The Labour Government (1997–2010) created a large number of new laws affecting religion. The Blair and Brown years saw the incorporation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, the creation of religiously-aggravated offences, the recognition of civil partnerships, and a tide of legislation affecting education, charities and equality law, which saw the extension of the law to cover discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. And all this legislation has resulted in an abundance of case law. There is more ‘religion law’ – national and international law affecting religion – than ever before. And, for some time, there has been an implicit tension in English law between this new religion law and older laws protecting religion. These old laws, many still on the statute books, were based upon a different premise. They often sought to protect Christianity in general (or the Church of England in particular) as the norm, while providing some degree of toleration for other faiths. Moreover, the legal regulation of religion was characterised by a lightness of touch. The new religion law, by contrast, is facilitative, seeking to protect religious freedom mainly as an individual right which needs to be balanced against other rights. No special protection is afforded to any one religion and protection is often afforded to non-religious beliefs. The new legal framework affords utmost importance to the concept of religious neutrality as the State takes on the role of facilitating the religious market place. The tension between the old laws on religion and the new ‘religion law’ can be seen, for example, in the abolition of the offence of blasphemy (which favoured the Church of England in particular) and its replacement by offences concerning religious hatred (which covers all religions). This tension has recently come to the fore in the Court of Appeal ruling in the application for leave to appeal in McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited.

The Second Colloquium of Anglican and Roman Catholic Canon Lawyers took place at St George's House, Windsor Castle, from 31st May to 3rd June 2000. The Colloquium was hosted by the Centre for Law and Religion at Cardiff Law School under the leadership of Professor Norman Doe, whose recent appointment to a personal chair at Cardiff University was a cause of much celebration amongst the participants. The Colloquium was designed to build upon the pioneering work of a similar venture convened last year in Rome by the Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas which, together with Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA, cosponsored the event. A report of the first Colloquium appears at (1999) 5 Ecc LJ 281.

In this paper, the authors present different views of the legal implications of Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission, in which the House of Lords reversed the Court of Session and held that a former minister could sue the Church under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and, contrary to previous views, probably had an enforceable contract for services. Cranmer describes the basis for the decision and suggests that it represents a realistic view of the employment status of clergy. Peterson is less optimistic about the decisions legal and practical effects and argues that it undermines the constitutional status of the Church of Scotland as well as overall prospects for religious freedom in Scotland.

This article deals with the relation between God and the secular legal systems of Western liberal democracies. It provides a normative argument for the compatibility of God and secular legal reasoning. In our age, in which believing in God is no longer socially axiomatic and the right to religious freedom protects all kinds of theistic and non-theistic religious beliefs, creeds and first philosophies, it seems contrary to religious neutrality for secular legal systems to single out God. This article instead argues that, although God and religion are inextricably intertwined, they affect the legal system in different ways because they are ontologically different. God cannot be reduced to a mere component of theistic religion. A proper understanding of secularisation might call for keeping God outside the legal system but not for driving God out of the public sphere of democratic societies. Secular legal systems are not atheist legal systems; they are legal systems ‘without religion’ but not ‘without God’. Secularisation implies some degree of minimal recognition of God as a metalegal concept. The specific degree of recognition of God appropriate for any given political community depends on its cultural and communitarian identity and should be subject to the rules of democratic procedures and majorities. This is the metalegal God.

Although it is indisputable that Muslims have been in Britain for centuries now, it is the events of the recent past that has increasingly focussed attention on the presence of what is now one of Britain's largest minorities. Like numerous other religious minorities in the United Kingdom, Muslims have established themselves and largely conduct their religious and cultural practices within the confines of English law. The aim of this article is to investigate how English law deals with Islam and the regulation, recognition and accommodation, if any, of certain Muslim practices, such as religious divorces and marriages and the establishment of places of worship. The article does not aim to be comprehensive in its coverage of all the issues raised by the Muslim population in the United Kingdom, especially the criminalisation of certain political activities which some Muslims consider to be religious obligations, but simply attempts to analyse how in some respects British Muslims regulate their activities and how a parallel but non-recognised legal system is now in operation and the extent to which English law makes provision for British Muslims and their practices, beliefs and needs.

The seal of the confessional was part of the canon law applied in England before the Reformation. It was also part of that law which was continued in force at the Reformation, as is confirmed by the proviso to canon 113 of the 1603 Canons. This proviso is still in force and proprio vigore binds the clergy of the Church of England. By the Act of Uniformity, 1662, the hearing of confessions was enjoined upon those clergy in certain circumstances; the law places no limit upon the frequency of their being heard. It is unsurprising that there are infrequent references to the seal of the confessional since the Reformation; such cases as there are are inconclusive. Nevertheless, although the seal of the confessional may be waived by the penitent, the refusal by an Anglican clergyman to disclose what was said within sacramental confession is based upon a duty imposed on him by the ecclesiastical law rather than upon an evidential privilege. An Anglican clergyman in breach of that duty would be in grave danger of censure by the ecclesiastical courts and such censure might well lead to his deprivation and possible deposition from Holy Orders. The ecclesiastical law is part of the general law of the land and must be applied in both the ecclesiastical and secular courts. Both courts must therefore enforce that clerical duty and uphold any refusal by an Anglican clergyman to answer questions in breach of the seal of the confessional.

On 21 April, Dominic Raab resigned as Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, to be replaced by Alex Chalk KC. On 8 May, The Times reported that the Bill of Rights Bill was to be dropped and that the Ministry of Justice had told its reporters that the new Justice Secretary had been ‘looking carefully’ at the Bill, while another Government source had described the Bill as a ‘complete mess’.

This article considers some of the controversies that have troubled the Anglican Communion during the past 25 years, and some of the approaches that the Churches and central Instruments of the Communion have used to maintain communion in the face of threatened division. In particular, it looks in detail at the terms of the proposed Anglican Covenant, its provenance and its legal significance. It points out the usefulness of the Covenant as a mechanism for resolving disputes between the Churches of the Communion, but questions the assumption that its adoption as, in effect, a contract between the Churches would of itself turn the Communion into a ‘two-tier’ body, or change in a fundamental way the nature of the relationships between the Churches. Finally, it notes that communion between the Churches of the Anglican Communion, with or without the Covenant, consists (as it always has done) in a wide range of relationships at very many different levels, far beyond the central structures of the Communion as they have developed during the last 150 years.

Bishop Eric Kemp was a canonist when such practice had yet to become fashionable once more. He was instrumental in the formation of the Ecclesiastical Law Society and served as its President from the creation of the Society until his death on the eve of Advent Sunday in 2009. He was a member of this Journal's Editorial Advisory Board from 1987 until 2002. The first issue of this Journal ran to 34 pages. The only substantive article, taking up more than half of its content, was by Eric Kemp. In celebration of the Silver Jubilee of the Journal and in recognition of its first President's contribution to its establishment and subsequent flourishing, this article is reproduced, lightly updated and annotated by the current Editor, who was pleased and proud to serve as Bishop Kemp's last chancellor in the Diocese of Chichester.1

John Witte Jr is a law and religion scholar of the first order. For decades, as the director of the Emory Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Atlanta, he has played a leading part in the development of the field of law and religion globally. He has written prolifically across a wide range of law and religion subjects. He has nurtured and guided a generation of vibrant scholars who will shape the field for decades to come. He has brought important new insights to law and religion that have animated critical and original law and religion thinking. This article introduces aspects of his work. It examines the personal interest of Witte in law and religion, and the influences on his approach to the field, particularly his Christian upbringing and convictions. It explores his rich and robust understanding of law and religion, around notions of the dialectical interaction between the two, the religiosity of secular law, and the juridical character of religion. It also studies Witte as a historian of law and religion – his quest to retrieve, reconstruct and re-engage historical aspects of law and religion so as to address challenges of today, interdisciplinary, international and inter-religious. In all this, Witte provides a work ethic for Christian scholars in this field in terms of stewardship, accessibility and engagement.

The freedom of the individual can easily come into conflict with his or her obligation to integrate in society. The case of Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium provides a good example. It is evident that some restrictions of citizens’ freedoms must be accepted for a state to function and, more basically, persist; as a consequence, it is acceptable that certain demands, incorporated in criminal law, are made of citizens. The issue of the extent to which such restrictions are justified has increasingly become a topic of discussion. The present case raises a number of important questions with respect to the right to wear a full-face veil in public if the societal norm is that the face should be visible, the most salient of which are whether women should be ‘protected’ from unequal treatment against their will and to what extent society may impose values on the individual. I will argue that Belgian law places unwarranted restrictions on citizens and that the values behind it testify to an outlook that is difficult to reconcile with the freedom of conscience and religion.

This article affirms the importance of ecclesiastical polity as a theological–juridical discipline and explores its connection to ecclesiology and church law. It argues that the Anglican Communion, though not itself a church, nevertheless has a lightly structured ecclesiastical polity of its own, mainly embodied in the Instruments of Communion. It warns against short-term, pragmatic tinkering with Church structures, while recognising the need for structural reform from time to time to bring the outward shape of the Church into closer conformity to the nature and mission of the Church of Christ. In discussing Richard Hooker's contention that the Church is a political society, as well as a mystical body, it distinguishes the societal character of Anglican churches from the traditional Roman Catholic conception of the Church as a societas perfecta. In the tradition of Hooker, the role of political philosophy in the articulation of ecclesiology and polity is affirmed as a particular outworking of the theological relationship between nature and grace. The resulting method points to an interdisciplinary project in which ecclesiology, polity and church law, informed by the insights of political philosophy, serve the graced life of the Church in its worship, service and mission.

‘In Scotland the Church is fortunately in a position of practical independence of the State. Whatever difficulties and hindrances affect the Church in Scotland, and they are many, are more than balanced by the non-interference of the temporal power.’ So wrote Canon Lempriére in 1903, and so it remains. As a result it has adapted to changing circumstances more easily than a body established by law.