The American people, especially in the eastern portion of the United States, are averse to political and social change particularly in institutions that have existed for a long period of time. A recent critic of American life has the following to say as a reason for this attitude of the American people:

“Among the many characteristics which foreign observers have ascribed to Americans are two about which there has been little difference of opinion. We are good-natured and we are individualists. Sermons have been preached against our good nature, so we need not dwell upon it. Much more important is our individualism—our absorption in individual interests and our reluctance to undertake things in combination with our neighbors or through the government. That individualism is an American characteristic is proved by a number of familiar facts. Thus the phrase ‘social reform,’ which in other countries suggests comprehensive plans of state action, is still usually associated in the United States with the welfare work of private corporations, private endowed schools of philanthropy…. Again, the coöperative movement which has made such signal progress in Europe, is in its infancy here.

“Industrial management” and “efficiency engineering” have become by-words in private business; in the field of public administration, we hear of “control.” The second World War has given great impetus to the development of effective practices in “management” or “control” in government departments.

As soon as the news of Pearl Harbor electrified the United States, armament production was expanded overnight to the limit of the country's resources. Pursuant to the defense program, the Department of War constructed not only many munitions plants, the great majority of them operated by private concerns under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, but also numerous storage depots and other installations owned by the Department of War and operated for the most part by its Ordnance Department, a division of the Army Service Forces.

During the initial months of the war, the problem uppermost in the minds of those who were directing the nation's defense program was how to achieve mass production of arms—a goal doubly difficult to reach because of the need of using entirely new techniques of manufacture. Not until the problem of quantity production was solved could attention be concentrated on obtaining maximum efficiency in operations. Swift expansion in any productive activity will by its very nature arrive at that point of unwieldiness where streamlining becomes imperative. Furthermore, because of the labor shortage, which grew more acute with the induction of increasing numbers of young men into the fighting forces, consideration of the efficiency of war plants early became mandatory.

The institution which is today termed the president's cabinet was, in its origin, a creation of George Washington. It grew out of the need of a vigorous, well organized and well directed central administration which should somehow be closely associated and unified under an executive chief magistrate.

Even before the close of the Revolutionary War there were signs that men desired to see the continental government in the guidance of a capable and trusted chief. There were occasional suggestions, too,—among which Pelatiah Webster's is quite the best known—that a committee or board of administrative officials not too strictly hampered by congress, might aid the chief executive as counsellors. Though ready after a brief discussion to establish a single executive magistrate at the head of the projected government, the convention of 1787 seems to have balked at Gouverneur Morris's crude plan for a president's council. The convention yielded, however, to the president the right to require from the principal officers their opinions in writing, and thus unconsciously helped to predetermine a privy council. In the early autumn of 1787 George Mason of Virginia expressed his fear lest there should “grow out of the principal officers of the great departments” what he termed a Council of State. The phrase was quickly reiterated by George Clinton of New York. James Iredell in answer to Mason, perceiving and writing of the analogy between some such body and the English cabinet committee, viewed the possibility of its existence in the new American government as in no wise dangerous.

Are there appropriate limits to the application of rational choice in political decision making? Does rationalism in politics lead to absolutism? Is there a “pressing threat” to liberal democracy “posed by the irreverent conviction of the hegemony of reason”? In the June 1987 issue of this Review, Darrell Dobbs drew lesson from Homer's epic poem, the Odyssey, to argue the limits of rationalism in politics. In this Controversy, Robert Crafstein argues that Dobbs's case against rationalism is not proved. In turn, Dobbs holds to his construction of the relevance of Odysseus' nod to sacred values.

As shown in the struggle recently ended, modern war means “a nation in arms.” The old-time distinction between fighters and workers was almost obliterated, and there was an industrial army as well as an army in the field. The labors of the men and women behind the lines were essential to the effective operations of the men in arms. That this condition was recognized by the governments themselves is shown by the classifications of workers, according to which those whose special skill or ability was essential to the conduct of war industries were taken out or kept out of the army and retained in the factories, mines, workshops, and fields. In various ways the old lines between soldier and civilian, between war operations and the work of production, were broken down. The Germans made no distinction between war vessels and merchantmen. They deliberately destroyed coal mines and factories, growing crops and cattle; this was done with a military purpose, for the sake of lessening the military strength of the enemy. So, too, the former distinction between contraband and free goods was obliterated. Whole nations were in arms, and all their resources were mobilized to carry on the titanic struggle.

This world conflict has taught us that war is not waged altogether by armies in the field. It is a contest between the industrial organization and technique of the opposing nations. It is not carried on by money alone, but by the total resources, material and human, that can be concentrated in a combined, productive effort. The World War gave the first opportunity for a complete application of the modern factory system of production in warfare.

Background of Conference Action. Forty-one countries were represented at the twenty-sixth session of the International Labor Conference, held in Philadelphia April 20–May 12, to consider the future rôle of the International Labor Organization and the economic and social policies to be recommended to the governments of member states. This was the first regular session of the Conference to be held since 1938, the New York-Washington session in 1941 having been a special one. As in 1941, there were no delegations from Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Spain, and the U.S.S.R. Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Switzerland, and Turkey, which were not represented at the 1941 sesseion, were represented by government delegates and advisers, as well as Sweden, which sent a full delegation. The occupied countries of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia were represented by complete delegations; also Luxemburg by two government delegates and an adviser.

As compared with the 1941 sesssion, the twenty-sixth was held at a time more propitious to the cause of the United Nations, was better attended both as to countries represented and the number of delegates and advisers present, and was more deeply occupied with specific proposals concerning the future status of the I.L.O. and post-war economic and social problems. The reasons for this were to be found in the events of the two and a half years separating the two sessions.