Patients from religious minorities can face unique challenges reconciling their beliefs with the values that undergird Western Medical Ethics. This paper explores homologies between approaches of Orthodox Judaism and Islam to medical ethics, and how these religions’ moral codes differ from the prevailing ethos in medicine. Through analysis of religious and biomedical literature, this work examines how Jewish and Muslim religious observances affect decisions about genetic counseling, reproductive health, pediatric medicine, mental health, and end-of-life decisions. These traditions embrace a theocentric rather than an autonomy-based ethics. Central to this conception is the view that life and the body are gifts from God rather than the individual and the primacy of community norms. These insights can help clinicians provide care that aligns Muslim and Jewish patients’ health goals with their religious beliefs and cultural values. Finally, dialogue in a medical context between these faith traditions provides an opportunity for rapprochement amidst geopolitical turmoil.

Conventional understanding and research regarding prognostic understanding too often focuses on transmission of information. However, merely overcoming barriers to patient understanding may not be sufficient. In this article the authors provide a more nuanced understanding of prognostic awareness, using oncological care as an overarching example, and discuss factors that may lead to prognostic discordance between physicians and patients. We summarize the current literature and research and present a model developed by the authors to characterize barriers to prognostic awareness. Ultimately, multiple influences on prognostic understanding may impede acceptance by patients even when adequate transfer of information takes place. Physicians should improve how they transmit prognostic information, as this information may be processed in different ways. A model of misunderstandings in awareness, ranging from patient understanding to patient belief, may be useful to guide future discussions. Future decision-making studies should consider these many variables so that interventions may be created to address all aspects of the prognostic disclosure process.

Pediatric residents experience ethical dilemmas and moral distress during training. Few studies have identified meaningful methods in reducing moral distress in pediatric trainees. The authors aimed to determine how residents perceive ethics case discussions, whether such a program affects trainee ethics knowledge and perceived moral distress, and if residents’ perceived moral distress changes before, during, and after a discussion series. Participants included pediatric residents in a single residency program. Five separate 1-hour sessions were presented over a 5-month period. Each session consisted of a case presentation by a resident developed under the guidance of an ethicist. Multidisciplinary services and content experts were present during sessions. Baseline, postsession, and final surveys were distributed to resident attendees. Open-ended responses were recorded. When comparing baseline and final responses, the only significance was increased preparedness to navigate ethical decisions (p = 0.004). A 10.2% decline was observed in perceived moral distress. An increase in ethics knowledge was observed. Residents favored case-based, multidisciplinary discussions. Residents desire more sessions, time for small-group discussions, and legal insight. Satisfaction was high with 90.7% of respondents feeling better prepared to address ethical concerns. Pediatric trainees desire case-based ethics training that incorporates small-group discussions and insight from multidisciplinary topic experts.

“INTELLECTUAL LIGHTENING”: A tribute to John Harris through a collection of memories, imaginary books, fictional reviews, and an interview. John Harris’ impressive and diverse academic career is illustrated and remembered by his colleagues who each contribute with a special memory, story or fake book review, in order to thank John and to cherish the memories. A good philosopher, a kind person, a teacher, different aspects of his work are discussed.

This paper addresses the need for, and ultimately proposes, an educational framework to develop competencies in attending to ethical issues in mental health and substance use health (MHSUH) in healthcare ethics consultation (HCEC). Given the prevalence and stigma associated with MHSUH, it is crucial for healthcare ethicists to approach such matters skillfully. A literature review was conducted in the areas of bioethics, health professions education, and stigma studies, followed by quality improvement interviews with content experts to gather feedback on the framework’s strengths, limitations, and anticipated utility. The proposed framework describes three key concepts: first, integrating self-reflexive practices into formal, informal, and hidden curricula; second, embedding structural humility into teaching methods and contexts of learning; and third, striking a balance between critical consciousness and compassion in dialogue. The proposed educational framework has the potential to help HCEC learners enhance their understanding and awareness of ethical issues related to structural stigma and MHSUH. Moreover, context-specific learning, particularly in MHSUH, can play a significant role in promoting competency-building among healthcare ethicists, allowing them to address issues of social justice effectively in their practice. Further dialogue is encouraged within the healthcare ethics community to further develop the concepts described in this framework.

Drawing on pedagogical tools utilized in clinical scenario simulation and emergency preparedness training, the authors describe an innovative method for teaching clinical ethics consultation skills, which they call a “tabletop” exercise. Implemented at the end of a clinical ethics intensive course, the tabletop enables learners to implement the knowledge and practice the skills they gained during the course. The authors highlight the pedagogical tools on which the tabletop exercise draws, describe the tabletop exercise itself, offer how to best operationalize such an exercise, reflect on the method’s strengths and weaknesses, and provide insights for others who may want to implement their own tabletop for ethics consultation education.

Putting a specific value on human life is important in many contexts and forms part of the basis for many political, administrative, commercial, and personal decisions. Sometimes, the value is set explicitly, sometimes even in monetary terms, but much more often, it is set implicitly through a decision that allows us to calculate the valuation of a life implicit in a certain rule or a certain resource allocation. We also value lives in what looks like a completely different way when we evaluate whether a particular life is being or has been lived well. Both of these ways of valuing are done from an outside or third-person perspective, but there is also a third way of valuing a life which is from the first-person perspective, and which essentially asks how much my life is worth to me. Is there any connection between these different ways of valuing life, and if so what is the connection between them? This paper provides an account of John Harris’ analysis of the value of life and discusses whether it can bridge the gap between first-person and third-person evaluations of the value of life, and whether it can do so in a way that still allows for resource allocation decisions to be made in health care and other sectors.

Bioethics education in residency helps trainees achieve many of the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education milestones and gives them resources to respond to bioethical dilemmas. For this purpose, The Providence Center for Health Care Ethics has offered a robust clinical ethics rotation since 2000. The importance of bioethics for residents was highlighted as the COVID-19 pandemic raised significant bioethical concerns and moral distress for residents. This, combined with significant COVID-19-related practical stressors on residents led us to develop a virtual ethics rotation. A virtual rotation allowed residents flexibility as they were called to help respond to the unprecedented demands of a pandemic without compromising high quality education. This virtual rotation prioritized flexibility to support resident wellbeing and ethical analysis of resident experiences. This article describes how this rotation was able to serve residents without overstraining limited bandwidth, and address the loci of resident pandemic distress. As pandemic pressures lessened, The Providence Center for Health Care Ethics transitioned to a hybrid rotation which continues to prioritize resident wellbeing and analysis of ongoing stressors while incorporating in-person elements where they can improve learning. This article provides a description of the rotation in its final form and resident feedback on its effectiveness.

This response engages critically with Harzheim’s review of Thomas Fuchs’ In Defense of the Human Being: Foundational Questions of an Embodied Anthropology. Fuchs’ work offers a profound exploration of embodied cognition, arguing that human cognition and existence are deeply shaped by our physical interactions. Harzheim’s critique highlights significant aspects of Fuchs’ framework, including his critique of functionalist models, the impact of transhumanist technologies, and ethical concerns in healthcare technology. This paper extends Harzheim’s review by proposing an integration of functionalist and embodied cognitive models, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive evaluation of technological impacts, and advocating for a more robust ethical framework that considers social equity. Additionally, it addresses the is-ought distinction and explores the implications of technological advancements on human identity and mental health. Doede’s critique is also discussed, underscoring the importance of integrating diverse cognitive models and addressing technological determinism. Overall, this response calls for a more nuanced and inclusive approach to the discourse on embodied cognition, aiming to enrich the scholarly conversation and address the complexities and implications of Fuchs’ analysis.

Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) has called for bioethics to end talk about personhood, asserting that such talk has the tendency to confuse and offend. It will be argued that this has only limited application for (largely) private settings. However, in other settings, theorizing about personhood leaves a gap in which there is the risk that the offending concept will get uptake elsewhere, and so the problem Blumenthal-Barby nominates may not be completely avoided. In response to this risk, an argument is presented in support of the idea that the role of philosophers and bioethicists, far from ending talk of personhood, ought to be to clarify the concept, and to do so in nuanced ways, given its application for specific kinds of impairments. The case of dementia is used to illustrate this in the context of person-centered care. Ironically, given the stigma attached to dementia, far from the need to end talk of personhood, bioethicists are needed to rescue the concept and clarify its role.

This article considers John Harris’ work on autonomy, specifically reproductive autonomy, outlined in The Value of Life and developed throughout his career. Harris often used the concept of reproductive autonomy to make the case for liberal approaches to developments in reproductive and genetic technologies. Harris argued that reproductive autonomy should be highly valued, and therefore we need compelling arguments to justify limiting it in anyway. When discussing reproductive autonomy, Harris focused mainly on restrictions on the potential users of reproductive technologies autonomy, that is, prospective parents. This article extends the discussion of autonomy and the appropriate limits to individuals exercising their autonomy to medical professionals working in this area. Given reproductive technologies have become part of routine medical practice, this article considers whether the current restrictions on both patients and clinicians, as imposed by regulators and professional guidelines, remain ethically justified.

The day has arrived that genetic tests for educational outcomes are available to the public. Today parents and students alike can send off a sample of blood or saliva and receive a ‘genetic report’ for a range of characteristics relevant to education, including intelligence, math ability, reading ability, and educational attainment. DTC availability is compounded by a growing “precision education” initiative, which proposes the application of DNA tests in schools to tailor educational curricula to children’s genomic profiles. Here I argue that these happenings are a strong signal of the geneticization of education; the process by which educational abilities and outcomes come to be examined, understood, explained, and treated as primarily genetic characteristics. I clarify what it means to geneticize education, highlight the nature and limitations of the underlying science, explore both real and potential downstream bioethical implications, and make proposals for mitigating negative impacts.

Many bioethicists have recently shifted from using “physician-assisted suicide” (PAS) to “medical aid-in-dying” (MAID) to refer to the act of voluntarily hastening one’s death with the assistance of a medical provider. This shift was made to obscure the practice’s connection to “suicide.” However, as the charge of “suicide” is fundamental to arguments against the practice, “MAID” can only be used by its proponents. The result has been the fragmentation of the bioethical debate. By highlighting the role of human agency—as opposed to natural processes—in causing death, the term “PAS” makes it easier both to perceive potential risks to vulnerable populations and to affirm suicide as a potentially autonomous choice. As such, “PAS” thus more transparently expresses the arguments of both supporters and opponents of the “right to die,” while avoiding the unnecessary stigmatization of suicide and suicidal people which is a result of the usage of “MAID.”

Medical ethics education is crucial for medical students and trainees, helping to shape attitudes, beliefs, values, and professional identities. Exploration of ethical dilemmas and approaches to resolving them provides a broader understanding of the social and cultural contexts in which medicine is practiced, as well as the ethical implications of medical decisions, fostering critical thinking and self-reflection skills imperative to providing patient-centered care. However, exposure to medical ethics topics and their clinical applications can be limited by curricular constraints and the availability of institutional resources and expertise. Podcasts, among other Free Open Access Medical Education (FOAMed) resources, are a novel educational tool that offers particular advantages for self-directed learning, a process by which learners engage in asynchronous educational opportunities outside of traditional academic or clinical settings. Podcasts can be readily distributed to wide audiences and played at any time, reducing barriers to access and offering a level of flexibility that is not possible with traditional forms of education and is well-suited to busy schedules. Podcasts can also use real voices and storytelling to make the content memorable and eminently human. This paper describes the development, production process, and impact of Core IM’s “At the Bedside,” a podcast focusing on issues in medical ethics and the medical humanities, intending to supplement standard bioethics curricula in an accessible, relevant, and engaging way. The authors advocate for broad incorporation of podcasts into medical ethics education.

Derek Parfit famously opined that causing a person to exist with a life barely worth living can be wrong, although it is not wrong for that person. This conundrum is known as the nonidentity problem. Parfit also held that persons can, in a morally relevant sense, be caused to exist in the distant future by actions that make the agent a necessary condition for a person’s existence. When these views are combined, which he did, and applied explicitly to persons with a life not worth living, which he did not, an interesting conditional conclusion can be drawn. If every family line eventually produces a person with a life not worth living, and if causing that person to exist cannot be justified by the benefits befalling others in the family line, it is always wrong to have children. Parfit did not draw this antinatalist conclusion, but an analysis of his introduction of the nonidentity problem shows that he could have. Since Parfit’s other views on population ethics continue to be discussed with relative respect, it stands to reason that the antinatalist position should be no exception. Right or wrong, it has its legitimate place in considerations concerning the future of reproduction.

The authors critique the NY Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which does not denounce continued captivity and invasive research in the pursuit of animal consciousness markers. They argue that such research often increases animal suffering by accepting harmful practices. Instead, they propose a nonanthropocentric, ethical framework aligned with the Belmont Report’s principle of beneficence, advocating for noninvasive methods in natural habitats. This approach prioritizes animal well-being, recognizing and safeguarding the intrinsic value of all conscious beings.

Whether anorexic patients should be able to refuse treatment when this refusal potentially has a fatal outcome is a vexed topic. A recent proposal for a new category of “terminal anorexia” suggests criteria when a move to palliative care or even physician-assisted suicide might be justified. The author argues that this proposed diagnosis presents a false sense of certainty of the illness trajectory by conceptualizing anorexia in analogy with physical disorders and stressing the effects of starvation. Furthermore, this conceptualization is in conflict with the claim that individuals who meet the diagnostic criteria for terminal anorexia have decision-making capacity. It should therefore be rejected.

Major depressive disorder is one of the most common serious illnesses worldwide; the disease is also among those with the lowest rates of treatment. Barriers to access to care, both practical and psychological, contribute significantly to these low treatment rates. Among such barriers are regulations in many nations that require a physician’s prescription for most pharmacological treatments including selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). These rules are designed to protect patients. However, such regulations involve a tradeoff between the welfare of “visible” victims, who might suffer negative consequences from a lack of regulation, and the well-being of invisible “victims,” who likely experience negative consequences that result from increased barriers to care. This article explores these tradeoffs and argues in favor of shifting SSRIs from prescription-only to over-the-counter status.

The Ethics Committee at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center (MSK) developed a Bioethics Ambassador Program (BAP); a yearlong educational program to assist clinical and non-clinical staff develop the skills to identify and address common burgeoning ethical issues that can arise during the provision of care to patients with cancer. The goal was to provide greater awareness of the role and services of Ethics, particularly at the institution’s geographically-diverse outpatient care centers and to better-instill a culture of preventative ethics. This article discusses the design and implementation of the first two years of the program and analyzes its strengths, weaknesses, and impact on MSK.