Although the black and white populations in the United States differ, on average, by about one standard deviation (equivalent to 15 IQ points) on current IQ tests, they differ by various amounts on different tests. The present study examines the nature of the highly variable black–white difference across diverse tests and indicates the major systematic source of this between-population variation, namely, Spearman's g. Charles Spearman originally suggested in 1927 that the varying magnitude of the mean difference between black and white populations on a variety of mental tests is directly related to the size of the test's loading on g, the general factor common to all complex tests of mental ability. Eleven large-scale studies, each comprising anywhere from 6 to 13 diverse tests, show a significant and substantial correlation between tests' g loadings and the mean black–white difference (expressed in standard score units) on the various tests. Hence, in accord with Spearman's hypothesis, the average black–white difference on diverse mental tests may be interpreted as chiefly a difference in g, rather than as a difference in the more specific sources of test score variance associated with any particular informational content, scholastic knowledge, specific acquired skill, or type of test. The results of recent chronometric studies of relatively simple cognitive tasks suggest that the g factor is related, at least in part, to the speed and efficiency of certain basic information-processing capacities. The consistent relationship of these processing variables to g and to Spearman's hypothesis suggests the hypothesis that the differences between black and white populations in the rate of information processing may account for a part of the average black–white difference on standard IQ tests and their educational and occupational correlates.

The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the “New Look” or “interaetionist” view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book.

Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological “readiness potentials” (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about—550 ms. Such RPs were used to indicate the minimum onset times for the cerebral activity that precedes a fully endogenous voluntary act. The time of conscious intention to act was obtained from the subject's recall of the spatial clock position of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of intending or wanting to move (W). W occurred at about—200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.

For spontaneous voluntary acts, RP onset preceded the uncorrected Ws by about 350 ms and the Ws corrected for S by about 400 ms. The direction of this difference was consistent and significant throughout, regardless of which of several measures of RP onset or W were used. It was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously. However, it was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears. Subjects can in fact “veto” motor performance during a 100–200-ms period before a prearranged time to act.

The role of conscious will would be not to initiate a specific voluntary act but rather to select and control volitional outcome. It is proposed that conscious will can function in a permissive fashion, either to permit or to prevent the motor implementation of the intention to act that arises unconsciously. Alternatively, there may be the need for a conscious activation or triggering, without which the final motor output would not follow the unconscious cerebral initiating and preparatory processes.

Converging data from different disciplines indicate that central nervous system processes are capable of influencing immune responses. This paper concentrates on recent studies documenting behaviorally conditioned suppression and enhancement of immunity. Exposing rats or mice to a conditioned stimulus previously paired with an immunomodulating agent results in alterations in humoral and cell-mediated immune responses to antigenic stimuli, and unreinforced reexposures to the conditioned stimuli result in extinction of the conditioned response. Although the magnitude of such conditioning effects has not been large, the phenomenon has been independently verified under a variety of experimental conditions. The biological impact of conditioned alterations in immune function is illustrated by studies in which conditioning operations were applied in the pharmacotherapy of autoimmune disease in New Zealand mice. In conditioned animals, substituting conditioned stimuli for active drugs delays the onset of autoimmune disease relative to nonconditioned animals using a dose of immunosuppressive drug that, by itself, is ineffective in modifying the progression of disease. The hypothesis that such conditioning effects are mediated by elevations in adrenocortical steroid levels receives no support from available data. Despite its capacity for self-regulation, it appears that the immune system is integrated with other psychophysiological processes and subject to modulation by the brain.