Requests by patients for providers of specific demographic backgrounds pose an ongoing challenge for hospitals, policymakers, and ethicists. These requests may stem from a wide variety of motivations; some may be consistent with broader societal values, although many others may reflect prejudices inconsistent with justice, equity, and decency. This paper proposes a taxonomy designed to assist healthcare institutions in addressing such cases in a consistent and equitable manner. The paper then reviews a range of ethical and logistical challenges raised by such requests and proposed guidance to consider when reviewing and responding to them.

Human brain organoids (HBOs) are three-dimensional biological entities grown in the laboratory in order to recapitulate the structure and functions of the adult human brain. They can be taken to be novel living entities for their specific features and uses. As a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the use of HBOs, the authors identify three sets of reasons for moral concern. The first set of reasons regards the potential emergence of sentience/consciousness in HBOs that would endow them with a moral status whose perimeter should be established. The second set of moral concerns has to do with an analogy with artificial womb technology. The technical realization of processes that are typically connected to the physiology of the human body can create a manipulatory and instrumental attitude that can undermine the protection of what is human. The third set concerns the new frontiers of biocomputing and the creation of chimeras. As far as the new frontier of organoid intelligence is concerned, it is the close relationship of humans with new interfaces having biological components capable of mimicking memory and cognition that raises ethical issues. As far as chimeras are concerned, it is the humanization of nonhuman animals that is worthy of close moral scrutiny. A detailed description of these ethical issues is provided to contribute to the construction of a regulative framework that can guide decisions when considering research in the field of HBOs.

Rigorous attention has been paid to moral distress among healthcare professionals, largely in high-income settings. More obscure is the presence and impact of moral distress in contexts of chronic poverty and structural violence. Intercultural ethics research and dialogue can help reveal how the long-term presence of morally distressing conditions might influence the moral experience and agency of healthcare providers. This article discusses mixed-methods research at one nongovernmental social support agency and clinic in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Chronic levels of moral distress and perceptions of moral harm among clinicians in this setting were both violent, following Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ use of that term, and a source of exceptional and innovative care. Rather than glossing over the moral variables of work in such desperate extremes, ethnography in these settings reveals novel skills and strategies for managing moral distress.

This paper takes up Axel Honneth’s suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The second part of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth’s idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch’s idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established.

The complexity of the human brain creates a spectrum of sophisticated behavioral repertoires, such as language, tool use, self-awareness, symbolic thought, cultural learning, and consciousness. Understanding how the human brain achieves that has been a longstanding challenge for neuroscientists and may bring insights into the evolution of human cognition and disease states. Human pluripotent stem cells could differentiate into specialized cell types and tissues in vitro. From this pluripotent state, it is possible to generate models of the human brain, such as brain organoids. The recent observation that brain organoids can spontaneously develop complex neural network activity in a dish can help one understand how neural network oscillations evolve and vary between normal and disease states. Moreover, this finding can be leveraged to other applications outside medicine, including engineering and artificial intelligence. However, as the brain model technology becomes more complex, it raises a series of ethical and moral dilemmas. This article discusses the status of this technology, some of its current limitations, and a vision of the future.

The application of mobile health holds promises of achieving greater accessibility in the evolving health care sector. The active engagement of private actors drives its growth, while the challenges that exist between health care privatization and equitable access are a concern. This article selects the private internet hospital in China as a case study. It indicates that a market-oriented regulatory mechanism of private mobile health will contribute little to improving health equity from the perspectives of egalitarians and libertarians. By integrating the capability approach and the right to health, it is claimed that mobile health is a means of accessing health care for everyone, where substantive accessibility should be emphasized. With this view, this article provides policy recommendations that reinforce private sector engagement for mobile health, recognizing liberty, equity, and collective responsibility in the Chinese context.

Canada is six years into a new era of legalized medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The law continues to evolve, following a pattern in which Canadian courts rule that legal restrictions on eligibility for MAiD are unconstitutional and Parliament responds by gradually expanding eligibility for MAiD. The central tension underlying this dialogue between courts and government has focused on two conceptions of how to best promote and protect the interests of people who are vulnerable by virtue of intolerable and irremediable suffering due to an illness, disease, or disability. Do we, as a society, have a duty to protect vulnerable people from seeking certain medical procedures that are contrary to their interests, as those are perceived by others? Or do we have a duty to uphold their rights to autonomy, including the right to make choices within a range that may be constrained by many factors, some of which may be socially unjust? This is a recurrent problem in bioethics and medical law, which we explore through the lens of how Canadian courts and Parliament have grappled with defining eligibility for MAiD.

The practice of solitary confinement (SC) is established within the literature as a common occurrence of torture within the prison system, andmany international and national human rights organizations have called for its abolition. A somewhat more contentious topic in the literature is the practice of force feeding (FF) of hunger-striking prisoners. The paper aims to make a case against FF by establishing a parity argument that states the following: If SC is considered an immoral practice (and indeed it should be), it should follow that FF is morally impermissible as well. In conclusion, this paper will argue that FF of hunger-striking prisoners is a violation of their fundamental moral rights and constitutes cruel and inhumane treatment and, therefore, should be abolished.

Pekka Louhiala crosses disciplines and decades to present a remarkably detailed review of the existing literature on placebos, placebo effects, and related concepts. The problem at hand—and Louhiala does aptly frame it as a problem—is a striking lack of consensus among researchers, scholars, and clinicians regarding virtually all aspects of the placebo topic. In capturing the complexity of this problem, Louhiala expertly compiles an extensive catalog of placebo literature that effectively gives the reader both a map of the territory and a legend to decipher it. He does not, however, give us clear directions to find our way out of the conceptual maze. The focus is often more on the problems than their solutions, which is simultaneously the most notable weakness and the greatest strength of the book.

The number of diagnoses and the number of persons having diagnoses have increased substantially, and studies indicate that diagnoses are given or upheld even if they are unwarranted, that is, that they do not satisfy professionally accepted diagnostic criteria. In this article, the authors investigate the ethics of withholding and withdrawing unwarranted diagnoses. First, they investigate ethical aspects that make it difficult to withhold and to withdraw such diagnoses. Second, they scrutinize whether there are psychological factors, both in persons/patients and healthcare professionals, making it difficult to withdraw and withhold unwarranted diagnoses. Lastly, they use recent elements of the withholding-versus-withdrawing treatment debate in medical ethics to investigate whether there are any differences between withholding and withdrawing treatment and withdrawing and withholding unwarranted diagnoses. The authors conclude that it is crucial to acknowledge and address all these issues to reduce and avoid unwarranted diagnoses.

It is often argued by health professionals working within the field of palliative care that palliative care and euthanasia/assisted suicide are incompatible. Across the literature, this claim is grounded on the three claims that (1) palliative care and euthanasia/assisted suicide have different aims, (2) euthanasia/assisted suicide is at odds with the doctor’s fundamental role as a healer, and (3) euthanasia/assisted suicide constitutes patient abandonment. Furthermore, even if palliative care and euthanasia/assisted suicide are compatible, it is often argued that the availability of palliative care renders euthanasia/assisted suicide redundant. This depends on two claims that (1) palliative care is always available and effective, and (2) palliative care is always preferable to euthanasia/assisted suicide. This article argues that all of these claims are false, ultimately aiming to establish that palliative care and euthanasia/assisted suicide are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

The main goal of the Book Review Section of Cambridge Quarterly is to cultivate a place where scholars can share their thoughts on broad philosophical topics sparked by noteworthy books. Instead of focusing narrowly on works in healthcare ethics, our reviews cast a wider net so that we may reflect on diverse ideas. Please email [email protected] if you have book recommendations or if you are interested in writing a review.

In his article, Thomas Rissfeldt argues the compatibility of palliative care with euthanasia and assisted suicide.1 By his account, many working within the field of palliative care feel that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are incompatible with palliative care. Wrongly, according to the author, since (1) the aims of palliative care and euthanasia/assisted suicide are not different, (2) euthanasia and assisted suicide are compatible with the fundamental role of the physician as healer, and (3) euthanasia and assisted suicide do not necessarily constitute patient abandonment.2

The reversal of Roe v. Wade by the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the states to regulate terminations of pregnancy more autonomously than during 1973–2022. Those who think that women should be legally entitled to abortions at their own request are suggesting that annulling the reversal could be an option. This would mean continued reliance on the interpretation of privacy that Roe v. Wade stood on. The interpretation does not have the moral support that its supporters think. This can be shown by recalling the shortcomings of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist example and its application to abortion laws. Philosophically better reasons for not restricting access to abortion can be found in a simple principle of fairness and in sensible theories on the value of human life. Whether or not philosophy has any use in the debate is another matter. Legal decisions to regulate terminations are probably based on pronatalist state interests, shared by the apparently disagreeing parties and immune to rational argumentation.

Since its inception, the institution of postmortem organ transplantation has faced the problem of organ shortage: Every year, the demand for donor organs vastly exceeds supply, resulting in the deaths of approximately 8,000 individuals in the United States alone.1 This is in large part due to the fact that the United States, for the most part, operates under an “opt-in” policy in which people are given the opportunity to voluntarily opt-in to organ donation by registering as organ donors.2 In the United States, a person’s organs will not be removed for transplantation purposes unless she has registered as a donor or her family gives their consent for organ removal.3 Jointly, these policies generate a situation where we do not retrieve as many organs as we could.

Since 2002, legislation in Spain has allowed for the creation and documentation of end-of-life decisionmaking. Over the intervening years, the actual implementation of such documents is very low. Through extensive analysis of the literature, this article explores the current status of the use of and attitudes toward advance directives in Spain and then proposes strategies for improvement in their implementation.

Alexander Zambrano sets out to refute an argument that I have made on a number of occasions over many years since 1992, which he calls “Harris’s Greater Need Argument” (2002).

Mallory Smith’s posthumously published book, Salt in My Soul: An Unfinished Life, is an insightful and moving account of one young woman’s experience living with a chronic, often invisible, illness.1 Mallory was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis (CF) at age three and began writing in a journal when she was 15. According to those close to her, Mallory wrote consistently over the span of 10 years, until shortly before she died at age 25 from complications related to a double lung transplant. Much of what Mallory included in her journal was too difficult for her to share with family and friends while she was alive, yet she hoped that her writing would one day “offer insight for people living with, or loving someone with, chronic illness.” (page x) As Mallory explained, “I want to create a piece so moving that people are in disbelief. And I want it to be like handing people a pair of glasses, giving them a way of seeing something they didn’t even realize they weren’t seeing.” (page 291) Shortly before Mallory died, she shared the password to her 2,500-page journal with her mother, along with instructions for how to select excerpts for what would become Salt in My Soul.

Professor Latham has written a thought-provoking commentary1 on my paper about advance directives.2 I am grateful for this opportunity to integrate the debate on the moral binding nature of these manifestations of will.

In a landmark Fatwa, Saudi Arabia’s highest religious authority—The Council of Senior Scholars—declared the Islamic permissibility of oocyte cryopreservation. The fatwa sanctioned the retrieval, preservation, and future use of oocytes, ovarian tissue, and whole ovaries from cancer patients receiving gonadotoxic interventions. Although momentous, the fatwa’s specification of cancer patients effectively rendered this technology unavailable to others to whom it may be similarly beneficial, including patients with other medical conditions or patients seeking elective cryopreservation. This article argues in favor of widening reproductive choices through expanded access to oocyte cryopreservation in Saudi Arabia—regardless of the underlying cause of infertility—on three grounds: the technology’s compliance with Islamic law, as a matter of fairness in medical practice, and as a means to support the well-being and flourishing of Saudi women within the context of a national societal and economic transformation strategy closely linked to their success.