The Ecclesiastical Law Society is rightly promoting afresh the study of ecclesiastical law. In the case of the Church of England, the sources of ecclesiastical law are three-fold: case-law, statutes (and Measures made thereunder) and the Canons of the Church of England. These are the formal sources for identifying and expounding (Anglican) ecclesiastical law. The sources qua sources may not be the subject of debate; the debate may only be as to the interpretation of the contents of the sources and whether the sources should be amended. This approach to determining the substantive content of ecclesiastical law reflects the positivist approach to law, such as Bentham, Austin and Hart have set out.

In October 1992 representatives of the British and Irish Anglican Churches, together with their counterparts from the Nordic and Baltic Lutheran Churches signed an historic agreement near Porvoo in Finland which, if accepted by all these churches, will bring about their closer communion. The Porvoo Common Statement and a supporting dossier of Essays on Church and Ministry in Northern Europe were published in 1993 (Together in Mission and Ministry, Church House Publishing, London). The Porvoo Common Statement is now being considered by the General Synod which will be asked to accept a core Joint Declaration. This begins by a mutual acknowledgement of each other's churches as part of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. A second acknowledgement follows concerning the mutual presence of the Word of God and the Sacraments of baptism and the eucharist;then acknowledgements of the common confession of the apostolic faith and the ministry as both an instrument of grace and as having Christ's commission.

In his address to the April meeting, the archbishop raised questions about the high business rates placed on the steel industry in the UK and the crisis faced by Welsh steelworkers, the elections for members of the Welsh Assembly and the forthcoming referendum on Europe. He reminded the Governing Body that the right to vote was won at a price and that, as Christians, we had a moral duty to exercise that right. The archbishop, considering the recent death of his wife, Hilary, also spoke of bereavement and dying in general. Palliative care and the hospice movement had come a long way in fifty years; if he had not already been persuaded by the arguments against assisted dying, watching the care and the gentleness of hospice nurses, for whom nothing was too much trouble, would have convinced him.

‘The manner of appointment [of bishops] reflects the delicate balance between the established nature of the Church of England and its autonomous self-governance.’ As with most matters of Church of England ecclesiology and polity, the process of the appointment of bishops in the Church of England is firmly rooted within the reforms of the sixteenth century, but has origins which stretch back to the mediaeval Church. This comment article focuses on the appointment of diocesan bishops in the Church of England.

In the decades that followed the close of the Second Vatican Council, great progress was made in the dialogue between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church. During that period, the Anglican–Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC) was founded in 1967 by Pope Paul VI and the Archbishop of Canterbury (Michael Ramsey). The rich and common heritage shared by Anglicans and Roman Catholics found expression in the work and statements of ARCIC. In the background was the work of theologians, historians, liturgists and Scripture scholars, and many relationships were being cultivated locally in dioceses and parishes around the world. While the possible significance of Church law had been recognised in the 1974 World Council of Churches Report, Christian Unity and Church Law, there has been no sustained discussion of canon law in the work of ARCIC.

Most recent historians have expressed a negative opinion of the quality of legal education at the English universities between 1400 and 1650. The academic study of law at Oxford and Cambridge, they have stated, was easy, antiquated and impractical. The curriculum had not changed from the form it assumed in the thirteenth century, and it did little to prepare students for their careers. This article challenges that opinion by examining the inner nature of the ius commune, the law that was applied in the courts of the church, and also by examining some of the works of practice compiled by English civilians during the period. Those works show that the negative opinion rests in part upon a misunderstanding of the nature of legal practice during earlier centuries. In fact, concentration on the texts of the Roman and canon laws, as old-fashioned as it seems to us, was well suited for the tasks advocates and judges would face once they left the academy. It also provided the stimulus needed for advance in the law of the church itself; their legal education made available to potential advocates and judges skills that would permit a sophisticated application of the ius commune, one better suited to their times. The article provides evidence of how this happened.1

In this article it is argued that individual sincerity has become the most significant determinant of whether or not a religious or philosophical belief is to be recognised as such for the purposes of accessing putative legal protections for individuals. However, a clear test of individual sincerity has not been fully articulated by the courts in the UK or indeed elsewhere. In this context, the possibility of developing a test based in large part on consistency of individual behaviour is considered in this article, and some objections noted. The article concludes that such a test is both useful and desirable in principle, and should be developed; however, it must be applied with great care in order to remain inclusive of those who may be driven to apparent inconsistency by fear or as a result of other factors.

On 9 January 2008, Dr Evan Harris, MP for Oxford West and Abingdon, brought forward the following new clause to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill: ‘The offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel are abolished’. His proposal had wide cross-party support and had also attracted backing from the House of Lords in the persons of the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey of Clifton, and the former Bishop of Oxford, Lord Harris of Pentregarth.

Although much of the business of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland relates to legislation and debates of reports from committees, unlike the synods of episcopal churches the General Assembly is also a court, with exclusive jurisdiction in ‘matters spiritual’. However, under the terms of Act III 2001, as amended, disciplinary matters are investigated by a Presbyterial Commission and, in disputed cases, ultimately come before the Assembly's Judicial Commission. Cases before the General Assembly were once quite common; but for the 2009 Assembly to find themselves hearing a judicial dispute was very unusual indeed.

The Cremation (England and Wales) Regulations 2008, which were put in place in the wake of the Shipman murders and the subsequent inquiry by Dame Janet Smith, came into effect on 1 January 2009. They modernise and consolidate all previous regulations, and replace the Cremation Regulations 1930, as amended. However, the new Regulations are themselves an interim measure, to be replaced in due course by a new system of death certification under the Coroners and Justice Bill, which was introduced into the House of Commons in January 2009.

In its recent judgment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v EEOC, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment precludes the application of anti-discrimination law to the employment relationship between a church and its clergy. In 2005 the House of Lords had reached the opposite conclusion, ruling, in Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland, that the decision to dismiss an ordained minister was not a spiritual matter falling outside the scope of anti-discrimination legislation. This article argues that Percy largely neglected important aspects of church autonomy and that the reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor offers an opportunity to rethink whether secular law should be allowed to affect a religious group's decision to appoint or dismiss a minister.