, asocial atom, and the latter as the mindless plaything of social forces. In this paper I characterize this contrast more fully, and discuss attempts to reduce norm-oriented action to some type of optimizing behavior.

This paper asks whether it is possible to study “elite” professional migrants in Europe with the same concepts and theories being used to explain the incorporation and/or integration of “ethnic” (i.e., non European) migrants in Europe; that is, in terms of their social mobility and social power in their new host countries. While globalisation may in theory make it easier for these professional migrants to transfer their “social capital” to other national contexts, observations of the personal and professional trajectories of European professional migrants in Brussels—particularly their difficulties establishing a true social power in a foreign national—suggests that theorists often overstate their arguments about “global cities” and the decline of the nation-state, at least as far as Europe is concerned. The paper links these empirical concerns with theoretical issues arising from the work of Bourdieu, Mann, Coleman, Castells and Portes, aiming to build a bridge between current work in ethnic and migration studies and core current issues in social theory.

The “performativity thesis” is the claim that parts of contemporary economics and finance, when carried out into the world by professionals and popularizers, reformat and reorganize the phenomena they purport to describe, in ways that bring the world into line with theory. Practical technologies, calculative devices and portable algorithms give actors tools to implement particular models of action. I argue that social network analysis is performative in the same sense as the cases studied in this literature. Social network analysis and finance theory are similar in key aspects of their development and effects. For the case of economics, evidence for weaker versions of the performativity thesis is quite good, and the strong formulation is circumstantially supported. Network theory easily meets the evidential threshold for the weaker versions. I offer empirical examples that support the strong (or “Barnesian”) formulation. Whether these parallels are a mark in favor of the thesis or a strike against it is an open question. I argue that the social network technologies and models now being “performed” build out systems of generalized reciprocity, connectivity, and commons-based production. This is in contrast both to an earlier network imagery that emphasized self-interest and entrepreneurial exploitation of structural opportunities, and to the model of action typically considered to be performed by economic technologies.

There is a particularly interesting, important, and, I think, generally unacknowledged cleavage within the study of the Geist, cultural history, Geisteswissenschaften, the human sciences, sociology or whatever term you employ. This deserves our consideraion.