The public religion of the Isle of Man is protestant Christianity in the liturgical tradition of the English Prayer Book. The religious establishment is headed by a bishop, who has been since 1541 subject to the oversight of the Archbishop of York.

The title of this article is deliberately provocative: what meaning can be attached to a concept which lacks all the classic jurisprudential marks of authority, by those who concern themselves with the legal aspects of Anglican churches? Conversely, what lessons can be learned by them from the very persistence of such a concept over so very many years?

This article focuses on the role of private patronage within the Church of England. Private patrons own advowsons. These property rights can no longer be traded but may still be bequeathed or transferred without value. When there is a vacancy in a benefice, a patron has the right to nominate a new incumbent in accordance with the Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986. This article uses contemporary and historical records to define private patronage and analyse the current role of the four broad categories of private patrons: private individuals, educational bodies, guilds and patronage societies. While acknowledging the benefits that patronage can bring, this article advocates substantive reform for the future including a sunset rule for private individual patronage. The article suggests that reform of the law of private patronage will make a positive contribution to other contemporary issues before the Church by promoting diversity in vocations, facilitating necessary pastoral reorganisation and adding to the dialogue about the future of the parish system.

The House of Commons starts each day with Prayers given by the Speaker's Chaplain, beginning with Psalm 67:

In R v NS the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was asked to consider a straightforward question: must a Muslim woman remove a niqab (face covering leaving only the eyes showing) when giving evidence in a sexual assault case in which she is the complainant. Two justices said ‘yes’; one said ‘almost always, no’; and the majority said ‘maybe yes, maybe no – it depends’. The matter was then returned to the preliminary inquiry judge to make the actual decision, which could still be subject again to appeal to the SCC. The court divided on the three available answers to the question: yes, no and maybe. The division, however, leaned in favour of requiring removal of the niqab because the reasons for judgment favouring ‘maybe’ were concurred in in the result by those favouring removal. In the end, the court did not give a clear answer to the question, but rather provided a four-part test for trial judges who must continue to make the decision, subject to appeal. The practical utility of this response may be doubted.

This article discusses the application of the proportionality test which the Court of Session in Scotland and the European Court of Human Rights carried out when reviewing the limitations to worship and public gatherings imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. The article concludes that judges should not use the proportionality standard of review as an avenue to circumvent their duty of neutrality towards religious dogmas.

There have been a number of tribunal decisions on the admissibility of discrimination claims concerning ‘belief’ as a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010. Some have favoured the claimant, establishing, inter alia, that opposition to fox hunting and hare-coursing, a belief in the ‘higher purpose’ of public service broadcasting and a commitment to vegetarianism constitute ‘philosophical beliefs’ for the purposes of the Equality Act. Others do not, such that a belief in wearing a poppy or, in contrast with an earlier decision, a commitment to vegetarianism do not qualify. The admissibility of these claims tended to turn on the extent to which the belief in question was considered cogent or was sufficiently weighty and substantial. In Forstater v CGD Europe & Anor, whether or not a belief fell into the protected category focused on the rather different issue of whether or not it was worthy of respect because of its compatibility (or otherwise) with the dignity and rights of others.

This article describes the changes in criminal law and procedure that the author saw take place during 50 years of practice, turning a criminal justice system in which it was difficult to prosecute cases involving multiple child witnesses into one much better adapted to cases alleging sexual assault and the needs of vulnerable witnesses. The article reviews, decade by decade, the major developments in people's understanding and perception of the prevalence of physical and sexual abuse, touching on a number of high-profile events. It traces the development of the Church of England's safeguarding policy, noting how it tracks the development of secular policies. In parallel it identifies a number of significant cases of sexual abuse by clergy which were/are the subject of ‘lessons learned’ reviews. A note of caution is however sounded arising from the cases of Carl Beech and Bishop Bell, in particular the danger of not following well-established investigative procedures but jumping to judgement. The article concludes by suggesting how investigation and fact-finding might take place in the future, independent of the bishops, but under the supervision of a ‘judge’, and argues that effective risk assessments can only be based on findings of fact.

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects manifestations of religion or conscience from interference under Article 9(1) except insofar as such interferences can be justified under Article 9(2). This analysis asks when Article 9 will protect believers who are forced to choose between religious observance and pursuit of secular ‘goods’ and offers some conclusions about how the protection of believers from forced choices compares with the protection of manifestations of religious belief. It also considers whether cases where believers are asked to choose between religious obligations and protected goods raise particular issues under 9(2). Finally, the conclusions arrived at are applied to an illustrative hypothetical example. The objective is to demonstrate the potential reach of 9(1), and to explore the 9(2) analysis specific to protected-good cases.2

On 9 January 2008, Dr Evan Harris, MP for Oxford West and Abingdon, brought forward the following new clause to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill: ‘The offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel are abolished’. His proposal had wide cross-party support and had also attracted backing from the House of Lords in the persons of the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey of Clifton, and the former Bishop of Oxford, Lord Harris of Pentregarth.

In his address to the April meeting, the archbishop raised questions about the high business rates placed on the steel industry in the UK and the crisis faced by Welsh steelworkers, the elections for members of the Welsh Assembly and the forthcoming referendum on Europe. He reminded the Governing Body that the right to vote was won at a price and that, as Christians, we had a moral duty to exercise that right. The archbishop, considering the recent death of his wife, Hilary, also spoke of bereavement and dying in general. Palliative care and the hospice movement had come a long way in fifty years; if he had not already been persuaded by the arguments against assisted dying, watching the care and the gentleness of hospice nurses, for whom nothing was too much trouble, would have convinced him.

The Cremation (England and Wales) Regulations 2008, which were put in place in the wake of the Shipman murders and the subsequent inquiry by Dame Janet Smith, came into effect on 1 January 2009. They modernise and consolidate all previous regulations, and replace the Cremation Regulations 1930, as amended. However, the new Regulations are themselves an interim measure, to be replaced in due course by a new system of death certification under the Coroners and Justice Bill, which was introduced into the House of Commons in January 2009.

The Ecclesiastical Law Society is rightly promoting afresh the study of ecclesiastical law. In the case of the Church of England, the sources of ecclesiastical law are three-fold: case-law, statutes (and Measures made thereunder) and the Canons of the Church of England. These are the formal sources for identifying and expounding (Anglican) ecclesiastical law. The sources qua sources may not be the subject of debate; the debate may only be as to the interpretation of the contents of the sources and whether the sources should be amended. This approach to determining the substantive content of ecclesiastical law reflects the positivist approach to law, such as Bentham, Austin and Hart have set out.

Most recent historians have expressed a negative opinion of the quality of legal education at the English universities between 1400 and 1650. The academic study of law at Oxford and Cambridge, they have stated, was easy, antiquated and impractical. The curriculum had not changed from the form it assumed in the thirteenth century, and it did little to prepare students for their careers. This article challenges that opinion by examining the inner nature of the ius commune, the law that was applied in the courts of the church, and also by examining some of the works of practice compiled by English civilians during the period. Those works show that the negative opinion rests in part upon a misunderstanding of the nature of legal practice during earlier centuries. In fact, concentration on the texts of the Roman and canon laws, as old-fashioned as it seems to us, was well suited for the tasks advocates and judges would face once they left the academy. It also provided the stimulus needed for advance in the law of the church itself; their legal education made available to potential advocates and judges skills that would permit a sophisticated application of the ius commune, one better suited to their times. The article provides evidence of how this happened.1