It is to an over-all situation based upon the complex play of political, social, economic and scientific factors, along with technological and mass media factors unique to our own era, that we owe the general trend toward multi-pluri-inter-trans-disciplinary questions so generally prevalent in our world today.

At the end of his writing, “La Différance,” Jacques Derrida deconstructs his text by taking on an authoritative rhetorical tone. Reflecting back on his discussion of metaphysics, Derrida announces that “(t)here will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being”. And then he takes a surprising phenomeno-logical turn and advocates a privileged attitude or disposition towards his reflection:

And we must think this without nostalgia, that is, outside the myth of a purely maternal or paternal language, a lost native country of thought. On the contrary, we must affirm this, in the sense in which Nietzsche puts affirmation into play, in a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance.

We might begin a search for the possibility of translation with a search for a common moral foundation for both the Eastasian world and the Western world. Answers come easily with a qualified yes or no; for example, we might make a list or table comparing how East and West think about adultery. This is unsatisfying; we ourselves are often unclear what we think and feel about these issues. So, a few of the more circumspect might ask where our own sense of the moral arises. Perhaps we will seek the source of the OUGHT. Our friends from the Orient might ask us what these words moral or OUGHT mean. I do not think the West can as easily convey to the East what it means by sense of obligation as the West imparts technology. Try to translate our word obligation by the Japanese word giri; this translation is suspect since for the West, obligations are obligations only if they grate against the well ingrained inclinations of our being. The Kantian necessary test of authenticity of the true moral act will be if we act against the grain of our inclinations.

This dialogue from the first century B.C. explains, with a slightly different meaning, a cardinal notion for Hinduism, the principle of individuation. Designated by the composite nāma (name) and rūpa (form), this notion illustrates the consubstantial relationship between the person and his name.

Our interdisciplinary studies for over twenty years applied to the comparative history of the Romané Chavé (European Gypsies) with the high military castes of India (Rajputs and Kshatrivas), had come off, as from 1964, to the following conclusions: the more a language is similar on the lexical level to Hindi-Rajasthani and, on the morphological one to Jodhpuri, the more it is similar to Gypsy language—Romani, the more a culture is similar to the culture of the Rajputs and Kshatrivas, the more it is similar to Romani culture; the more someone is similar to the members of the military castes of India and generally to the people of Hindu religion of North Western India, of the Delhi State and its surroundings (Haryana, Western Uttarprades, Rajasthan and Sindh), the more he is similar to a Romano Chavo.

Theoria, aisthesis, mimesis and doxa are terms that sometimes are opposed, and sometimes their particular relationships are denied. However, the system of the paradox that often animates esthetic theories and conceptions of mimesis have only the pathetic enjoyment of reclaimed and affirmed unsolvable questions. Therefore it would be well to grasp the historical configuration that ordered the play of these concepts and their evolution up until our contemporary poetics.