We regret that the originally published paper (Cochrane 2010) did not contain the author's proof corrections. We apologize for this oversight and reproduce the entire corrected paper here.

Canadian courts and governments increasingly invoke principles of mutual consent and nation-to-nation negotiation as central to the goal of addressing colonial injustices in a democratic society. However, Canada continues to interpret its obligations according to the Crown's fiduciary obligation to merely consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples on infringement of their rights. In this article, I argue that there are conceptual resources available within existing Canadian law and politics for reconstructing a democratic consensual resolution to the problem of Indigenous exclusion and dispossession. I demonstrate that meeting the basic threshold of mutual consent would first require Canadian institutions to abjure the imperious temptation to impose parochial standards of free, prior and informed consent. Second, the Crown would refuse to ensnare Indigenous communities in unconscionable bargains, agreements that they would not otherwise view as reasonable, fair or equitable. And finally, Canada would accept rights of jurisdiction over land rooted in vital relations of health and well-being, as well as a corollary right of refusal or veto over decisions deemed by affected parties to be unwanted.

Emergencies can threaten human rights by disrupting societies, increasing vulnerabilities, and instigating exceptional measures from governments and other actors. As independent institutions mandated to protect and promote the human rights embedded in Canada's federal, provincial and territorial legislation, Canada's human rights commissions (HRCs) have mobilized to advocate for human rights during the COVID-19 public health emergency.

This presidential address on Canada and the study of territorial politics makes four main arguments. The first is that territory is a central component of politics, especially of Canadian politics, and that it should remain a focal point of specialists of Canadian and comparative politics. The second is that territory matters in contemporary politics because it serves as grounding for political communities, their claims, and their politics. The third is that not “identifying” parts of Canadian politics as “territorial politics” risks overlooking the importance of territory in the theorizing of federalism, nationalism and regionalism. The fourth is that, through the case of Canada, political scientists have made significant contributions to the study of comparative territorial politics.

In this research note, we document the extent to which negative beliefs about women's capacity to hold public office are widespread in Canada. Using a list experiment, our results demonstrate that many Canadians believe that men are “naturally better” leaders than are women and that women are “too emotional” and “too nice” for politics. While some groups are willing to explicitly own these views when asked directly about them (for example, older people, men, those who are more conservative and religious), others are unwilling to do so unless social desirability is mitigated (for example, younger people, left-leaning). By overcoming concerns with social desirability, we show that women still face explicit, often sexist, barriers in political work.

British post-war experience constitutes the best case yet available for study of a conscious government policy of combining full employment and price stability within the framework of free collective bargaining. In this paper, a few of the unresolved problems inherent in a full-employment economy are examined in the light of British experience. The hard core of the problem of full-employment price instability is the difficulty of restraining demands for higher wages, not because labour is less “responsible” than other sectors of the economy, but because wages constitute the largest single item both of costs and of income. It is therefore interesting to determine whether British governments have produced a wage policy which could compress wage demands within the limits say, of the productivity of labour. Has any principle (other than uninhibited self-interest) provided a new orientation to the process of collective bargaining? Has collective bargaining with a fully employed labour force in Britain disturbed the traditional constancy of distributive shares to capital and labour and if so, what was the impact of this, in turn, on economic reconstruction? What, in general, has been the rationale of trade unions in the environment of full employment? Britain has attempted to discover answers to these problems. Only by knowing these answers can we intelligently appraise the policy of maintaining full employment.

We may begin by stating three fundamental factors which in their interrelationship and when set into our scheme of economic competition are the basis of the minority group status of the Japanese immigrants in America. It is also these three factors which serve to relate the American-born Japanese to the present world crisis.

To be considered first is the factor of race. It has been used as a discriminating category for land ownership, for naturalization, and for regulating immigration. In 1913 California passed the first of the anti-alien land laws, prohibiting aliens ineligible for citizenship from owning land. Other states followed later with similar laws. In 1922 the United States Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision that members of the “Mongolian race or the Malay race” could not be naturalized. The final legal disability placed upon the Japanese on a basis of race was denying them the right of any further immigration. This was established by the National Immigration Act of 1924, often called the “Exclusion Act.” Other groups face social problems because of discrimination based upon racial features, but in the case of the Japanese, when race is combined with the other two factors, it gains unique significance.

The second factor of fundamental importance is that of the Japanese ethnic heritage, of which a central point of concern was the Japanese family system. As early as 1900 the Americans in San Francisco were demanding exclusion, but then the immigrants were mainly single males, as the sex ratio of 2,369.9 males for every hundred females shows, but by 1910 this had dropped to 694.1.

No topic has evoked so much discussion in all parts of Great Britain, and indeed in the world outside, as the Labour Party's programme to nationalize 20 per cent of the economy. Nationalization is recognized by all as the most important domestic issue facing the nation because the industries brought under public ownership are vital to Britain's economic recovery at home and a key to her future role in foreign affairs. As the Conservatives will continue the programme as conceived by Labour, except in the case of the iron and steel industry which will probably be returned to private ownership, an analysis of British nationalization is as pertinent today as it was during the Labour Party's tenure in office.

The Labour Party defined its nationalization plan in a 1945 electoral document titled Let Us Face the Future which stated in part:

There are basic industries ripe and over-ripe for public ownership and management in the direct service of the nation. There are many smaller businesses rendering good service which can be left to go on with their useful work.

There are big industries not yet ripe for public ownership which must nevertheless be required by constructive supervision to further the nation's needs and not to prejudice national interests by restrictive anti-social monopoly or cartel agreements, caring for their own capital structures and profits at the cost of a lower standard of living for all.

The expected behaviour of aggregate corporate saving is an unsettled problem that has received considerably less attention in economic research than personal saving behaviour. In part this has reflected the rather uncertain status of the corporation as a separate behavioural entity in much of economic analysis. Keynes in the General Theory emphasized personal saving behaviour, and in a brief discussion of saving by corporations, governments, and other institutions he suggested rather obscurely that their motives for saving were “largely analogous to, but not identical with, those actuating individuals.’ Keynes's neglect of corporate saving was not new in the development of economic analysis, and H. G. Johnson has argued that it “reflects Marshall's inability to integrate the modern corporation into his system of economic analysis.”

An attempt to sort out some of the significant determinants of corporate saving is particularly important for two broad questions in economics. First, is the cyclical behaviour of corporate saving an important stabilizer? This question involves a study not only of the marginal relationship between changes in planned corporate saving and corporate income but also of the interdependence between planned corporate saving and planned corporate investment. Secondly, does the behaviour of corporate saving in our society adversely affect the allocation of economic resources? This question is important for the position one takes on whether or not government policy should be designed to increase the distribution of corporate income and thus to increase the channelling of new corporate funds through the capital market.

In the Canadian constitution, that which relates to the national interest is the responsibility of the federal government; while the provincial governments deal with those matters of local concern. In a perfectly static situation this division of labour would present no problem because the national interest would always assume the same form. But governments operate in a situation that is never static. Changes in techniques or beliefs, in the location of population, and in the political and economic conditions of the external world are taking place all the time. If there is an equilibrium within the Canadian federal system, it is a dynamic equilibrium in which those common purposes which are the proper concern of the federal government are in a constant state of flux. The national interest expands and contracts: it is ever shifting its ground.

It has been quite impossible to contain this elusive concept within the angular Victorian frame of the British North America Act. It would be unreal to suppose that the division of legislative power produced entirely water-tight compartments of action for the Dominion and the provinces. It could not. There is a large range of governmental activity which quite evidently may be the preserve of either the federal parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or, in fact, of both. Much of the difficulty which was created by the judicial interpretation of the constitution between the eighteen-nineties and the nineteen-thirties flowed from an attempt to make the enumerated heads of Sections 91 and 92 represent fields of exclusive legislative power. The only way in which this could be done was by interpreting away the meaning of several heads of Section 91 in order to preserve some meaning for Section 92. This search for water-tight compartments was unnecessary and contributed to the unsatisfactory decisions of those years. One of the results of this before 1939 was that it limited the effective range of action of Canadian governments—Dominion and provincial—to such activities as would commend themselves to a Victorian liberal.

Drawing on the CPSA's archival records, this article explores the origins of CPSA and the patterns of representation in its founding decades. We focus on the pre-World War II years, when disciplinary boundaries were fluid and scholars sought to shift policy discussion from moral reform to reform guided by science and professionalism. The CPSA's founding vision aspired to engage “typical citizens” in discussion of current issues. Despite the ambitious vision, a much narrower range of citizens participated. The CPSA's powerful melding of academic, corporate, state and political elites, in turn, shaped the CPSA's reflections on the development of the Canadian state and public policy. This historical legacy encourages us to reflect on the contemporary challenges of fostering independent scholarship on public issues.

Recent publications have once more drawn the attention of the scientific world to the School of Lausanne. While economists emphasize chiefly the originality of the conception of economic equilibrium in Walras, sociologists and mathematicians pay homage to Pareto's versatile genius. Contemporary authors are mainly interested in the mathematical method and the conception of pure economics advanced by these two men. But the same authors forget too easily that Walras and Pareto dealt with numerous political and social questions, and that their opinions in these matters are important from the point of view of both applied economics and methodology. The object of this paper is to discuss these opinions. We shall first state the great philosophical antithesis which marks the division between the ideas expressed by Walras and Pareto, and secondly, consider the ideas themselves.

Although the works of Walras and Pareto on the subject of pure economics are complementary, their methods in dealing with practical economics are completely different. According to Walras, the duty of a politician is to apply the principles and data deduced by the pure economist. The pure economist must scientifically deduce laws from the “good old Natural Law.” Walras believes in scientific ideals and in the permanence of political laws; in philosophy, he is a Realist, in the sense given to this word by the quarrel of the Universals. In contrast with this, the conception of Pareto is much more flexible, much more pragmatic. His doctrine is that certain principles, rationally erroneous, can in practical reality be excellent, because people are usually governed by their feelings and not by their intelligence. To the great Italian, scientific laws were only “experimental uniformities.” This is the conception of the nominalist philosophy, which Pareto stresses when he writes: “Io sono il piu nominalista dei nominalisti.”

To understand the effect of the war upon the Canadian economy it is first necessary to examine briefly the position of the country on the eve of the struggle. By the midsummer of 1913 Canada had come to the end of a long period of expansion and prosperity. For seventeen years the country had been engaged in the construction of the immense capital facilities which stimulated and resulted from the rapid settlement of the Prairie Provinces. The construction of transcontinental railways, the building of new cities and towns in Western Canada, the improvement of waterways and harbours, and the provision of machinery and equipment for nearly 200,000 new farms constituted an uniquely large proportion of the total economic activity of the country. In 1912-13, nearly one-fourth of all the labour and productive facilities of the economy was either directly or indirectly engaged in the production of capital goods. The employment of these resources could not, of course, be financed entirely out of the current savings of Canadians. Much of the money was borrowed abroad. About one-half of the total capital invested in Canada during the pre-war wheat boom came from foreign sources. In 1913 capital imports rose to more than $500 million, a figure equal to almost one-fourth of the national income. Such huge external borrowings could not be continued indefinitely. The money was obtained from abroad for the purpose of enlarging the export capacity of the country and it was necessary at some time to slow down expansion to enable the use of the facilities for the production of increased exports.

Shortly after the outbreak of war in 1939 foreign exchange control was imposed to maintain exchange stability and to conserve Canada's reserves and prospective receipts of foreign exchange so that they might be used in the first instance for purposes deemed to be in the national interest. An ancillary objective related to war financing was to prevent the demoralization of Canadian securities markets through panic sales by non-residents in moments of crisis. While the control was directed essentially against exports of capital by residents and non-residents, the instruments of control applied equally to current and capital transactions and the power given to the Board of regulating current transactions was exercised restrictively on occasion, notably in the case of travel. Of necessity the machinery of control was elaborate because it had to be all-embracing but it rested on five basic rules: (1) Permits were required for payments by residents to non-residents. (2) Permits were required for the export of funds by travellers. (3) Permits were required for change of status from resident to non-resident. (4) Residents were required to sell to an authorized dealer all foreign exchange accruing to them. (5) Payment in an appropriate manner and in a currency designated by the Board was required for exports of goods, services, and securities, and for anything of value transferred from a resident to a non-resident whether in Canada or abroad.

Few today would deny the necessity for subordinate legislation. The true business of Parliament remains the debate over the major principles of policy, but Parliament has neither the technical skill nor the time to process the mass of detailed regulation. Nevertheless, even with a sound division of function between Parliament and the departmental sources of delegated legislation, a serious problem remains. The initiative in the framing of public policy has passed to the bureaucracy, and machinery is required to ensure that bureaucratic legislation may receive the same debate, criticism, and review as ordinary legislation. The objective of administrative reform has been to safeguard the public against bureaucratic tyranny by three devices: (a) systematic publication of subordinate legislation; (b) opportunity for parliamentary review; and (c) continuance of judicial review of the scope of delegated authority.

In the United Kingdom, where these matters are more highly developed than under any other parliamentary system, the first two of these requirements are met by the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, by various Statutory Instruments Regulations made thereunder, by the activity of the House of Commons Select Committee on Statutory Instruments, and through various techniques of parliamentary review.

The past few decades have witnessed a steady growth in the importance of marketing activity in the Canadian economy and rapid alterations in marketing methods. These developments have posed new problems of economic efficiency and of public policy. The rapid multiplication of retail stores, for example, has raised the question whether there are not too many stores to permit of the greatest efficiency of each, and whether high over-head costs due to “excess capacity” is not a more serious problem in this field than in manufacturing industry. The rise of large distributors has presented the issue whether their buying and selling policies are not so oppressive as to call for legislation to protect the independent merchant, the manufacturer, and the wage-earner. Discussion of these issues has been for the most part cursory. Few attempts have been made to apply to them the methods of economic analysis which have been used in the study of manufacturing and other industries. It is essential, however, that such attempts should be made. The price of a finished good to consumers does not depend merely upon the manufacturer's price-policy, but upon a succession of price-determinations made in a series of markets, running from the farmer or miner at one end of the chain to the final purchaser at the other. Monopoly elements in any one of these markets may affect the final price quite as much as that monopolistic competition among manufacturers to which so much attention has recently been devoted. It is therefore necessary to study commodity distribution, not as an isolated, descriptive, and barely respectable “subject”, but as an integral part of the theory of prices.

When the Labour party came to power in Britain in 1945 and again when it was returned to office in 1950, it was committed to a programme that rejected “the claims of the few to live on the labour of the many,” and demanded that “fair shares should be the national rule.” As was noted in Labour and the New Social Order, “The first principle of the Labour Party—in significant contrast with those of the Capitalist System, whether expressed by the Liberal or by the Conservative Party—is the securing to every member of the community, in good times and bad alike (and not only to the strong and able, the well-born or the fortunate), of all the requisites of healthy life and worthy citizenship.” In 1945 “fair shares” was interpreted to mean, among other things, nationalization of certain basic industries, provision of welfare services, and taxation designed to redistribute income. It was assumed that egalitarian measures would not be difficult to apply, notwithstanding the fact that the bulk of the economy would continue to be privately owned and operated. Labour leaders and voters confidently looked forward to what one Labour M.P. called “a general levelling, upward, outward, and downward.”

The economic activity of the state in the British Dominions conforms throughout to a common pattern, which might be described as neo-mercantilist, conditioned by the geographic and peculiar socio-economic forces of frontier countries. That activity issues in a complex of policies concerned with tariffs, bounties, quotas, marketing controls, and varied forms of financial assistance, or outright public ownership, in order to establish fresh industries, or to aid those existing, in the face of intense competition from more mature industrial competitors; to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources, and to increase populations. These policies broadly resemble the older mercantilism in that their end, where rationalized in terms of the state, is the achievement of national power and prosperity by the development of the ill-balanced economic life of sparsely settled colonies into economies integrated and diversified.

The interpretation of what contributes to national prosperity is determined by the contemporary interests politically powerful, and ordinarily it is a composite product of the many interests with free play under the parliamentary regime. Sometimes there is agreement among the chief interest-groups in recognizing that the claim of a small population to an extensive territory is precarious unless it furthers settlement and development. Such a recognition underlay the generous bonusing of the Canadian Pacific syndicate in the eighties in order to ensure a transcontinental railway, tariffs to develop in Canada east-west traffic, the numerous controls of Commonwealth and state respecting Queensland sugar to guarantee a white population in the Australian tropics, and the aggressive efforts made at some time in every Dominion to increase immigration.