This article reframes understandings of pluralism in democratic theory by showing that the management of late and post-colonial identitarian conflict was integral to its incorporation into twentieth-century political science. It does so by reconstructing the central but underexamined place of theories of consociational democracy in efforts to reform South Africa’s apartheid constitution in the 1970s and 80s. Consociational democratic theory offered such promising resources for apartheid reform, it contends, because it entwined (a) a conception of social pluralism that redescribed apartheid’s racial hierarchy as identitarian difference with (b) a conception of institutional pluralism that curtailed the most transformative possibilities of decolonization through universal suffrage. Recovering pluralism’s colonial genealogies clarifies the conditions under which the recognition of identitarian diversity can function as a disavowal of racial domination, positioning democratic theory as an adjunct to projects of neo-colonial order.

Unequal patterns of cultural exchange between the Global South and Global North are sometimes labeled “neo-colonial.” What, if anything, is wrong with these patterns? Debates surrounding cultural globalization have traditionally divided proponents of free trade and cultural preservation. The article develops an alternative account grounded in a global application of the ideal of social equality. Citizens of privileged societies ought to regard and relate to citizens of disadvantaged societies as social equals. Patterns of cultural exchange play an important role in promoting these relationships. Historically, colonized peoples were often regarded as inferior based on perceived failures to produce cultural achievements. To the extent that unequal global cultural production and exchange persist, the colonial pattern remains. The duty to relate to foreigners as equals implies that Global North countries should stop pressing for cultural trade concessions and instead favor the import of cultural goods from the Global South.

Nominally, the English became a nation in the eighth century but did not achieve political integration until the seventeenth century, a thousand years later. During the millennium, the English “nation” was the scene of recurring internal wars, the last ending with the acceptance of the Bill of Rights by William III and Mary in 1688. What was the process leading to cessation in the use of armed conflict as a technique of domestic politics in England?

Nominally, Mexico was an independent nation in 1821 but did not see the end of its internal wars until the 1940's. What political process led to domestic “arms control” in Mexico?

Although taking place in different centuries and in nations with distinct political cultures, were there common elements in the two transitions to internal arms control? What were critical factors in the integrative process? May the same factors, or analogous ones, be identified and controlled in contemporary efforts related to regional and international arms control? What may be learned from the English, the Mexican, and other national cases that is generalizable to the problem of international political integration and arms control?

The present theory sketch views arms control as an aspect of the integration of political organizations. Political integration, in turn, is the consequence of a process of political transactions among principal political actors over time.

The American people, especially in the eastern portion of the United States, are averse to political and social change particularly in institutions that have existed for a long period of time. A recent critic of American life has the following to say as a reason for this attitude of the American people:

“Among the many characteristics which foreign observers have ascribed to Americans are two about which there has been little difference of opinion. We are good-natured and we are individualists. Sermons have been preached against our good nature, so we need not dwell upon it. Much more important is our individualism—our absorption in individual interests and our reluctance to undertake things in combination with our neighbors or through the government. That individualism is an American characteristic is proved by a number of familiar facts. Thus the phrase ‘social reform,’ which in other countries suggests comprehensive plans of state action, is still usually associated in the United States with the welfare work of private corporations, private endowed schools of philanthropy…. Again, the coöperative movement which has made such signal progress in Europe, is in its infancy here.

The Constitutional Atmosphere. In examining the effect of the present war on the English constitution, we are obliged to consider that constitution in its own context. Whether for good or ill, there is no international standard of practice, nor any universally accepted philosophical dogma, by which one may estimate its qualities. One cannot usefully apply to the English constitution the test of conformance to the ideals of Plato or Aristotle (or even of Thrasymachus the Sophist), or of Marx or Pareto, or even of Hamilton or Jefferson. It is profitless to wonder how well the English institutions of today might suit contemporary France, let us say, or contemporary America; nor is it relevant for either me or you to say “I like” or “I don't like.” The historical context of the English constitution is Locke and 1688, Disraeli and Gladstone, Asquith and 1911, Baldwin and 1926.

In previous issues of this Review Professor Wambaugh and the late Judge McClain have summarized the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions from 1909 to 1914. It is the purpose of this and a succeeding paper to deal in like manner with the decisions of the last three years. Owing to the number of cases decided during the triennium, the writer must content himself with the rôle of annalist and refrain from assuming that of analyst. For the benefit of those who desire fuller comment or criticism, references are given to articles and notes in various legal periodicals discussing the more important cases.

Since the expiration of the October term of 1913, three changes have occurred in the personnel of the bench. Mr. Justice Lurton died July 12, 1914, and his successor, Mr. Justice McReynolds, took his seat October 12, 1914. Illness prevented Mr. Justice Lamar from participating in any of the decisions of the October term of 1915. He died on January 2, 1916. The commission of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who succeeded him, was not recorded until June 5, 1916, so that during the 1915 term only eight justices participated in the work of the court. Mr. Justice Hughes resigned June 10, 1916, to accept the Republican nomination for the presidency, and his successor, Mr. Justice Clarke, took his seat on October 9, 1916. The bench as at present constituted consists of Chief Justice White, appointed associate justice by President Cleveland and chief justice by President Taft; Mr. Justice McKenna, appointed by President McKinley; Justices Holmes and Day, appointed by President Roosevelt; Justices Van Devanter and Pitney, appointed by President Taft; and the three new justices appointed by President Wilson.

Alfarabi treats the question of global governance more thoroughly than any of his Greek predecessors. The key to understanding his view of the matter lies with his highly selective use of the term “inhabited world” across several works. Citing the inhabited world's enormous size, immeasurable diversity, and frequently inhospitable terrain, Alfarabi rejects the possibility that its entirety will ever be governed politically. Furthermore, Alfarabi omits the term “inhabited world” from his most important accounts of deliberation and legislation. The implication is that in Alfarabi's view no statesman or prophet can ever deliberate about, or legislate for, the whole of the inhabited world. The scope and multiplicity of the political accidents occurring within this vast domain are too great for any deliberator or group of deliberators to adequately grasp. The consequence is that any given political action or piece of legislation concerns at most several nations. Alfarabi's discussion helps to reveal the limited scope of most political decisions today, which often appear to be global but in fact do not involve more than several nations.