Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 September 2016
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Council of Europe have recently recognised “living together” as a legitimate dimension of the rights of others that could justify limitations on various European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) rights, including the rights to freedom of religion and respect for private life. This article argues that the important, yet still unexplored in human rights law, idea of “living together” stems from the republican ideal of fraternity and supplements the distinctive links between democratic principles and rigorous human rights protection. Even so, its justifiability as a limitation ground depends on which conception of the idea is compatible with core values and functions served by human rights under the Convention. This article distinguishes between two main interpretations of “living together”, grounded on responsibility and conformity. It is argued that, in cases touching on our expressive conduct in public, including cases on the wearing of full-face veils, a conformity conception of “living together” sits uneasily both with firmly established case law of the ECtHR and with certain key functions of rights, such as the exclusion of moralistic majoritarian preferences as grounds for coercive prohibitions.
1 See Conseil d'Etat, Etude Relative aux Possibilités Juridiques d'Interdiction du Port du Voile Intégral, 30 March 2010; Brems, E., “Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance of Empirical Findings” (2014) 22 J.L. & Pol'y 517 Google Scholar, at 535.
2 S.A.S. v France (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber).
3 Ibid., at para. [122].
4 The term “necessary in a democratic society” reflects the familiar terminology of the Convention for the third stage of the proportionality test; see e.g. Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 10(2) ECHR.
5 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Resolution 2076: Freedom of Religion and Living Together in a Democratic Society, 30 September 2015 (33rd Sitting).
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27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., at para. [12].
29 Law no. 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010, s. 1.
30 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), at [69]–[74].
31 Ibid., at paras. [102]–[105].
32 Ibid., at para. [114].
33 Ibid., at para. [116].
34 Ibid., at para. [119].
35 S.O. Chaib and L. Peroni, “S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women Wearing a Face Veil”, Strasbourg Observers, 3 July 2014. Also M. Foblets and K. Alidadi (eds.), Summary Report on the Religare Project (European Commission 2013), 24.
36 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no. 42393/98), Judgment of 15 February 2001 (inadmissible).
37 Leyla Şahin v Turkey (Application no. 44774/98), Judgment of 10 November 2005 (Grand Chamber).
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40 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Resolution 1743: Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, 23 June 2010 (23rd Sitting), at [16].
41 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), at [120].
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., at para. [153].
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., at paras. [25], [141].
46 Ibid., at paras. [121]–[122].
47 Ibid., at para. [141].
48 Ibid., at para. [156].
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52 At the time of writing this article, a complaint about the Belgian ban on full-face veils in public is under consideration by the ECtHR. See Belkacemi and Oussar v Belgium (Application no. 37798/13), communicated to the Belgian Government on 9 June 2015.
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59 Amnesty International, “Spain: Supreme Court Overturns Ban on Full-Face Veils; AI Concerns Remain About Restrictions on Headscarves in Schools”, EUR 41/001/2013, 8 April 2013.
60 Ibid., at p. 1. The Supreme Court held that “the ban may have the effect of confining women wearing such a dress to the home”.
61 Ibid.
62 Foblets and Alidadi, Summary Report on the Religare Project, p. 24. On the wearing of headscarves in courtrooms, see Barik Edidi v Spain (Application no. 21780/13), Judgment of 26 April 2016 (only in French).
63 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), at [157].
64 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Resolution 2076, at [1].
65 Ibid., at para. [3].
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., at para. [4].
68 Ibid., at para. [5].
69 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, at [5].
70 Ibid. See also, mutatis mutandis, the partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge O'Leary in Affaire Ebrahimian c. France (Application no. 64846/11), Judgment of 26 November 2015 (in French).
71 Ibid., at para. [6].
72 Ibid., at para. [7].
73 Ibid., at para. [9].
74 Berry, “S.A.S. v France”.
75 L. Vickers, “Conform or Be Confined: S.A.S. v France”, Oxford Human Rights Hub, 8 July 2014.
76 Chaib and Peroni, “S.A.S. v France”.
77 E. Brems, “S.A.S. v France as a Problematic Precedent”, Strasbourg Observers, 9 July 2014.
78 Ibid.
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88 Vallianatos and Others v Greece (Application nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09), Judgment of 7 November 2013 (Grand Chamber). Also Trispiotis, “Discrimination and Civil Partnerships”, pp. 351–57.
89 Genovese v Malta (Application no. 53124/09), Judgment of 11 October 2011.
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94 Ibid.
95 Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v Bulgaria (Application no. 39023/97), Judgment of 13 December 2004.
96 Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v Bulgaria (Application nos. 412/03 and 35677/04), Judgment of 22 January 2009.
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99 I.A. (Application no. 42571/98), Judgment of 13 September 2005, at [28]–[30].
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101 Leyla Şahin (Application no. 44774/98), Judgment of 10 November 2005 (Grand Chamber), at [108].
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103 United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey (Application no. 19392/92), Judgment of 30 January 1998, at [45].
104 Chassagnou and Others v France (Application nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95), Judgment of 24 April 1999 (Grand Chamber), at [113].
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131 Ibid., joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, at paras. [5]–[7].
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135 Ibid., at paras. [12]–[13].
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152 See, mutatis mutandis, Chassagnou and Others (Application nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95), Judgment of 24 April 1999 (Grand Chamber), at [117], where the ECtHR held that freedom of association under Article 11 ECHR includes the right not to join an association.
153 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), joint partly dissenting opinion, at [8].
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155 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), joint partly dissenting opinion, at [14].
156 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland (Application no. 16354/06), Judgment of 13 July 2012 (Grand Chamber), at [48].
157 Stoll v Switzerland (Application no. 69698/01), Judgment of 10 December 2007 (Grand Chamber), at [101].
158 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse (Application no. 16354/06), Judgment of 13 July 2012 (Grand Chamber), at [48]; Stoll (Application no. 69698/01), Judgment of 10 December 2007 (Grand Chamber), at [101].
159 Perinçek (Application no. 27510/08), Judgment of 15 October 2015 (Grand Chamber), at [280].
160 Rawls has argued that a plurality of conflicting comprehensive doctrines, including religious, philosophical and moral, is a “fact” of well-ordered constitutional democracies. See Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, pp. 131–32.
161 Art. 17 ECHR prohibits abuse of rights.
162 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), at [25].
163 Ibid., at para. [17].
164 The full-face veil carries a plurality of meanings for women, as research from Liberty and the Open Society Justice Initiative demonstrates. See S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), at [101] and [104], respectively.
165 Ibid., at paras. [119]–[120].
166 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse (Application no. 16354/06), Judgment of 13 July 2012 (Grand Chamber), at [48]; Stoll (Application no. 69698/01), Judgment of 10 December 2007 (Grand Chamber), at [101].
167 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), at [17], [31].
168 Ibid., at paras. [19], [103]–[105].
169 Ibid., at para. [135].
170 J. Baubérot, Les Sept Laïcités Françaises (Paris 2015), 16–18.
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179 S.A.S. (Application no. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), at [17], [22].
180 Christian Democratic People's Party v Moldova (No. 2) (Application no. 25196/04), Judgment of 2 February 2010, at [24]; Tsonev v Bulgaria (Application no 45963/99), Judgment of 13 April 2006, at [48]; United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey (Application no. 19392/92), Judgment of 30 January 1998, at [42]–[43].
181 Association Les Temoins de Jehovah v France (Application no. 8916/05), Judgment of 30 June 2011 (only in French); Religionsgemeinschaft Der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v Austria (Application no. 40825/98), Judgment of 31 July 2008, at [98].
182 Perinçek (Application no. 27510/08), Judgment of 15 October 2015 (Grand Chamber), at [280].
183 Peck (Application no. 44647/98), Judgment of 28 January 2003, at [57].