ONE way in which governments may exercise political control over their subjects is by removing their status as citizens. Doing so – denying the individual the political and social rights that are constitutive of full membership of their community – involves making a radical choice, and accordingly such a decision must be properly regulated. One of the ways in which UK law does so is by preventing the exercise of the broad statutory power to rescind the citizenship of a UK national because it is “conducive to the public good”, where doing so would render that person stateless (British Nationality Act 1981, s. 40(2), (4)). Individuals may only be stripped of their citizenship under this provision on the condition that they remain full members of another political community.

ON 16 December 2015, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its judgment in the joined cases of Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica), ICJ Reports 2015. These are the latest in a line of cases raising key principles of international environmental law before the ICJ, following Pulp Mills (2010), Aerial Herbicide Spraying and Whaling in the Antarctic (2014).

UNITED Policyholder Group v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago [2016] UKPC 17 provided the Privy Council with its second opportunity in recent years to consider the doctrine of legitimate expectations (the first being Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2010] UKPC 32; [2012] 1 A.C. 1). The appellants were a group of individuals who held policies in a company known as the Colonial Life Insurance Company (CLICO). On learning in 2009 that CLICO was in serious financial difficulty, the then Government of Trinidad and Tobago had publicly issued a number of assurances to the effect that it would undertake a vast restructuring programme in order to ensure that CLICO's contractual liabilities to such policyholders were fulfilled. Following its election in 2010, the new Government changed direction; it found that CLICO's financial difficulties were much graver than had been originally anticipated and, accordingly, determined that the Government would take a different course with the consequence that CLICO's liabilities would be fulfilled to a less generous degree than originally represented.

IN Identoba and Others v Georgia (Application No 73235/12), 12 May 2015, the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights held that Georgia's failure to prevent, and effectively investigate, attacks against an anti-homophobia march violated Articles 3 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), read in conjunction with Article 14.

THE Legal Services Board, tasked with the supervision of approved regulators of persons carrying on legal activities, granted an application (by the Bar Standards Board, Solicitors Regulation Authority, and ILEX Professional Standards Board) for approval of alterations to their regulatory arrangements to give effect to the so-called Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (“the decision”). The Scheme provides for judicial assessment of criminal advocates in England and Wales: only those deemed “competent” would gain full accreditation for upper levels of criminal work. Judicial review had been sought, unsuccessfully in the courts below, by barristers practising criminal law. The question in R. (on the application of Lumsdon and others) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 121 was whether the decision was contrary to Regulation 14 of the Provision of Service Regulations 2009 (SI 2999/2009), which implemented Directive 2006/123/EC (O.J. No. L 376, p. 36). Regulation 14 requires that any authorisation scheme cannot be set unless, inter alia, the need for such a scheme is “justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest” and the scheme's objective “cannot be attained by means of a less restrictive measure” (see Regulation 14(2)).

THE Supreme Court's decision in Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 344 is a prime example of the balance that must be struck between the rights of the individual and the need to prevent terrorism. In this case, the majority placed their emphasis on the latter. Strong criticisms were made, however, of the relevant legislation. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 empowers “examining officers” (constables, immigration officers and customs officers) to stop, question, search, and detain persons at ports or borders. The powers apply whether or not the examining officer has grounds to suspect that person of being a terrorist (para. 2(4)). It is an offence to fail wilfully to comply with an examining officer's request (para. 18).

SECTION 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 requires the Home Secretary to lay down Immigration Rules regulating “entry into and stay in the United Kingdom” by “persons required by this Act to have leave to enter”. The rules are glossed by voluminous, extra-statutory, internal guidance and Immigration Directorate Instructions (hereafter referred to as “guidance”) drawn up in the Home Office.

THE image of King Canute trying to hold back the tide is a popular one used to critique attempts by national courts to restrain the publication of private information in the face of a global and online media. The truth, or at least the allegation, will out. The issue is certainly not a new one. The futility of an injunction in England and Wales, given extensive publication out of the jurisdiction, played a key role in the Spycatcher litigation in the late 1980s. Such futility is a feature of confidentiality or secrecy: the tide of information cannot be held back in an information age. In PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26, the Supreme Court, endorsing an approach developed by the High Court in several earlier authorities, distinguished between protecting confidentiality and preventing intrusion as twin rationales for the tort of misuse of private information. The intrusion of a pending media storm in the jurisdiction, repeating allegations already widely available, was a further misuse of private information and could usefully be restrained in England and Wales. Even where confidentiality had already been lost, privacy injunctions could continue to play a useful role as a defence against the significant additional intrusion, at least where it could be practicably restrained, and the pending media storm that would accompany a lifting of the injunction represented one such case.

BARRY Beavis fought the law of contract and the law won. To the disappointment of motorists nationwide, he failed to show that an £85 shopping centre parking fine was an unenforceable penalty at common law (or under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999). Ironically, he lends his name notwithstanding to a leading case which confirmed the existence of the penalty doctrine (a joined commercial challenge also failed on the facts): ParkingEye Ltd. v Beavis; Cavendish Square Holding v El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1373.

MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd. v Rock Advertising Ltd. [2016] EWCA Civ 553 deals with a number of important issues concerning variation of contracts. Rock occupied as licensee premises managed by MWB. In August 2011, Rock decided to expand its business, and entered into a written agreement with MWB for larger premises for 12 months beginning 1 November 2011. The licence fee was agreed to be £3,500 per month for the first three months, and then £4,433.34 from 1 February 2012. Unfortunately, Rock's business was not as successful as hoped and, by late February 2012, it had incurred arrears of over £12,000. MWB gave notice purporting to terminate the agreement, but the parties then orally agreed to reschedule the licence fee payments due from February to October 2012: Rock would pay less than the originally agreed amount for the first few months, but after that would pay more, with the result that the arrears would be cleared by the end of the year. Pursuant to this agreement, Rock paid £3,500 to MWB, which was the first instalment due in accordance with the revised payment schedule. However, MWB subsequently changed its mind and sued for the arrears. MWB presented two arguments why Rock could not rely upon the oral variation. First, MWB pointed to an anti-oral variation clause in the written contract. Second, MWB relied upon Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 for the proposition that the variation was not supported by consideration. Both arguments failed before a unanimous Court of Appeal (Arden, Kitchin and McCombe L.JJ.).

IN Collins v Secretary of State [2016] EWHC 33 (Admin), the High Court refused to declare that Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 76(5A) – the so-called “householder's defence” – was incompatible with the right to life enshrined in Article 2 of the ECHR, in that it failed to protect the lives of attackers sufficiently. Section 76(5A) was inserted into the 2008 Act by Crime and Courts Act 2013, s. 43, and came into force in April 2013.

IN Salt v Stratstone Specialist Ltd. (t/a Stratstone Cadillac Newcastle) [2015] EWCA Civ 745; [2015] C.T.L.C. 206, the Court of Appeal usefully emphasised that rescission is the primary remedy for misrepresentation (whether that misrepresentation be fraudulent, negligent, or innocent). The Court decided that the discretion to award damages in lieu of rescission under s. 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 can only be exercised where the right to rescind still exists, which helpfully resolves an issue of some controversy. The Court of Appeal also held that rescission for misrepresentation is not barred just because the asset sold has dropped in value or been registered, and cast doubt on the notion that lapse of time can by itself bar rescission. The short but important decision in Salt v Stratstone Specialist Ltd. is welcome and full of interest.

CRIMINAL complicity has been dramatically changed by the combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and the Privy Council in Jogee; Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681. At least since the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, it has been settled that a person (S) who has intentionally assisted or encouraged another (P) to commit a crime has been liable to be tried, convicted, and punished as if S was a principal. For decades, there has also been a much-debated, additional form of complicity where the accomplice was “parasitically” liable for further crimes committed by P beyond the scope of a common criminal purpose shared by S and P. For that kind of liability, the accomplice need not have assisted or encouraged the further crime but need only have foreseen that it was a possible incident of the common purpose. The effect of Jogee and Ruddock is that this further form of complicity, first recognised explicitly in the Privy Council decision of Chan Wing-Siu [1985] A.C. 168 and later endorsed by the House of Lords in Powell; English [1999] 1 A.C. 1, has been shorn off the criminal law. As a result, Chan Wing-Siu directions will no longer be given to juries.

MORTGAGE Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555 concerned a sale and leaseback. In desperate circumstances, the naïve and vulnerable A (Ms Lambert) entered into a sale and leaseback arrangement in respect of her flat. She was paid a small proportion of the value of the flat, which was then registered in the joint names of B (the buyers). B mortgaged it without disclosing to C (the mortgagee) the leaseback arrangement to A. The mortgage was registered, but no lease was. Ultimately, B defaulted on the mortgage and C sought to sell the property. The litigation concerned whether A had a right that could bind C. The Court of Appeal held that A did not and allowed the sale to proceed.

THE era of civil litigation to recover the proceeds of fraud continues and, with it, the elaboration of principles of judge-made law as to when defrauded persons may recover. These principles reflect a truth of human nature. Apart from the silly, reckless and brazen, those who commit fraud wish their takings to be undetectable. A crucial development in the history of English law, therefore, was to accept that, for some purposes, persons may make juridical claims not only to an asset originally taken from them, but also to other assets representing the original: Maitland, “Trust and Corporation”, in Selected Essays (Cambridge, 1936), 171–72. The concept of assets “representing” the original assets is at the heart of the equitable and common law doctrines of tracing and civil recovery for fraud.

LIKE the interpretation of the express words in a contract, the implication of terms in fact is traditionally explained as a way of the court giving effect to what the parties intended, judged objectively. So the two processes have something in common at a high level of generality. Much more controversial is the suggestion, made by Lord Hoffmann giving the opinion of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd. [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988, that the process of implying terms is merely an aspect of interpretation: “There is only one question: is that what the instrument, read as a whole against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?” This analysis, which generated intense academic debate, had not been considered by the Supreme Court until the recent decision in Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 72.

RATIONALISING the doctrine of anticipatory breach is notoriously difficult. This may explain the complete lack of attempt by the UK Supreme Court to address its conceptual difficulties in its recent judgment in Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] 3 All E.R. 1082. It is therefore of interest that the Singapore Court of Appeal in The “STX Mumbai” [2015] SGCA 35; [2015] 5 S.L.R. 1 explained why the doctrine of anticipatory breach can be applied to executed contracts (in the sense of being fully executed by the innocent party). Whilst anticipatory breach applies similarly under English law, the English courts have never considered the underlying justification, save to say in a case with a partially executed contract that “it would be very strange and hardly unworkable” if the innocent party had to wait until the time for performance (Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd. [1973] A.C. 331, 356, per Lord Simon).

COX v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 806, and Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc. [2016] UKSC 11; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 821 expand the reach of vicarious liability. In Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools [2012] UKSC 56; [2013] 2 A.C. 1 (“CCWS”), Lord Phillips had declared vicarious liability “is on the move”. Lord Reed stated in Cox “it has not yet come to a stop”.

WISHART v Credit and Mercantile Plc [2015] EWCA Civ 655 is an unusual priorities case. At its heart is an informal business partnership between two close friends: S and W. Together, the pair undertook a series of property developments. In all their ventures, S took the lead on financial matters. With the approaching sale of a particularly lucrative development, S and W considered how to spend their gains. W indicated that he would like to purchase a residential property for himself and his family, and entrusted the arrangements for the acquisition to S. W removed himself entirely from the process, failing even to look at the contract of sale. As such, he did not realise that S had inserted himself as the purchaser of the property. Upon sale, W and his family moved into the property, oblivious to the subterfuge. S then secured a loan of £500,000 on the property by way of a legal mortgage in favour of C&M. The sum was promptly gambled away, and S, now declared bankrupt, disappeared. C&M obtained possession of the property and sold it for £1.1 million, using just under £700,000 of the proceeds to recoup their loan and expenses. It was at this point that W re-entered the narrative, appearing before the court to argue that, by virtue of an overriding interest, he was entitled to the proceeds of the sale over C&M.