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Physics envy: Trying to fit a square peg into a round hole

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

James Shanteau  and
David J. Weiss
James Shanteau
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Bluemont Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS [email protected]/psych/cws
David J. Weiss
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, California State University, Los Angeles, CA 90032. [email protected]
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Abstract

Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) argue that classical probability (CP) fails to describe human decision processes accurately and should be supplanted by quantum probability. We accept the premise, but reject P&B's conclusion. CP is a prescriptive framework that has inspired a great deal of valuable research. Also, because CP is used across the sciences, it is a cornerstone of interdisciplinary collaboration.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 306 - 307
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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