The Cultural Revolution is a struggle for power, but at the same time it is the most extraordinary coup d'état in history in the sense that the dictator is trying to destroy with the help of outside forces the existing Party, which is his own creation and the very foundation of his power, in order to produce a totally new power structure.

The National Library of Beijing is the largest library in China currently open to foreigners. During 1979 and 1980 I used this library while carrying out research on the People's Bank of China and its role in industrial enterprise decision-making. Consequently, this report, in so far as it deals with the materials available, will focus only on those which are broadly related to the field of economics. It.is not, therefore, an account of all the Library's holdings, just a small part of them.

marketization is a prime feature of arts and culture in contemporary china. strikingly, while avant-garde poetry is hardly involved in this trend, and some of its commentators feel a sense of crisis as a result, it continues to flourish as a small but stable, high-cultural niche area that boasts increasing textual richness and a well-positioned constituency. an explanation of this phenomenon must take into account multiple re-inventions of traditional chinese notions of poetry and poethood, amid rapidly changing circumstances throughout the contemporary era. less culturally specific but no less essential, another factor is the very nature of the genre of avant-garde poetry in its social context and of artistic experiment per se, creating a problem for cultural analysis that makes numbers the measure of all things.

Between mid-1977 and mid-1979, the average annual rate of growth in Chinese industry fell below 5 per cent, and it appeared that the Chinese would not be able to fulfil the annual plan for 1979, especially in light industry.1 As it turned out, however, output surged in the second half of the year and the targets shown in Table 1 were met easily.

Early in 1928 the Chinese Communist Party was in crisis. It might have disintegrated and disappeared. Yet in fact it persisted, constantly refashioned itself, and ultimately became the political system of the country. The broad questions we may ask about this historical fact are: What was the nature of the Party in 1928? What had been the experience of the leadership? And what was the relationship between the Party, with its distinctive ideology, and the Chinese social environment?

For both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD), the experience of their political association from 1922 to 1927 had a profound effect on the later course of their development. This period has come to be known as the First United Front, though in fact this term cannot be used without initial reservation, since only the CCP spoke of a united front between it and the GMD. For the latter party, with its well-established revolutionary history, the term “admission of the communists” (rong gong) was invariably used to denote the opening up of GMD membership to members of a smaller and definitely junior political movement. The adoption of the communist designation in later years by many students of the period reflects in part the attention given by western scholarship to the development of the CCP during the critical years of the 1920s. However, even if the term “united front” is retained for convenience as a general rubric for the 1922–27 period, it is important that the Guomindang be subjected to careful scrutiny in its own right, so that the GMD-CCP relationship may be understood more fully. This is to be stressed, since the categories often applied to the GMD, such as “left” and “right,” while of value in some instances, on the whole blur or distort the wide range of opinion within that party on the question of communist involvement in it. Until the purge of the CCP took place in 1927, GMD attitudes towards the communists were characterized by much fluidity.

The eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met on 15 September 1956 in an atmosphere of some triumph. In the 11 years that had elapsed since the seventh Congress, the Communists had defeated the Kuomintang, taken over the country and set up a strong administration that had given the country the peace and unity so desperately lacking over the previous century. They had restored and developed the economy, substantially collectivized agriculture – without the drastic consequences suffered by the Soviet Union – and they had nationalized or semi-nationalized private industry and commerce. The People's Liberation Army had fought impressively in Korea, engendering a healthy respect abroad for the new Chinese regime. More recently, especially since the 1955 Bandung Conference, Chinese diplomacy had won new friends in Asia. China had stood up, Mao had said in 1949, and by 1956 it was clear to all that it had.

On the morning of 8 November 1977 I was given the opportunity to interview the director, Jen Chien-hsin, and another member of the Legal Affairs Department of the China Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade. We discussed the Chinese legal system in general and some legal aspects of the law of foreign trade in particular

China has constructed a rigorous state apparatus to control its online social content. To date, research has largely focused on the central government's cyber control, but the less studied local cyberspace administrative forces are also important. Our fieldwork and interviews at a county-level cyberspace administration office (CAO) in east China reveal that the local CAO had been rendered a “toothless tiger” with insufficient technology, power and labour. However, it has made up for these deficiencies by utilizing systems such as outsourced surveillance, organized mass reporting and personnel secondment. We contend that these practices, which we label “extra-institutional governance” (EIG), emerge when bureaucracies with limited resources face external pressures. The findings shed light on how censorship machines operate in local governments in China and reveal the general dynamics of how bureaucratic organizations adapt to environmental pressures.

Since the founding of The People's Republic of China, research on the world economy has been developed on an unprecedented scale, although not without setbacks. The Cultural Revolution and the activities of the “ gang of four ” seriously affected such research and virtually brought it to a halt for 10 years. However, the removal of the “ gang of four ” has meant that work on the world economy has revived and reached a completely new stage of development.

Chinese state capitalism may be transitioning towards a technology-assisted variant that we call “surveillance state capitalism.” The mechanism driving this development is China's corporate social credit system (CSCS) – a data-driven project to evaluate the “trustworthiness” of all business entities in the country. In this paper, we provide the first empirical analysis of CSCS scores in Zhejiang province, as the Zhejiang provincial government is to date the only local government to publish the scores of locally registered firms. We find that while the CSCS is ostensibly a means of measuring legal compliance, politically connected firms receive higher scores. This result is driven by a “social responsibility” category in the scoring system that valorizes awards from the government and contributions to causes sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party. Our analysis underscores the potential of the CSCS to nudge corporate fealty to party-state policy and provides an early window into the far-reaching potential implications of the CSCS.