Given the extraordinary pace of across-the-board expansion in Korea–China relations, the lack of assessments on the state of studies of contemporary Chinese politics in Korea is a crucial void to be filled. This evaluative article first offers a socio-demographic sketch of the Korean scholarly community of contemporary Chinese politics. More specifically, it examines how the epistemological community has evolved over the last half century in terms of generational and orientational changes. The second section assesses scholarly outputs in the field of contemporary Chinese politics by looking at monographs, refereed journal articles and doctoral dissertations produced by Korean scholars. The article concludes with some suggestions for further advancement of the studies of contemporary Chinese politics, which may be applicable to Korea as well as to the peer communities in other countries.

Few studies on the legacies of the Chinese Civil War have examined its effects on state consolidation in the borderland area between China and mainland South-East Asia. This paper empirically examines the impact of the intrusion of the defeated Kuomingtang (KMT) into the borderland area between China, Burma and Thailand. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the presence of the US-supported KMT across its Yunnan border increased the new communist government's threat perceptions. In response, Beijing used a carrot-and-stick approach towards consolidating its control by co-opting local elites while ruthlessly eliminating any opposition deemed to be in collusion with the KMT. In the case of Burma, the KMT presence posed a significant challenge to Burmese national territorial integrity and effectively led to the fragmentation of the Burmese Shan State. Finally, in Thailand, Bangkok collaborated with the Americans in support of the KMT to solidify its alliance relations. Later, Thailand used the KMT as a buffer force for its own border defence purposes against a perceived communist infiltration from the north. This paper contextualizes the spill-over effects of the Chinese Civil War in terms of the literature on how external threats can potentially facilitate state consolidation.

Communist literature on “Contemporary (post-May 4) History” in which China begins a “bourgeois democratic reVolution” is more than an ideological exercise; it is autobiographical. The leading character is none other than the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. The emotional inVolvement of mainland scribes is comparable to that of a public figure writing his biography. Every event from 1919 to the present is regarded in the light of the CCP's role. Communist leadership is even attributed to the May 4 Movement, which antedated the Party's formation by two years.

“Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning.…” These words of Mao's, written just over 20 years ago, are an apt reminder of the fact that in the conduct of war, as in the control of the Party or the elimination of opposition, Mao makes no confrontation without intensive preparation. They set the mood of this short study of the dismissal of P'eng Te-huai; a study in which my thesis is that P'eng was eliminated as a real or potential threat to Mao some months prior to the 8th Plenum.

Within her first decade under Communist leadership, China has been transformed from a virtual nonentity into a major world Power. International decisions which ignore her interests are unenforceable against her. Her status as one of the Big Five can in practice no longer be challenged, and must be taken into account even by countries that refrain from acknowledging the changed situation diplomatically.

In 1980 when I took over the editorship of The China Quarterly from Dick Wilson, I was conscious of two main challenges. One was the administrative and managerial challenge of editing the journal with the degree of efficiency that would be required; the other was the editorially strategic challenge posed by the unfolding of events in China as reform and opening to the world gained pace.

If one were to choose a single adjective to apply to the pattern of Communist China's foreign relations since the Moscow declaration of 1960, “reactive” would be as nearly accurate a choice as any other. China's circumstances during 1961 and 1962 provide ample reasons for a reactive posture. The crisis in the economy, though not exactly measurable, has been evident. The course of internal politics has been less clear. The dominant trend has been a controlled retreat from the organisational methods of the Great Leap Forward. In the course of this manoeuvre, the role of the Party and its relation to non-Communist elements hi the population, organised or unorganised, has had to be redefined. What may be more diagnostic of this period, however, is a serious decline of public morale and of confidence in the régime.

The Cultural Revolution in the field of Overseas Chinese affairs has induced a state of paralysis in the bureaucracy, has accelerated the tendency to extinction of domestic Overseas Chinese status, and reduced policy towards the Chinese abroad to long periods of silence, silence punctuated until late 1968 by protests against incidents involving the Chinese in South-east Asia. The Cultural Revolution also has provided an insight into the Overseas Chinese policies of the People's Republic of China since 1949. Part I of this paper deals with the latter of these two aspects, while Part II is concerned with the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Overseas Chinese policies and institutions.

The commercial, cultural and educational agreement between the State of Ohio and Hubei province has become a major element in Hubei's efforts to modernize its industrial and agricultural sectors. At the same time, the agreement also provides evidence of increasing provincial autonomy in China's economic development. This latter fact is seen in the negotiating practices adopted by provincial officials before and after the agreement was reached.

The reasons for the visit to Russia, Eastern Europe, and China last summer of a DRV (Democratic Republic of [North] Vietnam) mission led by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Chairman of the National Planning Board Le Thanh Nghi gave rise to some speculation in the West. The inclusion of Le Thanh Nghi suggested that it was connected with economic aid to the DRV, more particularly with aid for the carrying out of the extremely ambitious five-year plan, which was first announced during the third Congress of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in September, 1960.

The grain output in China in 1974 was not only, as Robert Michael Field noted in The China Quarterly No. 65, “ far larger than output claimed for any previous year ” ; it was also far larger than the estimates made by most western economists concerned with China. Such observers, believing that agricultural production in China was “ stagnating,” had estimated Chinese grain output for 1974 as being between 255 and 259 million tons. Peking's announcement that 1974 grain output was 274-9 million tons thus set up a contradiction: either those western economists had been far off the mark in their extrapolations of growth or the Chinese figure was somehow misleading. Field opts for the second explanation.

One of the most frequent questions one is asked on returning from a visit to China is whether the tour was guided or whether one could do what one liked and forage for oneself. The question worries both academics and non-academics, whatever their particular interests. The assumptions behind the question would appear to be that one can only really discover anything of value by working as an individual and that a guided tour is only a propaganda exercise. While both assumptions contain an element of truth, they certainly do not express the full reality. The academic aim of extended field work in China is a practical impossibility at the moment and, even were it possible, it would require the assistance and guidance of large numbers of Chinese. The interpretation may belong to the academic but his data depend on the co-operation of others. Similarly, the extent to which a guided tour is a propaganda exercise is a function of one's previous experience and knowledge. The more Chinese one can speak and read, for example, the less likely it is that one can be misled.