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THE era of civil litigation to recover the proceeds of fraud continues and, with it, the elaboration of principles of judge-made law as to when defrauded persons may recover. These principles reflect a truth of human nature. Apart from the silly, reckless and brazen, those who commit fraud wish their takings to be undetectable. A crucial development in the history of English law, therefore, was to accept that, for some purposes, persons may make juridical claims not only to an asset originally taken from them, but also to other assets representing the original: Maitland, “Trust and Corporation”, in Selected Essays (Cambridge, 1936), 171–72. The concept of assets “representing” the original assets is at the heart of the equitable and common law doctrines of tracing and civil recovery for fraud.