Unlike several of my colleagues whose retrospective essays are included in this special section, I did not have a personal relationship with Alfred DuPont Chandler, though during the 1980s he did invite me to present a discussion of my first book Proprietary Capitalism at his Harvard business history seminar. I also met Dr. Chandler frequently at Business History Conference meetings, where I found him ever-gracious, indifferent to criticism, and supportive of diverse projects whether allied with or tangential to his own. Thus here I offer some reflections on our discipline and its current situation, taking Chandler's publications as a point of departure.

The media celebration of media owner Ted Turner's career and personal biography reflects important shifts in the image of American corporate leadership over the past thirty years.Even aspects of Turner’s life we would normally consider private, such as his sex life and his marriage to Jane Fonda, have taken on this very public function.As a result Turner has served as a transitional figure between two competing visions of corporate identity and responsibility: paternalist managerialism and the “real entity” theory of the firm on the one hand, and on the other, antimanagerial market adventurism and the new economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts.The story of how Turner has come to serve this gender-charged iconic function helps clarify how the balance of representational power continues to shift back and forth between these two visions during a period of considerable upheaval in the social, legal, and symbolic construction of the American corporation.

J. Walter Thompson (JWT), the leading American advertising agency until the 1970s, established a branch office in Paris in 1927. While many of JWT's worldwide branches became the leading agencies in their respective countries, notably Great Britain and Germany, JWT-Paris foundered from the late 1920s through the early 1960s. This article focuses on the reasons why: cultural clashes between the French and Americans, a regulated and protected French market, anti-Americanism among French businesses, and American condescension and insensitivity. It concludes with an analysis of and the reasons for JWT-Paris's achievement of limited success by the late 1960s.

First experimented with in the 1920s and 1930s in the production of automobile engines, transfer machines became dominant in U.S. engine plants in the 1940s and 1950s, as automakers invested heavily in this equipment to meet pent-up demand following the war. Transfer machines thus became identified with “Detroit automation”. But with the advent of a “horsepower race”, firms found that transfer machines could not accommodate even minor changes in design. Late in the 1950s the industry developed and applied “building-block automation” to transfer machines to attain greater flexibility. Examining these developments contributes to our understanding of both specific industries and the general history of mass production and its alternatives.

The role of business enterprise in integrating economies is one of the central historical themes of the last two centuries. Although globalization—both in its current iteration and in its nineteenth-century form—has been widely studied, the role of the firm, as opposed to macroeconomic forces, has yet to receive sufficient attention. Many research questions remain, including the role of the United States as a host country, the place of multinationals based in emerging markets, and the importance of understudied sectors such as retailing. Business historians should shift the focus of queries from “why” to “how” and go beyond the discipline's traditional organization along national lines to study the behavior of firms worldwide.

Beginning in the 1950s, advertising and marketing specialists in Yugoslavia campaigned aggressively to change public and official perceptions of their work. By casting commercial promotion in terms of categories already established as legitimate in the ideology of Yugoslav socialism, the industry gradually naturalized advertising and marketing, transforming them from suspect capitalist practices into apparent necessities of progressive, rational production and distribution. Although the rhetoric used in this campaign consistently appealed to socialist values, in practice Yugoslav advertising and marketing were largely based on Western models. Yugoslav commercial promotion was only superficially “socialist advertising”; practitioners' arguments tended to obscure the true qualities of the industry.

Women flourished as producers, directors, screenwriters, and editors in the first quarter-century of the film industry. But by 1925 their presence in all but screenwriting was severely diminished. The argument of this essay is that the process of gendering the industry ultimately closed studio doors to female filmmakers. As studios moved from the artistic and entrepreneurial stage, conducive to the perceived qualities of women, to the corporate stage, the needs of the industry became masculinized and women were excluded. This process is explored by examining the assumptions regarding gender inherited by the early movie industry and the context in which gender was discussed within the industry, and by asking whether explicit assumptions about the fitness of women and men were ever factors in determining what and who a filmmaker should be.

This article analyses the evolving relationship between mainstream oral history and business oral history, and explores the ways in which the latter has been deployed and discussed in business history journals. Business historians have, until relatively recently, tended to utilize oral history as a means to fill gaps in the archive. Interviews thus made important contributions to business history studies, but much of their potential remained untapped. Recent critical engagement with issues of methodology and interpretation has seen a discernible shift in the ways that oral history is being understood by business historians. This article outlines this evolution and the possibilities that it raises for both business and oral history.

While the first business organizations to reach large size in the late nineteenth century did so through the route of vertical integration—formal ownership of assets and direct employment of workers—mid-twentieth-century franchising firms pioneered a new path to bigness, relying on restrictive contracts rather than formal integration to control their business organizations. Franchised chains replaced formal ownership and employment with contractual mechanisms known as vertical restraints (contractual controls on separate firms, such as price and supplier restrictions) to achieve uniformity and control over their outlets, without directly owning them. While most existing accounts of franchising focus on efficiency reasons for the evolution of the business form, this paper identifies a policy and legal mechanism: the relaxing of antitrust prohibitions on vertical restraints. These policy and legal changes were heavily lobbied for by franchising firms themselves. Whatever the efficiency implications of franchising, the increasing legalization of vertical restraints also had the benefit for franchising firms of allowing them to pull in the legal boundaries of the firm, leaving workers and other stakeholders outside. At the same time that they pursued franchising as a kind of vertical integration by other means, franchisors lobbied to preserve the legal benefits of having franchisees considered separate firms under a variety of laws, such as access to Small Business Administration loans and exclusion of workers at franchised establishments from access to collective bargaining and other rights against them.

On the basis of articles in contemporary periodicals, literature, and company archives, this article explores the views of entrepreneurs and society about what constitutes the responsibility of entrepreneurs. From the mid-nineteenth century, we can trace discussions about how entrepreneurs should behave in their own company and toward society, but these ideas were far from constant over time. The changing views on the social responsibilities of entrepreneurs give us therefore important information about changes in the national business system. Though focused on the Dutch entrepreneurs in their relationship to Dutch society, the article includes the influence of ideas from abroad. International management literature abounded in the Netherlands, and multinational companies often picked up ideas from other countries. How companies and entrepreneurs defined their responsibilities depended to a large extent on the criticisms launched by the outside world. Entrepreneurs and company managers responded to concerns in the society of which they formed part, and the progressive ones among them, the true leaders, searched for ways of reconciling the requirements of their business with the demands of the society.

Today, we are all aware of the importance of technology to modern business, including process technologies as well as consumer and industrial products incorporating technology. The significant role of technology in business (and vice versa) is not, of course, new. Although the history of technology and business history have different professional organizations and often focus on different theoretical and empirical phenomena, the large number of historians who work at the intersection of the two today reflects the importance of each to the other over a much longer time period. Yet historians of both types still too often give short shrift to the role of business enterprises as technology users as well as to the actual business use of technology.

This article analyzes the emergence of public relations among corporations in interwar Britain. It adopts a discursive approach and applies the philosophy of Michel Foucault. It argues that public relations was a result of state propaganda during World War I, the emergence of a mass-media society, and criticism from a range of groups toward corporations during the period. It acted as an emergent institutional text, which taught corporations how to create corporate identities so as to garner public good will and institutional legitimacy. This was achieved by a range of strategies, including social programs and the creation of corporate narratives.

Following the seminal work of Lévi-Strauss, developed by Baker and Nelson and Duymedjian and Rüling, this paper analyzes the role that entrepreneurial bricolage played as an innovation tool in the origins and growth of four important Spanish tourism companies: Meliá, Barceló, Iberostar, and Riu. Their development has been deeply embedded in the island of Majorca (Spain), whose historical market conditions shaped and drove the companies’ bricolage actions. Entrepreneurial bricolage has generally been studied from a short-term perspective; however, this work adopts a dynamic approach that, instead of focusing on the concept of bricolage, aims to explain its evolution over time. To this end, four historical and qualitative case studies are used. The main contribution made by this paper is that the four companies did not limit their bricolage actions to contexts of scarcity but made this type of entrepreneurship a regular mechanism in their business practices, as the island’s tourism context thrived. However, the resulting innovations, as well as their main drivers, did indeed change over time.

The ‘corporate veil’ refers to the separation of legal identity between parent firms and their subsidiaries, which gives the parent protection against the liabilities of its subsidiaries. Fearing that such liability protection would facilitate illicit activity, early twentieth century courts, especially in America, would sometimes ‘pierce’ the corporate veil. This article explores Adams v. Cape (1990), in which American plaintiffs attempted to persuade the English courts to lift the corporate veil and impose liability for industrial disease on Cape Industries, a leading U.K. asbestos manufacturer. This landmark case shows how corporate strategy can be closely intertwined with international corporate law and occupational health and safety issues. It also highlights how limited liability law and separate legal personality can result in significant injustice to claimants against multinational enterprises.

This essay is a business and cultural history of Wrigley marketing in North America from the 1890s until the early 1930s. Wrigley relied on wholesalers at a time when consumer goods makers were expanding their sales forces. A prolific advertiser, Wrigley provided favorable terms to retailers carrying chewing gum, countering the view that advertising, by enabling direct communication between manufacturer and consumer, diminished retailer clout in the chain of distribution. Wrigley advertising constructed meanings on multiple levels, discussed here with the theoretical tools of liminality and semiotics. The text of Wrigley ads championed relief for two modern conditions: indigestion and stress. The imagery, mainly that of the liminal “Spearman,” evoked notions of unworldly escape and infantile nostalgia. The ads were richly polysemic. Accordingly, Wrigley's widespread popularity and market dominance by 1930 should be assessed in terms of both marketing function and representational process.

It is London 1856. William Henry Perkin serendipitously invents the first synthetic dye while he is trying to synthesize quinine, a medicine for malaria. The nineteen-year-old Perkin leaves the Royal College of Chemistry and quickly commercializes his aniline purple dye, launching the synthetic dye industry. From that time on, the industry continues to dazzle the eye with ever new and appealing dye colors. Perkin, along with entrepreneurs from Britain and France, dominates the synthetic dye industry for the next eight years. During this period, British and French firms introduce most other innovative synthetic dyes onto the market, and they hold the largest global market share.

This article argues that an information ecosystem emerged rapidly after World War II that made possible the movement of knowledge about computing and its uses around the world. Participants included engineers, scientists, government officials, business management, and users of the technology. Vendors, government agencies, the military, and professors participated regardless of such barriers as languages, cold war politics, or varying levels of national economic levels of prosperity.

Gordon Moore designed Moore’s Law as a multifunctional tool to drive process and product innovation, sell Fairchild’s and Intel’s microchips, and outcompete other semiconductor firms. Because Intel’s ability to stay on Moore’s Law depended upon other corporations developing materials and manufacturing equipment for exponential scaling, Moore and his closest associates heavily promoted Moore’s Law in the microelectronics community. They also established the national and international technology roadmaps for semiconductors in order to set the direction and cadence of innovation in microelectronics at the national and, later, global scales. Moore’s and his successors’ relentless pursuit of Moore’s Law and their deft management of the roadmaps significantly reinforced Intel’s competitiveness and helped it to dominate semiconductor technology and industry until the mid-2010s.

Through an investigation into the origins of American food marketing, this dissertation reveals how branding—specifically, the centennial brands Quaker Oats, Coca-Cola, and Crisco—came to underpin much of today's market-driven economy. In a manner akin to alchemy, the entrepreneurs behind these three firms recognized the inherent value of an agricultural Eden, then found ways to convert common, low-cost agricultural goods—oats, sugar, and cottonseed oil—into appealing, high-revenue branded food products. In the process, these ventures devised new demand-driven business models that exploited technology and communications advances, enabling them to tap a nascent consumer culture. Their pioneering efforts generated unprecedented profits, laid the foundation for iconic billion-dollar brands, and fundamentally changed how Americans make daily food choices.