This article argues that mistakes in written contracts should be corrected under the equitable doctrine of rectification rather than the common law of interpretation. But rectification on the basis of a common mistake should only be granted where both parties are actually mistaken. Any other approach is inconsistent with the nature of the equitable jurisdiction, and blurs the boundary between common mistake and unilateral mistake rectification.

This article is about the implication of terms into contracts based upon the presumed intention of the parties. It is particularly concerned with the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Limited,1 a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions thereafter, and whether there has been any change in the law. Before getting to Belize, it is necessary to consider, as briefly as possible, what went before.

The philosophical answer to Milton's problem is, like so many philosophical answers, a counter-question. What do you mean by human life? This could involve further probing of a kind that a pre-Darwinian like John Milton would fail to comprehend. Does he include Neanderthal man, for example, in “human life”, or does he want to start with Homo sapiens?

A resurrected Milton might protest that in writing Paradise Lost he was not concerned with problems of evolution (of which he had not previously heard). His question suggests that he was thinking of the “life” of a particular “human being”; but he knew so little of what we now call biology that he would probably have been as nonplussed by the biological answer to his problem as one given in terms of prehistory.

According to the English law of restitution, a payment under a mistake of fact can usually be recovered from the recipient, at least if the mistake is a liability mistake or “fundamental”. In three-party situations the situation therefore seems to be straight-forward: independently of the relationship of each of the three parties to each other, the plaintiff is the payer and the defendant is the recipient. However, a closer look into the case law and literature reveals that there are problems.

In Germany v. European Parliament and Council (Case C-376/98, judgment of 5 October 2000) the European Court of Justice held that Directive 98/43/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products ([1998] O.J. L 213/9), the legality of which had been challenged in various earlier cases (e.g., Cases T-172/98 and T-175/98 to T-177/98 Salamander AG et al. v. European Parliament and Council; Case C-74/99 The Queen and Secretary of State for Health ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd. and Others), was invalid.

This article considers the contentious invocations of history that have become prominent in debates about English public law. It presents them as uses of history not simply to understand English public law but to reform it, through the reconstruction of historic authorities or reappraisal of historical sources. This article addresses the criticism they have attracted by distinguishing different kinds of orthodox and unorthodox reformist history. It advocates their transparent use and thoroughly deliberative history for reformist purposes in public law. It does so in three distinctive ways: first, by suggesting implications of Coke's dictum on causal understanding for whig historical approaches in the common law; secondly, by reassessing Maitland's dichotomy between the lawyer's logic of authority and the historian's logic of evidence; and, thirdly, by arguing that much can be learnt from the methodological caution, deliberation and rigour promoted by comparativists in their developed literature on legal transplants and law reform.

TAX lawyers and family lawyers are being provided with much interest by the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Jones v. Garnett. The Revenue have obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords. When that appeal is heard it is to be hoped that the Lordships will not be swayed by one particular point made both in the Court of Appeal (by Chancellor Morritt and Carnwath L.J.), where the taxpayer succeeded, and in the High Court (Park J.), where the Revenue had succeeded.

This article argues that public property rights should be recognised as a separate category of property interest, different and distinct from private and common property interests and conferring distinctive rights and obligations on both “owners” and members of the public. It develops a taxonomy to differentiate private, public and common property rights. The article concludes that it is a mistake to think in terms of “private property”, “common property” or “public property”. The division and allocation of resource entitlements in land can result in private, common and public property rights subsisting over the same land simultaneously, in different combinations and at different times. The categorisation of property interests in land (as private, common or public) may also shift and change from time to time. The article considers the importance of distinguishing between private, common and public property interests for developing new strategies for environmental governance, and for implementing the effective protection of natural resources.

The expression “common law marriage” has layers of paradox. It now denotes, as Mr. J. C. Hall pointed out in a recent article in this Journal, a relationship whose characteristic is precisely that it is extra-marital. Previously, for many centuries, the validity of such a marriage was a matter not for the common but the canon law and so, before the Reformation, for the canon law of Rome, the ius commune, Maitland's “wonderful system” administered by the courts Christian and directly applicable throughout western Christendom. The story of the common law marriage in England, Scotland and Ireland offers glimpses of great historical processes and-provides a wider context in which to consider the question raised by Mr Hall as to the survival, or revival, of the common law marriage in England.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Council of Europe have recently recognised “living together” as a legitimate dimension of the rights of others that could justify limitations on various European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) rights, including the rights to freedom of religion and respect for private life. This article argues that the important, yet still unexplored in human rights law, idea of “living together” stems from the republican ideal of fraternity and supplements the distinctive links between democratic principles and rigorous human rights protection. Even so, its justifiability as a limitation ground depends on which conception of the idea is compatible with core values and functions served by human rights under the Convention. This article distinguishes between two main interpretations of “living together”, grounded on responsibility and conformity. It is argued that, in cases touching on our expressive conduct in public, including cases on the wearing of full-face veils, a conformity conception of “living together” sits uneasily both with firmly established case law of the ECtHR and with certain key functions of rights, such as the exclusion of moralistic majoritarian preferences as grounds for coercive prohibitions.