Human beings, like chimpanzees, deliberately kill their own species in order to expand their territory. For a self-aware social animal to attack its own kind, it would need to evolve a mechanism to dehumanize, or dechimpanzee-ize those it attacks. It is suggested that cruelty reflects such an evolved predisposition. The implications for violence prevention are discussed.

We question the ecological plausibility as a general model of cognition of van der Velde's & de Kamps's combinatorial blackboard architecture, where knowledge-binding in space and time relies on the structural rules of language. Evidence against their view of the brain and an ecologically plausible, alternative model of cognition are brought forward.

Blair's assertion that fluid intelligence (gF) is distinct from general intelligence (g) is contradictory to cumulative evidence from intelligence research, including extant and novel evidence about generational IQ gains (Lynn–Flynn effect). Because of the near unity of gF and g, his hypothetical concept of gF' (gF “purged” of g variance) may well be a phlogiston theory.

Bering's target article proposes that the tendency to believe in an afterlife emerged (in evolutionary history) in response to selective pressures unique to human societies. However, the empirical evidence presented fails to account for the broader social context that impinges upon researcher–participant interactions, and so fails to displace the more parsimonious explanation that it is childhood credulity that underlies the acquisition of afterlife beliefs through cultural exposure.

The definition of cruelty used by the author is broad and ambiguous and does not distinguish between acts of sadism, abuse, and neglect that all lead to the suffering of other beings. Some of the research involving animal cruelty is reviewed with the aim of raising questions about the relevance of the painblooddeath (PBD) complex described by Nell.

Although the job security afforded by tenure is one important factor in deciding whether or how to exercise academic freedom, professors must weigh a number of other important career goals that constrain their choices. This multiplicity of goals, combined with concerns about career mobility, may help to explain the differences Ceci et al. observe between professors at different ranks.

Darwinian evolution, defined as evolution arising from selection based directly on the properties of individuals, does not account for cultural constructs providing the organizational basis of human societies. The difficulty with linking Darwinian evolution to structural properties of cultural constructs is exemplified with kinship terminologies, a cultural construct that structures and delineates the domain of kin in human societies.

Selection for or against muscle initiates a cascade of centripetal (outside-in), trophically mediated, neurological events through which the environment programs heritable neuromuscular and neuroneuronal connections in a rapid and specific fashion. The velocity, direction, and efficiency of this process are a consequence of the environment acting directly on muscle, the organ of action, and behavioral interface between organism and environment.

Bering makes a good case for turning attention to an organized system that provides the self with transcendental meaning. In focusing on the evolutionary basis of this system, however, he overlooks the self-organizing properties of cognitive systems themselves. We propose that the illusory system Bering describes can be more generally and parsimoniously viewed as an emergent by-product of self-organization, with no need for specialized “illusion by design.”

Evolutionary developmental biology (“evo-devo”) may provide insights and new methods for studies of cognition and cultural evolution. For example, I propose using cultural selection and individual learning to examine constraints on cultural evolution. Modularity, the idea that traits vary independently, can facilitate evolution (increase “evolvability”), because evolution can act on one trait without disrupting another. I explore links between cognitive modularity, evolutionary modularity, and cultural evolvability.

Blair boldly proposes a model integrating different aspects of intelligence. Its real-life value can be put to the test by using programs designed to develop children's abilities in areas predicted to be crucial for minimizing adverse outcome. Until support from such programs is available, the model is an interesting hypothesis, albeit with remarkable possible repercussions. As such, it seems worthy of further development.

Aggressive-sadistic personality disorder (SPD) involves derivation of pleasure from another's physical or emotional suffering, or from control and domination of others. Findings from a head-injured sample indicate that SPD traits are associated with neuropsychological deficits in executive function and language, suggesting difficulties in frontal-lobe-mediated self-regulation of aggressive and emotional impulses. Implications for rehabilitation of aggressive offenders are discussed.

Tenure debates and disputes are often irresolvable because of the complex and multivariate nature of contractual relationships between faculty and administration, and the nuanced and varying beliefs about tenure held by the professoriate. The Ceci et al. study leads this commentator to suggest a simple solutionallow individual institutions to define the parameters of tenure according to their unique core values.

Analogies between biological and cultural evolution may be illuminating and suggest methods to pursue in the quest for a unified science of cultural evolution. Significant progress, however, is unlikely to be made by trying to fit cultural evolution neatly into a biological evolution schema. A key element defining and differentiating cultural evolution may be the role of conscious human choices.

In the target article, human cruelty is linked to intrinsic reinforcement from engaging in the behavior without any recommendations for a research program to validate or test for such reinforcement and its independence from ultimate adaptive outcomes. Suggestions are offered in this commentary for such a program.

The question of whether fluid intelligence can be differentiated from general intelligence in older adults is addressed. Data indicate that the developmental pattern of performance on fluid tasks differs from the pattern of general intelligence. These results suggest that it is important to identify changes in fluid cognitive functions associated with frontal lobe decline, as they may be early indicators of cognitive decline.

During an out-of-body experience (OBE), one sees the world and one's own body from an extracorporeal visuospatial perspective. OBEs reflect disturbances in brain systems dedicated to multisensory integration and self-processing. However, they have traditionally been interpreted as providing evidence for a soul that can depart the body after death. This mystical view is consistent with Bering's proposal that psychological immortality is the cognitive default.

Tenure should not be judged on its ability to promote whistle-blowing. Because the process of getting tenure may weed out those who might later need it, reform is called for. Reform of tenure must take into account not only the Salieri-effect, but also Thomas Kuhn's popular philosophical attack on independent thought and the tendency towards the use of minimal standards, resulting from the professionalization of research, to block work which is more than minimal. Reform of various institutions to encourage autonomy is needed so that those who receive tenure use it for its intended purpose.

Cognitive function certainly poses the biggest challenge for computational neuroscience. As we argue, past efforts to build neural models of cognition (the target article included) had too narrow a focus on implementing rule-based language processing. The problem with these models is that they sacrifice the advantages of connectionism rather than building on them. Recent and more promising approaches for modeling cognition build on the mathematical properties of distributed neural representations. These approaches truly exploit the key advantages of connectionism, that is, the high representational power of distributed neural codes and similarity-based pattern recognition. The architectures for cognitive computing that emerge from these approaches are neural associative memories endowed with additional mapping operations to handle invariances and to form reduced representations of combinatorial structures.

In our target article, we took the position that tenure conveys many important benefits but that its original justificationfostering academic freedomis not one of them. Here we respond to various criticisms of our study as well as to proposals to remedy the current state of affairs. Undoubtedly, more research is needed to confirm and extend our findings, but the most reasonable conclusion remains the one we offeredthat the original rationale for tenure is poorly served by the current system as practiced at top-ranked colleges and universities.