Norris, McQueen & Cutler provide two possible explanations for neighborhood effects. The first suggests that nonwords that are more similar to words tend to activate those words more than do less similar nonwords, and the second is based on sequential probabilities between phonemes. Unfortunately, neither explanation is sufficient to explain all reported neighborhood effects.

Culture-led gene-culture coevolution is a framework within which substantive explanations of human evolution must be located. It is not itself an explanation. Explanations depend on such concrete historical evolutionary factors such as the control of fire, collective child-rearing, lethal weapon technology, altruistic cooperation and punishment, and the mastery of complex collaboration protocols leading to an effective division of social labor.

Glenberg tries to explain how and why memories have semantic content. The theory succeeds in specifying the relations between two major classes of memory phenomena – explicit and implicit memory – but it may fail in its assignment of relative importance to these phenomena and in its account of meaning. The theory is syntactic and extensional, instead of semantic and intensional.

Experimental research is reviewed which suggests that rational framing effects influence young children's social activities according to a logic of interdependence. However, young children are unlikely to possess some of the elaborate cognitive skills argued in the Target Article to be prerequisite for rational framing effects. Understanding rational framing effects requires understanding their ontogenetic origins.

Ivancovsky et al.'s Novelty-Seeking Model suggests several mechanisms that might underlie developmental change in creativity and curiosity. We discuss how these implications both do and do not align with extant developmental findings, suggest two further elements that can provide a more complete developmental account, and discuss current methodological barriers to formulating an integrated developmental model of curiosity and creativity.

Selection through iterated learning explains no more than other non-functional accounts, such as Universal Grammar (UG), why language is so well designed for communicative efficiency. It does not predict several distinctive features of language, such as central embedding, large lexicons, or the lack of iconicity, which seem to serve communication purposes at the expense of learnability.

Acceptability judgments are no longer acceptable as the holy grail for testing the nature of linguistic representations. Experimental and quantitative methods should be used to test theoretical claims in psycholinguistics. These methods should include not only behavior, but also the more recent possibilities to probe the neural codes for language-relevant representations.

Can ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles explain the function of dreaming? The analysis of self-experience in dreams suggests that the answer is no: The phenomenal dream self lacks certain dimensions that are crucial for the efficacy of AAOM in wakefulness. However, the comparison between dreams and AAOM may be fruitful by suggesting new perspectives for the study of lucid dreaming as well an altered perspective on the efficacy of AAOM itself.

Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.

Yarkoni's paper makes an important contribution to psychological research by its insightful analysis of generalizability. We suggest, however, that broadening research practices to include field research and the correlated use of both converging and complementary observations gives reason for optimism.

The action-based model of cognitive dissonance proposes an adaptive function for rationalization that differs from the one offered by Cushman. The one proposed by Cushman is concerned more with the cold construction of cognitions, whereas the one proposed by the action-based model is a motivated protection of a strongly held cognition.

notwithstanding the many strengths of the dynamic developmental theory, there remain challenges to be overcome before it can be incorporated into a true causal model of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (adhd). these include the development of reliable measures of reinforcement delay gradients, the validation of shortened reinforcement delay as an endophenotype, and the integration of this pathway with other potential pathways.

This call to revolution in theories of visual search does not go far enough. Treating fixations as uniform is an oversimplification that obscures the critical role of the mind. We remind readers that what happens during a fixation depends on mindset, as shown in studies of search strategy and of humans' ability to rapidly resume search following an interruption.

I make three points. First, the i-frame and s-frame are not helpful frameworks for thinking about behavioral public policy. Second, the authors ignore the role of politics: Policies (and the s-frame) require laws and regulations. Third, the research on retirement savings, which is all about the system, undercuts their claims.

When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. For example, when standardized test scores in education become targets, teachers may start “teaching to the test,” leading to breakdown of the relationship between the measure – test performance – and the underlying goal – quality education. Similar phenomena have been named and described across a broad range of contexts, such as economics, academia, machine learning, and ecology. Yet it remains unclear whether these phenomena bear only superficial similarities, or if they derive from some fundamental unifying mechanism. Here, we propose such a unifying mechanism, which we label proxy failure. We first review illustrative examples and their labels, such as the “cobra effect,” “Goodhart's law,” and “Campbell's law.” Second, we identify central prerequisites and constraints of proxy failure, noting that it is often only a partial failure or divergence. We argue that whenever incentivization or selection is based on an imperfect proxy measure of the underlying goal, a pressure arises that tends to make the proxy a worse approximation of the goal. Third, we develop this perspective for three concrete contexts, namely neuroscience, economics, and ecology, highlighting similarities and differences. Fourth, we outline consequences of proxy failure, suggesting it is key to understanding the structure and evolution of goal-oriented systems. Our account draws on a broad range of disciplines, but we can only scratch the surface within each. We thus hope the present account elicits a collaborative enterprise, entailing both critical discussion as well as extensions in contexts we have missed.