There is much to like about how De Neys analyzes and seeks to advance theories about fast and slow thinking. One is the emphasis on that there is no good–bad or rational–irrational analogy that can be made based on the distinction between intuition and deliberation. Another is the promotion of a non-exclusive view of dual-process theory, where intuition and deliberation do not necessarily need to generate unique responses such that one type of response is exclusively tied to deliberation and is assumed to be beyond the reach of the intuitive system. However, we think that it is important to distinguish the dual purpose of dual-process theories for (1) producing testable predictions and (2) functioning as benchmark theories that, no matter their empirical plausibility, can serve as a starting point for more refined research questions and domain-specific models. We argue that the main benefit of dual-process theories lies in the latter of these two. Thus, dual-process theories have much in common with the fictional character Barbapapa, a blob-shaped creature with the notable ability to shapeshift and thereby smoothly overcome any obstacle. Just like Barbapapa, dual-process theory is liked by many and can easily be reshaped to fit in many contexts.
De Neys argues that a core issue of dual-process theory lies in its exclusivity feature, the assumption that intuition and deliberation should result in unique responses such that one type of response is exclusively tied to deliberation and cannot be reached via intuition. We agree that this exclusivity assumption is not supported by the empirical literature; however, viewing the lack of empirical evidence as a weakness of dual-process theory implicitly assumes that the main purpose of dual-process theory is to provide empirically falsifiable predictions of human decision making and to pinpoint the exact mechanisms that explain why certain behaviors come about. Although making predictions and pinpointing mechanisms are an important ambition when developing further model specifications, we would argue that the perhaps most important function of dual-process theory is in its role as a benchmark theory that, no matter the empirical falsifiability, can serve as an all-embracing framework for thinking about how people process information. In this perspective, dual-process theory does quite well. Arguably a key reason for why dual-process theory has become so popular is that it can easily be reshaped and refined to make sense of the cognitive processes underlying human behavior in specific domains. Thus, we think that dual-process theory has become so influential thanks to the fact that it is practically impossible to falsify, not despite it.
In some sense, dual-process theory can be seen as psychological science's equivalent of expected utility theory in economics. Expected utility theory is an all-embracing theory for assessing decision outcomes and can be applied to all contexts and decisions. It is difficult to falsify the claim that a certain chosen behavior maximizes that person's utility, because we typically behave in a way that leads to what we expect to be the most preferred outcome. The key for any model specification is how to define and measure utility. Expected utility theory serves as an intuitive way to organize and make sense of the costs and benefits that people assign to outcomes. However, although expected utility theory focuses on the outcomes of decision making, dual-process theory provides a framework for thinking about the process of decision making. Dual-process theory thus adds a missing perspective to the outcome-focused framework that economists traditionally work within.
The evolution of dual-process theory has brought economists and psychologists closer together in the quest to improve understanding of human behavior. Still, attempts to merge dual-process theory with utility maximization and general economic models are few. For future developments of dual-process theory it could be worthwhile to start thinking about how the growing literature on belief-based utility (Golman, Loewenstein, Moene, & Zarri, Reference Golman, Loewenstein, Moene and Zarri2016; Grant, Kajii, & Polak, Reference Grant, Kajii and Polak1998; Loewenstein & Molnar, Reference Loewenstein and Molnar2018) relates to and can be incorporated into dual-process theory. These models emphasize that beliefs often fulfill important psychological needs that can influence how people assess information. People hold certain beliefs partly because it makes them feel good, not because they are necessarily correct (Sharot & Sunstein, Reference Sharot and Sunstein2020; Tinghög, Barrafrem, & Västfjäll, Reference Tinghög, Barrafrem and Västfjäll2022). We see the feedback loop presented in De Neys's model as a potential starting point for theoretical work in this direction. In addition, the future research agenda for dual-process theory could benefit from being more inclusive and less narrow-minded in regard to qualitative methods. The workhorse methodological vehicle in the dual-process literature has been behavioral experiments testing hypotheses about the general effect of invoking more intuitive or analytical processing. However, as pointed out by De Neys, dual-process theory runs into problems when it is used as a framework to make predictions about aggregate behavior. To understand individual differences and make sense of contradicting patterns of results, qualitative approaches may be needed to provide deeper insights that cannot be achieved through experiments.
Back to Barbapapa. Who is Barbapapa? He is a blob-shaped creature from a well-known cartoon who tries to fit into the human world. His most notable ability is to shapeshift at will and thereby smoothly overcome any obstacle. After various adventures Barbapapa finally meets Barbamama who has the same notable ability to shapeshift. Together, Barbapapa and Barbamama are able to merge in order to resolve even bigger obstacles. They have seven barbababies who too can shapeshift at will but who have more distinctive individual strengths that can be used to overcome particular obstacles. Barbapapa, Barbamama, and their barbababies are always ready to help and do not fear action. Dual-process theory is the theoretical equivalent of Barbapapa, because it can easily be reshaped to fit the understanding of any human behavior. In the same analogy, expected utility theory is Barbamama, and the barbababies are the more domain-specific dual-process models. Describing dual-process theory in this way highlights its role as a benchmark theory to develop better and more specific models. To conclude, dual-process theory is Barbapapa. The world needs Barbapapa and social science needs dual-process theory.
There is much to like about how De Neys analyzes and seeks to advance theories about fast and slow thinking. One is the emphasis on that there is no good–bad or rational–irrational analogy that can be made based on the distinction between intuition and deliberation. Another is the promotion of a non-exclusive view of dual-process theory, where intuition and deliberation do not necessarily need to generate unique responses such that one type of response is exclusively tied to deliberation and is assumed to be beyond the reach of the intuitive system. However, we think that it is important to distinguish the dual purpose of dual-process theories for (1) producing testable predictions and (2) functioning as benchmark theories that, no matter their empirical plausibility, can serve as a starting point for more refined research questions and domain-specific models. We argue that the main benefit of dual-process theories lies in the latter of these two. Thus, dual-process theories have much in common with the fictional character Barbapapa, a blob-shaped creature with the notable ability to shapeshift and thereby smoothly overcome any obstacle. Just like Barbapapa, dual-process theory is liked by many and can easily be reshaped to fit in many contexts.
De Neys argues that a core issue of dual-process theory lies in its exclusivity feature, the assumption that intuition and deliberation should result in unique responses such that one type of response is exclusively tied to deliberation and cannot be reached via intuition. We agree that this exclusivity assumption is not supported by the empirical literature; however, viewing the lack of empirical evidence as a weakness of dual-process theory implicitly assumes that the main purpose of dual-process theory is to provide empirically falsifiable predictions of human decision making and to pinpoint the exact mechanisms that explain why certain behaviors come about. Although making predictions and pinpointing mechanisms are an important ambition when developing further model specifications, we would argue that the perhaps most important function of dual-process theory is in its role as a benchmark theory that, no matter the empirical falsifiability, can serve as an all-embracing framework for thinking about how people process information. In this perspective, dual-process theory does quite well. Arguably a key reason for why dual-process theory has become so popular is that it can easily be reshaped and refined to make sense of the cognitive processes underlying human behavior in specific domains. Thus, we think that dual-process theory has become so influential thanks to the fact that it is practically impossible to falsify, not despite it.
In some sense, dual-process theory can be seen as psychological science's equivalent of expected utility theory in economics. Expected utility theory is an all-embracing theory for assessing decision outcomes and can be applied to all contexts and decisions. It is difficult to falsify the claim that a certain chosen behavior maximizes that person's utility, because we typically behave in a way that leads to what we expect to be the most preferred outcome. The key for any model specification is how to define and measure utility. Expected utility theory serves as an intuitive way to organize and make sense of the costs and benefits that people assign to outcomes. However, although expected utility theory focuses on the outcomes of decision making, dual-process theory provides a framework for thinking about the process of decision making. Dual-process theory thus adds a missing perspective to the outcome-focused framework that economists traditionally work within.
The evolution of dual-process theory has brought economists and psychologists closer together in the quest to improve understanding of human behavior. Still, attempts to merge dual-process theory with utility maximization and general economic models are few. For future developments of dual-process theory it could be worthwhile to start thinking about how the growing literature on belief-based utility (Golman, Loewenstein, Moene, & Zarri, Reference Golman, Loewenstein, Moene and Zarri2016; Grant, Kajii, & Polak, Reference Grant, Kajii and Polak1998; Loewenstein & Molnar, Reference Loewenstein and Molnar2018) relates to and can be incorporated into dual-process theory. These models emphasize that beliefs often fulfill important psychological needs that can influence how people assess information. People hold certain beliefs partly because it makes them feel good, not because they are necessarily correct (Sharot & Sunstein, Reference Sharot and Sunstein2020; Tinghög, Barrafrem, & Västfjäll, Reference Tinghög, Barrafrem and Västfjäll2022). We see the feedback loop presented in De Neys's model as a potential starting point for theoretical work in this direction. In addition, the future research agenda for dual-process theory could benefit from being more inclusive and less narrow-minded in regard to qualitative methods. The workhorse methodological vehicle in the dual-process literature has been behavioral experiments testing hypotheses about the general effect of invoking more intuitive or analytical processing. However, as pointed out by De Neys, dual-process theory runs into problems when it is used as a framework to make predictions about aggregate behavior. To understand individual differences and make sense of contradicting patterns of results, qualitative approaches may be needed to provide deeper insights that cannot be achieved through experiments.
Back to Barbapapa. Who is Barbapapa? He is a blob-shaped creature from a well-known cartoon who tries to fit into the human world. His most notable ability is to shapeshift at will and thereby smoothly overcome any obstacle. After various adventures Barbapapa finally meets Barbamama who has the same notable ability to shapeshift. Together, Barbapapa and Barbamama are able to merge in order to resolve even bigger obstacles. They have seven barbababies who too can shapeshift at will but who have more distinctive individual strengths that can be used to overcome particular obstacles. Barbapapa, Barbamama, and their barbababies are always ready to help and do not fear action. Dual-process theory is the theoretical equivalent of Barbapapa, because it can easily be reshaped to fit the understanding of any human behavior. In the same analogy, expected utility theory is Barbamama, and the barbababies are the more domain-specific dual-process models. Describing dual-process theory in this way highlights its role as a benchmark theory to develop better and more specific models. To conclude, dual-process theory is Barbapapa. The world needs Barbapapa and social science needs dual-process theory.
Competing interest
None.