Mealey's work has several interesting implications: It refutes the charge that sociobiology paints a cynical portrait of human nature and adopts a one-sided reductionism; it exemplifies a general theoretical scheme for constructing evolutionary biopsychosocial models of human behavior; and it has the practical effect of promoting and informing early intervention in children at risk for psychopathic disorder.

The authors of Images of mind have been highly successful in unravelling the neural basis of complex brain functions. Their emphasis on top-down processingin experimental neuroscience is especially important and, it is hoped, influential. Tracking brain activation accurately botli in space and in time would benefit from studiesofindividual subjects without relying on grand average data.

The target article extends molar behaviorism in two positive ways: beyond average aggregates and beyond restricted laws of “conditioning.” Although a molar framework based on purely overt events shows promise for advancing behavior theory, Rachlin's specific form of teleological behaviorism is in need of clarification.

The search for simplifying principles in motor control motivates the target article. One method that the CNS uses to simplify the task of controlling a limb's mechanical properties is absent from the article. Evidence from multi-joint, force-field measurements and from kinematics that points to the existence of multi-joint primitives as control variables is discussed.

The subtraction and covariance paradigms are two analytic techniques used with functional neuroimaging data. The first assumes that a brain region participating in a task should show altered neural activity (relative to a control task). The second assumes that tasks are mediated by networks of interacting regions.Images of mind attempts to link results from the subtraction paradigm with a network interpretation that could have been more explicitly done using the covariance paradigm.

Rachlin's teleological behaviorist account shows promise for extending our behavioral understanding of many aspects of self-control, particularly when self-control involves controlling behavior through larger behavioral patterns. However, it may face special challenges in dealing with instances of self-control that involve pattern breaking.

Although serotonin, testosterone, and genes contribute to sociopathy, the relationships are probably indirect and subject to modifiers (e.g., present only under certain conditions of rearing and temperament). Age at menarche may be a marker variable as well as a causal factor. Since the genders differ in all four areas, sex differences in sociopathy represent a very complex interaction of these factors.

Kinematic properties of reaching movements reflect constraints imposed on the joint angles. Contemporary models present solutions to the redundancy problem by a pseudoinverse procedure (Whitney 1969) or without any inversion (Berkenblit et al. 1986). Feldman & Levin suggest a procedure based on a regular inversion. These procedures are considered as an outcome of a more general approach.

We consider four mechanisms by which apparent discontinuities in the distribution of antisociality could arise: (1) executive genes or hormonal systems, (2) multiplicative interactions of predisposing factors, (3) environmental tracking into a limited number of social roles, and (4) cross-generational gene—environment interactions. A more explicit consideration of complex self-organizing dynamic systems may help us understand the maintenance of antisocial subpopulations.

Models of central control variables (CVs) that are expressed in positional reference frames and rely on proprioception as the dominant specifier of muscle activation patterns have not yet been shown to be adequate for the description of fast, voluntary movement, even of single joints. An alternative model with illustrative data is proposed.

Rachlin's view of self-control is rejected on the grounds that his arguments do not establish the possibility of “molar” abstract, external, stimulus patterns and that his experiments, although they show that pigeons and human beings do sometimes choose postponed rather than immediate gratification, do not challenge the commonly held view that internal factors are involved in the former choice.

Posner & Raichle's Images of mind is an excellent educational book and very well written. Some flaws as a scientific publication are: (a) the accuracy of the linear subtraction method used in PET is subject to scrutiny by further research at finer spatial-temporal resolutions; (b) lack of accuracy of the experimental paradigm used for EEG complementary studies.

Extrapersonal frames of reference for aimed movements are representationally convenient. They may, however, carry associated costs when the movement is executed in terms of the complex coordination of multiple joints they require. Studies that have measured both fingertip and joint paths suggest the motor systems may seek a compromise between simplicity of extrapersonal spatial representation and computational simplicity of multi-joint execution.

It is argued that current neuroimaging studies can provide useful constraints for the construction of models of cognition, and that these studies should be guided by cognitive models. A numberof challenges for a successful cross-fertilization between “mind mappers” and cognitive modelers are discussed in the light of current research on word recognition.

Rachlin proposes that the mechanism underlying self-control involves the cost incurred in changing one's response pattern, but his account explains neither how the response pattern is originally established nor why a change in response pattern entails a cost. I suggest that response patterns occur because they tend to be effective (thus alternatives are more costly) and are maintained because the decision process itself is costly.

Although Mealey's account provides several interesting hypotheses, her integration across disparate samples renders the value of her explanation for psychopathy ambiguous. Recent evidence on Psychopathy Checklist-identified samples (Hare, 1991) suggests primary emotional and cognitive deficits inconsistent with her model. Whereas high-anxious psychopaths display interpersonal deficits consistent with Mealey's hypotheses, low-anxious psychopaths' deficits appear more sensitive to situational parameters than predicted.

Complex cases of self-control involve processes such as guilt-avoidance, inhibition, self-punishment, conscious thought, free will, and imagination. Such processes, conceived as internal mediating mechanisms, serve the function in psychological theory of avoiding teleological causation. Acceptance of the scientific legitimacy of teleological behaviorism would obviate the need for internal mediation, redefine the above processes in terms of temporally extended patterns of overt behavior, and clarify their relation to selfcontrol.

Endorsing Mealey's analysis, it is pointed out that increasing rates of crime and violence are due to increasing proportions of children being reared in circumstances radically different from the extendedfamily environment to which we are evolntionarily adapted, that is, they are reared without fathers.

Posner & Raichle illustrate how neuroimaging blends profitably with neuropsychology and electrophysiology to advance cognitive theory. Recognizing that there are limitations to each of these techniques, we nonetheless argue that their confluence has fundamentally changed the way cognitive psychologists think about problems of the mind.

The lambda model predicts that the command received by each motor nucleus during locomotion is specific for the joint at which its muscle acts and is independent of external conditions. However, investigation of the commands received by motor nuclei during fictive locomotion and of the sensitivity of these commands to feedback from the limb during locomotion indicates that neither condition is satisfied.