This article explores Spinoza's distinctive contribution to the eudaimonistic tradition, which considers happiness (eudaimonia) to be the highest good. Most (if not all) ancient eudaimonists endorse some sort of hierarchy between mind and body, where one is always dependent on, or subordinate to, the other. In particular, many of them endorse ethical intellectualism, where mental things are considered more valuable than bodily ones. I argue that Spinoza, in contrast, considers mind and body ontologically and ethically identical and equal, thereby bringing something new to this ethical tradition.

In this article, we re-examine Pascal's Mugging, and argue that it is a deeper problem than the St. Petersburg paradox. We offer a way out that is consistent with classical decision theory. Specifically, we propose a “many muggers” response analogous to the “many gods” objection to Pascal's Wager. When a very tiny probability of a great reward becomes a salient outcome of a choice, such as in the offer of the mugger, it can be discounted on the condition that there are many other symmetric, non-salient rewards that one may receive if one chooses otherwise.

The moral problem of authority can be expressed as follows: how can authority, and the deference it entails, be compatible with freedom and rationality? The pluralist approach separates political obligation from authority. For pluralists, authority is both unjustifiable and unnecessary, and so legitimate political obligation, including the duty to obey the law, does not entail deference. I argue that it is possible to retain the pluralist commitment to plural grounds of legitimacy, while rebutting the pluralist objections to authority. As a result, whenever authority does have legitimacy, the moral question of authority will demand an answer.

This review locates Asha Bhandary's Freedom to Care in the history of philosophy, notes some of the theory's distinctive features that clearly advance the care theory tradition, and raises some puzzles and questions regarding specific elements of the theory. My remarks focus mostly on Part I of the book and on the following four topics: (1) Bhandary's Rawlsian roots, (2) Bhandary's engagement with Eva Feder Kittay, (3) Bhandary's choice of J. S. Mill and John Rawls as her main historical interlocutors, and finally, (4) Bhandary's methodological choice of ‘men/fathers,’ ‘women/mothers,’ and ‘children/girls/boys’ as the main focus of much of her analysis.

In this article, I respond to symposium articles by Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg, and Helga Varden. With shared sympathies for anti-oppression liberalism and social contract theory, they urge me to develop the theory of liberal dependency care (LDC) in new directions — respectively, as a form of subject-centered justice, with a political liberal justification, and with a Kantian foundation for ‘private right.’ I respond by explicating the inclusivity that is built into the arrow of care map and the variety of contract theory I advance. Furthermore, I insist that anti-oppression liberalism need not formulate its claims in political liberal terms.

In this introduction, I offer a broad overview of Asha Bhandary's Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture so that readers can better situate the suggestions of this symposium's contributors: Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg, and Helga Varden. Bhandary develops and defends the theory of liberal dependency care in response to the failure of past liberal theorizing to appreciate that dependency care — which is essential to our survival — is a matter of justice. By concluding with a Hamptonian framing, I hope to further generate discussion of this novel work that broadens the influence of contemporary feminist liberal theorizing.

John Rawls and Asha Bhandary use David Hume's conditions of justice to frame the original position choice from which principles of justice are selected. To use Hume's conditions in this way excludes from representation those who are not full cooperators, including people who need lifelong dependency care. This implies that their claim to dependent care is not a fundamental claim of justice, but must have significantly lower priority. This article argues that an appropriate theory of liberal dependency care will abandon this Humean framing assumption, and will treat the claim to dependency care as a fundamental requirement of justice.

Even if it cannot be found elsewhere, it does at least appear that logical infallibility, or incorrigibility, can be found in the belief that one is, or is not, in pain, as well as in the Cogito. But how could the existence of a (true) belief and the existence of the fact believed be the same existence? An answer is proposed. Sometimes a belief can be a desire.

Le concept de valeur est souvent disqualifié pour son ambivalence : la valeur croît et décroît ; elle est reconnue par les uns, mais pas par les autres. Les philosophies de la valeur seraient subjectivistes ou contaminées par une rationalité économique. Nous montrons, à partir de Gilbert Simondon, que la valeur peut être conçue comme une grandeur variable sans tomber dans le nivellement ou le relativisme axiologique. Ceci implique de congédier la séparation néokantienne de l'ontologie et de l'axiologie, de rejeter la conception de la culture comme ensemble de valeurs (et la bipolarité des oppositions de valeur), et enfin de mobiliser une analogie physico-mathématique plutôt qu’économique pour penser la valeur.

Success semantics holds, roughly, that what it is for a state of an agent to be a belief that P is for it to be disposed to combine with her desires to cause behaviour that would fulfill those desires if P. J. T. Whyte supplements this with an account of the contents of an agent's “basic desires” to provide an attractive naturalistic theory of mental content. We argue that Whyte's strategy can avoid the objections raised against it by restricting “basic desires” to sensory inclinations that cause us to do things independently of our beliefs about their contents.

I argue, through Heidegger, that the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the Parmenides does not signify eternity, or a trace of eternity in time, but rather implies a primordial conception of time. In deduction two, the relationship between stasis and kinesis becomes problematic due to the notion of τὸ νῦν. This leads Parmenides, in deduction three, to posit the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης to solve this problematic relationship, implying a primordial conception of time.

L'ambition de cet article est de restituer la radicalité de l'argument central contre les logiques déviantes que W.V.O. Quine déploie dans Philosophy of Logic. Cet argument a pour objet de mettre au jour l'inanité du concept de logique déviante, c'est-à-dire son caractère dénué de sens. En rendre compte requiert alors de prendre la mesure de sa dimension anti-psychologiste. Nous tâchons ainsi de montrer que le défi le plus radical de Quine ne consiste pas à opposer au logicien déviant que changer de lois logiques, c'est changer la signification des termes de constantes logiques.

I am broadly sympathetic to D. C. Matthew's analysis. However, in what follows, I restrict my remarks to a few areas where I think he either lacks empirical precision, or overstates his case.

D. C. Matthew argues that although integration offers blacks social and economic benefits, it also creates the conditions for phenotypic devaluation that leads to harm against black self-worth and servile behaviour. Therefore, he advises against integration because the resulting self-worth harms outweigh the benefits of integration. I argue that Matthew's cost-benefit calculation against integration lacks the requisite evidence, and amounts to a luxury belief that will result in more harm. Moreover, his interpretation of behaviour — which he construes as being indicative of a lack of self-worth — is unfounded. Further, his cost-benefit calculation results in socially reactionary sexual policing and ideological purity tests.

In “Racial Integration and the Problem of Relational Devaluation,” I argue that blacks should reject racial integration on self-protective and solidarity grounds. Integration will intensify the self-worth harms of stigmatization and phenotypic devaluation by leading blacks to more fully internalize their devaluation, and while the integrating process itself might reduce the former, it may well leave in place the latter. In this paper, I reply to the challenges to these arguments presented by Sharon Stanley, Andrew Valls, Elvira Basevich, Michael Merry, and Ronald Sundstrom.

Le rapport qu'a entretenu G. W. F. Hegel avec la pensée de F. H. Jacobi a été constant. Il s'attarde avant tout à la question du savoir, de la vérité et de sa saisie, immédiate ou médiatisée. Or, l'un des concepts centraux à la pensée de Jacobi, et sur lequel se fonde en un sens sa conception du savoir immédiat, est celui de perception entendue comme saisie du vrai (Wahr-nehmen). C'est en partant de ce concept, largement discuté au chapitre deux de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit, que nous tenterons d’éclairer sous un angle inédit la critique hégélienne de Jacobi.

I defend Edith Stein's theory of empathy as an alternative to simulation theories of empathy. Simulation theories of empathy involve using one's own cognitive resources to replicate the mental states of others by imagining being in their situation. I argue that this understanding of empathy is problematic within the context of mental healthcare because it can lead to the co-opting and assimilation of another person's experiences. In response, I maintain that Stein's theory is preferable because it involves appreciating others’ experiences as it is for them, and this alternative account of empathy avoids the assimilation of the experiences of others.

Immanuel Kant maintained throughout his life that non-human persons likely exist but he failed to specify how we could recognise them. In this article, I argue (a) that non-human organisms can be considered non-human persons if they can be judged as belonging to a species with a moral vocation, and (b) a species can be judged as having a moral vocation if at least one of its members is able to make what I will call a “moral sacrifice” in which that member sacrifices its physical life for the sake of its moral life.

When discussing well-being, subject-relative concerns are intuitively important ones. In this article, I argue that Immanuel Kant's theory of well-being can be satisfactorily subject-relative, despite his emphasis on objective moral well-being. Because the specifics of agents’ situations affect agents’ moral endowments, duties regarding moral well-being can be altered for subject-relative reasons. When it comes to thinking about the well-being of others, the important Kantian notion of respect for rational agents ensures that this will be decidedly subject-relative, too, and, what is more, that this will be aimed specifically at natural well-being (happiness).

There is a ubiquitous claim in the grounding literature that metaphysical foundationalism violates the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in virtue of positing a level of ungrounded facts. I argue that foundationalists can accept the PSR if they are willing to replace fundamentality as independence with completeness and deny that ground is a strict partial order. The upshot is that the PSR can be compatible with both metaphysical foundationalism and metaphysical infinitism, and so presupposing this fixed explanatory demand need not beg the question in favour of either view.