In this Reply to Critics, I respond to essays by Professors Alysia Blackham, Jessica Eisen, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Dale Smith, Iyiola Solanke, and Daniel Viehoff on the theory of wrongful discrimination developed in my book, Faces of Inequality. Among the topics I discuss are: the relationship between equality and discrimination, the role of social subordination in my theory of wrongful discrimination, and methodology in discrimination theory.

At the heart of Sophia Moreau's theory of wrongful discrimination is the moral duty to treat others as equals. This article raises some challenges regarding the contours of this duty and suggests some ways to make the theory stronger. In particular, it suggests that we incorporate a cosmopolitan view of the duty's scope, that we illuminate the features at the basis of individuals’ equal moral status to determine its grounds, and that we identify some considerations about important interests to articulate its contents. The relation between Moreau's theory and human rights discourse is also briefly examined, and more engagement with the latter is recommended.

In Faces of Inequality, Sophia Moreau offers a pluralist theory of discrimination, according to which discriminatory conduct involves one or more of (at least) three types of wrong. She claims, further, that each of these wrongs represents a failure to treat some people as the equal of others. I argue that this further claim is mistaken. I also suggest that there may be no need for a pluralist theory of discrimination to identify a property that is shared by the different types of wrong recognised by the theory (beyond the fact that each is present in cases of wrongful discrimination).

Sophia Moreau's wide-ranging and nuanced book defends a pluralist view of wrongful discrimination. I argue three points. First, I argue that Moreau's account of deliberative freedom does not provide a distinct ground for objecting to discrimination. Second, I argue that there is not as wide a gap between her view and expressivism as she makes there out to be. Third, there is an intriguing gap in the argument that deserves further exploration: Moreau never provides us with an account of when and why social subordination is wrong.

Sophia Moreau, in her important book, offers an insightful account of (one strand of) the wrong of discrimination based on the evil of subordination. My symposium contribution seeks to clarify the structure of Moreau's account of subordination and its normative and axiological status. On one plausible view, subordination is fundamentally bad or wrong. On another view, subordination is a distinctive social phenomenon, which is bad or wrong only derivatively. I will outline each view, and consider the implications each has for certain issues central to Moreau's book.

Alberto Voltolini advocates a syncretistic account of fictional entities, asserting that it satisfies all the desiderata for a suitable account of fictional entities. This article presents an alternative account of fictional characters that meets these criteria, while circumventing the problems with Voltolini's account. On my Leibnizian antirealist account, a fictional character can be identified by the collection of predicates attributed to its name. And this account offers the benefit of the bundle theory, avoiding the issue of bearers of fictional names, while also explaining why a fictional character is more than just a collection of predicates.

David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality. In one of its readings, this “virtual realism” states that virtual entities ontologically depend on real digital entities. This article explores that suggestion and offers a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Drawing on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution, we contend that virtual objects should be seen as constituted by digital objects, when these are placed in certain favourable circumstances. We explore the rationale and implications of this view, which we see as a promising form of virtual realism.

L'opposition entre contrainte et libre nécessité a conduit nombre de commentateurs de Spinoza à concevoir la libération éthique comme une reconquête de soi contre les aliénations causées par l'extériorité, et à confondre plus ou moins explicitement contrainte et contrariété de la puissance d'agir. L'analyse du mot coactus dans le texte spinoziste montre que les modes finis ne peuvent être et ne peuvent se libérer que par et dans la contrainte, qui n'est pas forcément contrariante. Une telle analyse rejoint celles des sociologues Émile Durkheim et Pierre Bourdieu.

John Rawls est souvent perçu comme un partisan de politiques redistributives visant à apaiser les conséquences d'une économie capitaliste qu'il ne remettrait pas en cause. Cet article montre qu'il s'agit là d'un préjugé et donne un aperçu de la transformation du paysage des entreprises qu'impliquerait une société juste aux yeux de Rawls. Nous commentons les régimes économiques qu'il esquisse dans son œuvre et rappelons que le libéralisme égalitaire a en vérité des implications profondes et souvent insoupçonnées en ce qui concerne la propriété et la gestion des entreprises. Pour Rawls, la démocratie de propriétaires implique que les citoyens possèdent tout au long de leur vie des parts sociales dans les entreprises tandis que le socialisme libéral suppose la nationalisation des moyens de production et la socialisation de leur gestion.

This article aims to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of inquiry. I start with some common desiderata for any theory of inquiry. I then categorize inquiry as a structured process. By focusing on its essential components, I advance a new characterization of inquiry as a combination of questioning attitudes guiding actions. Finally, I turn to the recent objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry. I argue that inquiry is a structured process essentially constituted by questioning attitudes having two precise functional roles, initiating and guiding the deployment of cognitive capacities towards an epistemic goal.

Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood.

L'une des fonctions des institutions publiques des démocraties libérales est de formuler des recommandations à l'attention des décideurs. Or, les institutions publiques savent que leurs recommandations seront souvent ignorées en partie par le décideur. Cette situation de « conformité partielle » aux recommandations soulève plusieurs problèmes de nature philosophique pour les institutions. En nous appuyant sur une analyse de 570 recommandations tirées de 40 documents et rapports du secteur public québécois, nous identifions deux enjeux entourant la structure des recommandations issues du secteur public.

In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas states that the “aspect of pastness” involved in memory is a certain kind of cognitive object — i.e., an intention — apprehended by the “estimative power.” All told, however, Aquinas mentions this idea precisely once. In this article, I construct an account of the idea that pastness is an estimative intention by drawing upon texts in which I argue that Aquinas develops this idea, albeit without invoking the terminology of the estimative intention. I conclude that, by identifying the aspect of pastness as an estimative intention, Aquinas neatly synthesizes the Aristotelian and Arabic traditions on memory.

In this article, I argue that some irremediably depressed patients have the decision-making capacity to consent to medical treatment even when they want to die. These patients are said to have deficits in appreciative capacity because they lack insight into their condition. I argue that some patients have insight if they can cognize and articulate a range of future possibilities regarding their health. The argument requires a phenomenological lens. Phenomenology captures something fundamental about depression, such as temporal experience, which is needed for a more thorough assessment of capacity for medical assistance in dying (MAiD).

In response to the claim that democracies are inherently short-termist, this article argues for a new way to understand them as being committed to future generations. If taking turns among rulers and ruled is a normative idea inherent to the concept of democracy, then such turn-taking commits democrats to a fair turn with future generations.

Indigenous philosophy from the 17th century and earlier is often thought to be irretrievable because of a lack of extant works. There are at least two reasons that this view is mistaken. First, it overlooks the role oral traditions play in preserving the thought of Indigenous peoples. Second, some Indigenous thinkers had their philosophical views recorded by European interlocutors shortly after contact. With these sources, the same techniques used to recover the views of philosophers like Prodicus, whose works are lost, can be applied to Indigenous thinkers. By reconstructing the philosophy of Kondiaronk, I show how this can be done.

There are strong moral reasons to acknowledge that third parties can have the standing to forgive. Third-party refusals to forgive can reinforce the moral agency and value of women and disrupt the gendering of forgiveness. Third-party forgiveness can also be crucial for restorative justice aims, like recognizing the value of wrongdoers. Lastly, many victim-only accounts of forgiveness are problematic and utilize an individualistic conception of the self that reinforces the logic of misogyny. Victim-only accounts of forgiveness can also restrict focus to the victim's suffering, thereby neglecting the importance of healing and the relevance of third-party forgiveness for facilitating healing.

One of the key responsibilities of public institutions in liberal democracies is to formulate recommendations for decision makers. However, public institutions realize that decision makers will often partly ignore their recommendations. This situation of “partial compliance” with recommendations raises a number of philosophical issues for institutions. Based on an analysis of 570 recommendations drawn from 40 Quebec public-sector documents and reports, we identify two issues surrounding the structure of public-policy recommendations.

Steven Burns argues that rich works of art tend to yield best readings rather than ambiguous interpretations. This is no mere statistical claim. Rather, Burns holds that such richness makes ambiguity less likely or sustainable. As a champion of multiple interpretability, I criticize Burns’s account. Adding detail to an ambiguous work may not disambiguate it and may in fact increase the range of equally rewarding interpretations. Ambiguous works are furthermore numerous and noteworthy, and range across various artforms. All else being equal, ambiguity appears to add to rather than detract from the richness of artworks.

Les pays ayant une structure politique fédérale sont souvent confrontés aux revendications de leurs États membres pour obtenir plus d'autonomie politique. Pour répondre à ces revendications, les théoriciens du fédéralisme multinational ont proposé de reconnaître un droit à l'autodétermination interne qu'ils ont pris soin d'encadrer de diverses manières. Bien qu'intéressante, cette proposition pourrait toutefois s'avérer insuffisante pour répondre aux inégalités entre les peuples au sein d'une même fédération. C'est la thèse que nous défendrons dans le présent article. Nous montrerons que le concept d'autodétermination interne défendu par Kymlicka reste indéterminé et ouvre la porte à des interprétations plus exigeantes.