To appreciate the political theories and institutions of Asia in the proper historical perspective, it is necessary to remember that, in spite of Switzerland, universal suffrage and the initiative and referendum are essentially young phenomena in Eur-America; and that republicanism cannot be pronounced to be a historic trait of the occidental mind.

On the other hand, it is apparent that the liberal political movements in Young Asia have, if at all, only very remote blood-relationship with the theories and institutions developed in its past history. The Japanese constitutional monarchy, the ideals of the Young Turk, the Chinese republic, as well as the nationalist activities in Egypt, Persia and India, are chiefly based on the modern Eur-American achievements. These sources can be briefly mentioned as: (1) the English parliament, (2) the American federation, (3) the “ideas of 1789,” (4) the idealism of Fichte and Schiller, (5) the socialism of Karl Marx and Louis Blanc, (6) the political mysticism of Joseph Mazzini, and, last but not least, (7) the philosophy and methodology of John Stuart Mill.

Within these limitations it should be possible to define the rightful place of the Asians in a scientific study of comparative politics.

Every state legislature in the United States is divided into a considerable number of standing committees. In spite of obvious advantages which seem to render it indispensable, the development of the committee system has been attended by great evils. Indeed, it is perhaps not too much to say that with the committee system the worst evils connected with legislative organization and procedure are intimately associated.

It is the chief purpose of this paper to point out the principal weaknesses or defects of the committee system in connection with state legislatures generally, and particularly the defects which have appeared in the practical operation of the system in the Illinois legislature; and at the same time to discuss certain proposals designed to remedy these defects.

These weaknesses and proposed remedies will be taken up in the following order:
I. Defects in the methods of making committee assignments.
II. Defects due to the number of standing committees.
III. Defects due to the size of committees.
IV. Defects due to the lack of a definite and fixed schedule of committee meetings.
V. Defects due to the lack of publicity and to the irresponsibility surrounding committee proceedings.
VI. Defects due to the insufficient control of each house over its committees.
VII. Defects peculiar to the committee on rules and the conference committee.

Two instances of race discrimination which came before the court were aimed against aliens. Truax v. Raich annulled an Arizona statute which required every employer of not more than five workers to employ not less than 80 per cent qualified electors or native born citizens of the United States. The decision was based, not only on the equal protection clause, but also on the principle that the states must not interfere with the acknowledged powers of the nation. The power to admit aliens which Congress possesses and has exercised would be nugatory if the states after their admission could deny them the opportunity of a livelihood.

But neither of these principles was held applicable to the exclusion of aliens from employment on public works. The opinions in Heim v. McCall and Crane v. New York went so far as to declare that a state must be as free as an individual to decide for itself what persons shall be employed on work done for it. Yet it must be seriously doubted whether the court by actual decision would go so far as to sanction discriminations against Quakers or Methodists or Republicans or Democrats. The exclusion of aliens may be justified on grounds which would not apply to other whimsicalities.