Laland et al. suggest that as a specific evolutionary force niche construction has entailed the encephalization of the brain. While not denying rapid co-evolution of brain traits and abilities with niches and cultures, I argue that encephalization reflects a classical genetic buffer system allowing rapid evolutionary adaptation independent of the nature of the selective pressure.

Niche construction theory inherits flaws from previous gene-culture coevolutionary theories. Units of cultural transmission have not yet been defined. Vertical transmission is not necessarily an overwhelmingly important part of culture. The assumption that human genetic interests and human cultural interests are in synch is a form of naive group selection.

One implication of Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman's niche construction model concerns the significance of the role of behavioural or cultural traits in comparative analysis. In this commentary it is suggested that cladistic methods already recognise this importance, and that behavioural characters may play a key role in hominid speciation and the definition of species.

Niche construction is a potentially important concept for the human behavioural sciences but we question how it differs from models of gene-culture coevolution and whether it can be developed in the detailed ways that will be necessary if it is going to make a significant contribution to the human behavioural sciences.

Laland et al. rightly observe that the pressures affecting the evolution of a trait include the previous effects the trait has had on the environment. Ignoring this would be like ignoring the effect of compound interest: a distortion, not a simplification. However, cultural evolution is not niche construction. In niche construction one mechanism has effects over multiple paths. Cultural evolution involves the effects of several mechanisms.

Cultural evolution may be even more prolific in the generation of new forms than is biological evolution – especially when it takes the form of creative genius. Yet evolutionary theories have tended to overlook the factors that might select for outstanding individual creativity. A recent dual-inheritance theory is outlined and then integrated with the niche-construction theory of Laland et al.

I show that there is a link between the evolution of organisms and the evolution of ideas. In particular, if conformity is selected for, then mechanisms are needed so that “mutations” of ideas can occur. Creativity acts as a counter-force to conventional intelligence, so that ideas can develop that do not just elaborate existing paradigms, but oppose these paradigms. Sometimes oppositional ideas go too far, however, and wisdom acts as a force to bring the old and the new together. The dialectic thus integrates intelligence, creativity, and wisdom, with intelligence serving as thesis, creativity as antithesis, and wisdom as synthesis.

The antipathy toward group selection expressed in the target article is puzzling because Laland et al.'s ideas dovetail neatly with modern group selection theory.

Inclusion of cultural variables in the study of human evolution is essential but introduces problems of vagueness, nonspecificity, and overgeneralization. Recognition of intracultural variation and conflict, and inclusion of ontogenetic processes such as individual learning are antidotal.

Industrial melanism, according to the traditional explanation, amounts to niche construction since it involves changes in predation pressure. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine selection without niche construction. This cannot be what Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman mean. They offer convincing examples, but they should provide a better definition of “niche construction” to indicate how their view supplements traditional evolutionary biology.

Those who emphasize complexity must show how it can be studied productively. Laland et al.'s target article partially succeeds but at times gets lost in a sea of possibilities. I discuss the challenge of understanding complexity, especially with respect to multilevel evolution.

Our response contains a definition of niche construction, illustrations of how it changes the evolutionary process, and clarifications of our conceptual model. We argue that the introduction of niche construction into evolutionary thinking earns its keep; we illustrate this argument in our discussion of rates of genetic and cultural evolution, memes and phenogenotypes, creativity, the EEA (environment of evolutionary adaptedness), and group selection.